International Cooperation

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Information related to international cooperation in the Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law(MPEPIL), Germany, United Kingdom
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Kinne, B. J. (2013). Network dynamics and the evolution of international cooperation. American Political Science Review, 107(04), 766–785.
Koremenos, B. (2001). Loosening the ties that bind: A learning model of agreement flexibility. International Organization, 55(2), 289–325.
Krasner, S. D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. International Organization, 36(2), 185–205.
Kreps, D. (1990). Corporate culture and economic theory. In J. Alt & K. Shepsle (Eds.), Perspectives on positive political economy (pp. 90–143). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kuo, R., Johnson D. D. P., & Toft, M. D. (2015). Correspondence: Evolution and territorial conflict. International Security, 39(3), 190–201.
Lake, D. A. (1993). Leadership, hegemony, and the international economy: Naked emperor or tattered monarch with potential? International Studies Quarterly, 37(4), 459–489.
Leeds, B. A. (1999). Domestic political institutions, credible commitments, and international cooperation. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 979–1002.
Leeds, B. A., & Savun, B. (2007). Terminating alliances: Why do states abrogate agreements? Journal of Politics, 69(4), 1118–1132.
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Mattes, M., & Rodríguez, M. (2014). Autocracies and international cooperation. International Studies Quarterly, 58(3), 527–538.
Mayer, F. W. (1992). Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: The strategic use of internal side-payments. International Organization, 46(4), 793–818.
McGillivray, F., & Smith, A. (2000). Trust and cooperation through agent specific punishments. International Organization, 54(4), 809–824.
Mearsheimer, J. (1995). The false promise of international institutions. International Security, 19(3), 5–49.
Mercer, J. (1996). Reputation and international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mercer, J. (2010). Emotional beliefs. International Organization, 64(1), 1–31.
Milgrom, P., North, D., & Weingast, B. (1990). The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The medieval law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs. Economics and Politics, 2(1), 1–23.
Milner, H.V. (1997). Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mitchell, R. B. (1994a). Intentional oil pollution at sea: Environmental policy and treaty compliance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Mo, J. (1994). The logic of two-level games with endogenous domestic coalitions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(3), 402–422.
Moravcsik, A. (2000). The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe. International Organization, 54(2), 217–252.
Morrow, J. D. (2002). The laws of war, common conjectures, and legal systems in international politics. Journal of Legal Studies, 31(1), S41–S60.
Morse, J. C., & Keohane, R. O. (2014). Contested multilateralism. Review of International Organizations, 9(4), 385–412.
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Ostrom, E., & Keohane, R. O. (1995). Local commons and global interdependence: Heterogeneity and cooperation in two domains. London: SAGE.
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Powell, R. (1994). Anarchy in international relations theory. International Organization, 48(2), 313–344.
Rathbun, B. C. (2011). Trust in international cooperation: International security institutions, domestic politics and American multilateralism (Vol. 121). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Sampson, M. (2016). The strategic logic of international agreement design (Doctoral dissertation). University of Oxford.
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Stone, R. W., Slantchev, B. L., & London, T. R. (2008). Choosing how to cooperate: A repeated public-goods model of international relations. International Studies Quarterly, 52(2), 335–362.
Tallberg, J. (2002). Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union. International Organization, 56(3), 609–643.
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Thompson, A. (2010). Rational design in motion: Uncertainty and flexibility in the global climate regime. European Journal of International Relations, 16(2), 269–296.
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Hierarchical Display of International cooperation

International cooperation

Concept of International cooperation

See the dictionary definition of International cooperation.

Characteristics of International cooperation

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Resources

Translation of International cooperation

Spanish: Cooperación internacional
French: Coopération internationale
German: Internationale Zusammenarbeit
Italian: Cooperazione internazionale
Portuguese: Cooperação internacional
Polish: Wspó&lstrok;praca mi&eogon;dzynarodowa

Thesaurus of International cooperation

International Cooperation

International Cooperation

International Cooperation

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See Also

Further Reading

Hierarchical Display of International cooperation

International cooperation

Concept of International cooperation

Characteristics of International cooperation

Resources

Translation of International cooperation

Thesaurus of International cooperation

See also

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