Libya

Countries or entities currently subject to sanctions by the United States: Libya

Libya in 2011

United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): On March 26, 2011, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh delivered a speech regarding the use of force in Libya at the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in Washington, D.C. Excerpts from Mr. Koh’s speech below include his discussion of the justification for the use of force in Libya based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011). U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973. The full text of Mr. Koh’s speech is available at (internet link) state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/159201.htm. information on International Criminal Law in this legal Encyclopedia discusses the United Nations Security Council’s referral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court. information on International Human Rights in this legal Encyclopedia discusses Libya’s suspension from the Human Rights Council. information on Diplomatic Relations, Succession, Continuity of States and Statehood Issues in this legal Encyclopedia discusses recognition and succession of the new regime in Libya. And information on Nationality, Citizenship and Immigration in this legal Encyclopedia6 discusses the use of sanctions, including by the United Nations Security Council, in an effort to halt the violence against civilians by the Qadhafi regime in Libya.

On March 19, 2011, at President Obama’s direction, U.S. military forces began a series of strikes in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. These strikes will be limited in their nature, duration, and scope.

Their explicit purpose is to support an international coalition as it takes all necessary measures to enforce the terms of Resolution 1973 (adopted on March 17, 2011), as part of an international effort authorized by the United Nations Security Council and undertaken with the support of European allies and Arab partners, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat posed to international peace and security by the crisis in Libya.

U.S. forces are conducting a limited and well-defined mission in support of international efforts to protect civilians, to prevent a humanitarian disaster, and to set the stage for further action by other coalition partners. U.S. military efforts are discrete and focused on employing unique U.S. military capabilities to set the conditions for the U.S. European Allies and Arab partners to continue to carry out the measures authorized by Resolution 1973. The United States has not deployed ground forces into Libya and will not do so. U.S. forces have targeted the Qaddafi regime’s air defense systems, command and control structures, and other capabilities of Qaddafi’s armed forces used to attack civilians and civilian populated areas. We are working with the U.S. allies to transition to NATO and other partners the principal command and control of this effort and to ensure the continuation of activities necessary to realize the objectives of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 (adopted on February 26, 2011) and 1973.

Developments

These United States military actions rest on ample international legal authority. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter grants authority to the Security Council to decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security where it determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression (Article 39). Articles 41 and 42 further specify that the Security Council may take such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Acting under Chapter VII, in Resolution 1973, the Security Council determined that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes a threat to international peace and security (PP21), and: (1) in operative paragraphs 6 to 8 of the resolution imposed a No-Fly Zone in the air space of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians, and authorized states to take “all necessary measures” to enforce that No-Fly Zone in accordance with the Resolution, (2) in operative paragraph 4 authorized Member States to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory; and (3) in operative paragraph 13 authorized Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out inspections aimed at the enforcement of the arms embargo. Under the Security Council authorizations, Member States may also work through regional organizations or arrangements and with local partners who share the goal of preventing attacks on civilians or civilian populated areas.

Resolution 1973 sent Qaddafi a very clear message that a ceasefire must be implemented immediately. In addition, President Obama made clear that Qaddafi was to stop his forces from advancing on Benghazi, to pull them back from Ajdabiya, Misrata, and Zawiyah, and to establish water, electricity, and gas supplies to all areas. The Resolutions also made clear that humanitarian assistance had to be allowed to reach the people of Libya. Although Qaddafi’s Foreign Minister announced a ceasefire, Qaddafi and his forces instead continued attacks on Misrata, and advanced on Benghazi.

Qaddafi also threatened civilians living in areas that refused to acquiesce to his threats, declaring, “We will come house by house, room by room. . . . We will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity.” As President Obama said in his weekly address “I firmly believe that when innocent people are being brutalized; when someone like Qaddafi threatens a bloodbath that could destabilize an entire region; and when the international community is prepared to come together to save thousands of lives—then it’s in the U.S. national interest to act. And, it’s the U.S. responsibility. This is one of those times.”

Qaddafi’s defiance of the Arab League as well as the broader international community represents a lawless challenge to the authority of the Security Council and its efforts to preserve stability in the region. The United States supports the Security Council’s conclusion that Qaddafi’s continued attacks and threats against civilians and civilian populated areas are of grave concern to neighboring Arab nations and constitute a threat to the region and to international peace and security. His illegitimate use of force not only is causing the deaths of substantial numbers of civilians among his own people, but also is forcing many others to flee to neighboring countries, thereby destabilizing the peace and security of the region. Qaddafi has forfeited his responsibility to protect his own citizens and created a serious need for immediate humanitarian assistance and protection, with any further delay only putting more civilians at risk. Left unaddressed, the growing instability in Libya could ignite wider instability in the Middle East with dangerous consequences to the national security interests of the United States, which made these actions necessary.

The President directed these actions, which are in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, pursuant to his constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. The President has well-recognized authority to authorize a mission of this kind, which as he explained, will be time-limited, well-defined, discrete, and aimed at preventing an imminent humanitarian catastrophe that directly implicates the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The Administration has been closely consulting Congr
ess regarding the situation in Libya, including in a session with the bipartisan leadership that the President conducted before his announcement. Before Resolution 1973 was adopted, on March 1, 2011 the Senate adopted its own resolution by unanimous consent (S. Res. 85) calling for a No-Fly zone. The President has acted consistently with the reporting requirements in the War Powers Resolution, and has furthermore indicated that he is committed to ongoing, close consultations with Congress as the situation develops.

In sum, the United States’ military actions in Libya are lawful.

On March 28, 2011, President Obama summarized U.S. actions with respect to Libya in an “Address to the Nation,” at the National Defense University. Daily Comp. Pres. Docs., 2011 DCPD No. 00206. President Obama’s speech is excerpted below.

Details

For generations, the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor of global security and as an advocate for human freedom. Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world’s many challenges. But when the U.S. interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act. That’s what happened in Libya over the course of these last 6 weeks.

Libya sits directly between Tunisia and Egypt, two nations that inspired the world when their people rose up to take control of their own destiny. For more than four decades, the Libyan people have been ruled by a tyrant, Muammar Qadhafi. He has denied his people freedom, exploited their wealth, murdered opponents at home and abroad, and terrorized innocent people around the world, including Americans who were killed by Libyan agents.

Last month, Qadhafi’s grip of fear appeared to give way to the promise of freedom. In cities and towns across the country, Libyans took to the streets to claim their basic human rights. As one Libyan said, “For the first time we finally have hope that the U.S. nightmare of 40 years will soon be over.”

Faced with this opposition, Qadhafi began attacking his people. As President, my immediate concern was the safety of the U.S. citizens, so we evacuated the U.S. Embassy and all Americans who sought the U.S. assistance. Then we took a series of swift steps in a matter of days to answer Qadhafi’s aggression. We froze more than $33 billion of Qadhafi’s regime’s assets. Joining with other nations at the United Nations Security Council, we broadened the U.S. sanctions, imposed an arms embargo, and enabled Qadhafi and those around him to be held accountable for their crimes. I made it clear that Qadhafi had lost the confidence of his people and the legitimacy to lead, and I said that he needed to step down from power.

In the face of the world’s condemnation, Qadhafi chose to escalate his attacks, launching a military campaign against the Libyan people. Innocent people were targeted for killing. Hospitals and ambulances were attacked. Journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and killed. Supplies of food and fuel were choked off. Water for hundreds of thousands of people in Misurata was shut off. Cities and towns were shelled, mosques were destroyed, and apartment buildings reduced to rubble. Military jets and helicopter gunships were unleashed upon people who had no means to defend themselves against assaults from the air.

Confronted by this brutal repression and a looming humanitarian crisis, I ordered warships into the Mediterranean. European allies declared their willingness to commit resources to stop the killing. The Libyan opposition and the Arab League appealed to the world to save lives in Libya. And so at my direction, America led an effort with the U.S. allies at the United Nations Security Council to pass a historic resolution that authorized a no-fly zone to stop the regime’s attacks from the air and further authorized all necessary measures to protect the Libyan people.

Ten days ago, having tried to end the violence without using force, the international community offered Qadhafi a final chance to stop his campaign of killing or face the consequences. Rather than stand down, his forces continued their advance, bearing down on the city of Benghazi, home to nearly 700,000 men, women, and children who sought their freedom from fear.

At this point, the United States and the world faced a choice. Qadhafi declared he would show no mercy to his own people. He compared them to rats and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we have seen him hang civilians in the streets and kill over a thousand people in a single day. Now we saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city. We knew that Éif we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.

It was not in the U.S. national interest to let that happen. I refused to let that happen. And so 9 days ago, after consulting the bipartisan leadership of Congress, I authorized military action to stop the killing and enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973.

More about the Issue

In this effort, the United States has not acted alone. Instead, we have been joined by a strong and growing coalition. This includes the U.S. closest allies—nations like the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey—all of whom have fought by the U.S. sides for decades. And it includes Arab partners like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, who have chosen to meet their responsibilities to defend the Libyan people.

To summarize then, in just 1 month, the United States has worked with the U.S. international partners to mobilize a broad coalition, secure an international mandate to protect civilians, stop an advancing army, prevent a massacre, and establish a no-fly zone with the U.S. allies and partners. To lend some perspective on how rapidly this military and diplomatic response came together, when people were being brutalized in Bosnia in the 1990s, it took the international community more than a year to intervene with air power to protect civilians. It took us 31 days.

Moreover, we’ve accomplished these objectives consistent with the pledge that I made to the American people at the outset of the U.S. military operations. I said that America’s role would be limited, that we would not put ground troops into Libya, that we would focus the U.S. unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we would transfer responsibility to the U.S. allies and partners. Tonight we are fulfilling that pledge.

Our most effective alliance, NATO, has taken command of the enforcement of the arms embargo and the no-fly zone. Last night NATO decided to take on the additional responsibility of protecting Libyan civilians. This transfer from the United States to NATO will take place on Wednesday. Going forward, the lead in enforcing the no-fly zone and protecting civilians on the ground will transition to the U.S. allies and partners, and I am fully confident that the U.S. coalition will keep the pressure on Qadhafi’s remaining forces.

In that effort, the United States will play a supporting role, including intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue assistance, and capabilities to jam regime communications. Because of this transition to a broader, NATO-based coalition, the risk and cost of this operation—to the U.S. military and to American taxpayers—will be reduced significantly.

Libya in 2011

United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): … [M]uch of the debate in Washington has put forward a false choice when it comes to Libya. On the one hand, some question why America should intervene at all, even in limited ways, in this distant land. They argue that there are many places in the world where innocent civilians face brutal violence at the hands of their government, and America
should not be expected to police the world, particularly when we have so many pressing needs here at home.

It’s true that America cannot use the U.S. military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure the U.S. interests against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what’s right. In this particular country, Libya, at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale. We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves. We also had the ability to stop Qadhafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on the ground.

To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader, and more profoundly, the U.S. responsibilities to the U.S. fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.

Moreover, America has an important strategic interest in preventing Qadhafi from overrunning those who oppose him. A massacre would have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya’s borders, putting enormous strains on the peaceful yet fragile transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling to power. The writ of the United Nations Security Council would have been shown to be little more than empty words, crippling that institution’s future credibility to uphold global peace and security. So while I will never minimize the costs involved in military action, I am convinced that a failure to act in Libya would have carried a far greater price for America.

Now, just as there are those who have argued against intervention in Libya, there are others who have suggested that we broaden the U.S. military mission beyond the task of protecting the Libyan people and do whatever it takes to bring down Qadhafi and usher in a new government.

Of course, there is no question that Libya and the world would be better off with Qadhafi out of power. I, along with many other world leaders, have embraced that goal and will actively pursue it through nonmilitary means. But broadening the U.S. military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.

The task that I assigned the U.S. forces—to protect the Libyan people from immediate danger and to establish a no-fly zone—carries with it a U.N. mandate and international support. It’s also what the Libyan opposition asked us to do. If we tried to overthrow Qadhafi by force, the U.S. coalition would splinter. We would likely have to put U.S. troops on the ground to accomplish that mission or risk killing many civilians from the air. The dangers faced by the U.S. men and women in uniform would be far greater. So would the costs and the U.S. share of the responsibility for what comes next.

To be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq. Thanks to the extraordinary sacrifices of the U.S. troops and the determination of the U.S. diplomats, we are hopeful about Iraq’s future. But regime change there took 8 years, thousands of American and Iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion dollars. That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.

As the bulk of the U.S. military effort ratchets down, what we can do, and will do, is support the aspirations of the Libyan people. We have intervened to stop a massacre, and we will work with the U.S. allies and partners to maintain the safety of civilians. We will deny the regime arms, cut off its supplies of cash, assist the opposition, and work with other nations to hasten the day when Qadhafi leaves power. …

More about Libya

On June 28, 2011, Mr. Koh testified before the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate on the use of force in Libya, which, he explained, was consistent with the United States Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, and international law. Mr. Koh’s written testimony, excerpted below (with most footnotes omitted), is available in full at (internet link) state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/167250.htm.

We believe that the President is acting lawfully in Libya, consistent with both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution, as well as with international law. the U.S. position is carefully limited to the facts of the present operation, supported by history, and respectful of both the letter of the Resolution and the spirit of consultation and collaboration that underlies it…

…Faced with brutal attacks and explicit threats of further imminent attacks by Muammar Qadhafi against his own people, the United States and its international partners acted with unprecedented speed to secure a mandate, under Resolution 1973, to mobilize a broad coalition to protect civilians against attack by an advancing army and to establish a no-fly zone. In so doing, President Obama helped prevent an imminent massacre in Benghazi, protected critical U.S. interests in the region, and sent a strong message to the people not just of Libya—but of the entire Middle East and North Africa—that America stands with them at this historic moment of transition.

From the start, the Administration made clear its commitment to acting consistently with both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. The President submitted a report to Congress, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, within 48 hours of the commencement of operations in Libya. He framed the U.S. military mission narrowly, directing, among other things, that no ground troops would be deployed (except for necessary personnel recovery missions), and that U.S. armed forces would transition responsibility for leading and conducting the mission to an integrated NATO command. On April 4, 2011, U.S. forces did just that, shifting to a constrained and supporting role in a multinational civilian protection mission—in an action involving no U.S. ground presence or, to this point, U.S. casualties—authorized by a carefully tailored U.N. Security Council Resolution. As the War Powers Resolution contemplates, the Administration has consulted extensively with Congress about these operations, participating in more than ten hearings, thirty briefings, and dozens of additional exchanges since March 1—an interbranch dialogue that my testimony today continues.

This background underscores the limits to the U.S. legal claims. Throughout the Libya episode, the President has never claimed the authority to take the nation to war without Congressional authorization, to violate the War Powers Resolution or any other statute, to violate international law, to use force abroad when doing so would not serve important national interests, or to refuse to consult with Congress on important war powers issues. The Administration recognizes that Congress has powers to regulate and terminate uses of force, and that the War Powers Resolution plays an important role in promoting interbranch dialogue and deliberation on these critical matters. The President has expressed his strong desire for Congressional support, and we have been working actively with Congress to ensure enactment of appropriate legislation.

Developments

Where, against this background, does the War Powers Resolution fit in? The legal debate has focused on the Resolution’s 60-day clock, which directs the President—absent express Congressional authorization (or the applicability of other limited exceptions) and following an initial 48-hour reporting period—to remove United States Armed Forces within 60 days from ÒhostilitiesÓ or Òsituations where immin
ent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.Ó But as virtually every lawyer recognizes, the operative term, Òhostilities,Ó is an ambiguous standard, which is nowhere defined in the statute. Nor has this standard ever been defined by the courts or by Congress in any subsequent war powers legislation. Indeed, the legislative history of the Resolution makes clear there was no fixed view on exactly what the term ÒhostilitiesÓ would encompass. Members of Congress understood that the term was vague, but specifically declined to give it more concrete meaning, in part to avoid unduly hampering future Presidents by making the Resolution a Òone size fits allÓ straitjacket that would operate mechanically, without regard to particular circumstances.

From the start, lawyers and legislators have disagreed about the meaning of this term and the scope of the Resolution’s 60-day pullout rule. Application of these provisions often generates difficult issues of interpretation that must be addressed in light of a long history of military actions abroad, without guidance from the courts, involving a Resolution passed by a Congress that could not have envisioned many of the operations in which the United States has since become engaged. Because the War Powers Resolution represented a broad compromise between competing views on the proper division of constitutional authorities, the question whether a particular set of facts constitutes ÒhostilitiesÓ for purposes of the Resolution has been determined more by interbranch practice than by a narrow parsing of dictionary definitions. Both branches have recognized that different situations may call for different responses, and that an overly mechanical reading of the statute could lead to unintended automatic cutoffs of military involvement in cases where more flexibility is required.

In the nearly forty years since the Resolution’s enactment, successive Administrations have thus started from the premise that the term ÒhostilitiesÓ is Òdefinable in a meaningful way only in the context of an actual set of facts.Ó9 In this case, leaders of the current Congress have stressed this very concern in indicating that they do not believe that U.S. military operations in Libya amount to the kind of ÒhostilitiesÓ envisioned by the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day pullout provision. The historical practice supports this view. In 1975, Congress expressly invited the Executive Branch to provide its best understanding of the term Òhostilities.Ó My predecessor Monroe Leigh and Defense Department General Counsel Martin Hoffmann responded that, as a general matter, the Executive Branch understands the term Òto mean a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces.Ó On the other hand, as Leigh and Hoffmann suggested, the term should not necessarily be read to include situations where the nature of the mission is limited (i.e., situations that do not Òinvolve the full military engagements with which the Resolution is primarily concernedÓ); where the exposure of U.S. forces is limited (e.g., situations involving Òsporadic military or paramilitary attacks on the U.S. armed forces stationed abroad,Ó in which the overall threat faced by the U.S. military is low); and where the risk of escalation is therefore limited. Subsequently, the Executive Branch has reiterated the distinction between full military encounters and more constrained operations, stating that Òintermittent military engagementsÓ do not require withdrawal of forces under the Resolution’s 60-day rule. And successive Congresses and Presidents have opted for a process through which the political branches have worked together to flesh out the law’s meaning over time. By adopting this approach, the two branches have sought to avoid construing the statute mechanically, divorced from the realities that face them. In the thirty-six years since Leigh and Hoffmann provided their analysis, the Executive Branch has repeatedly articulated and applied these foundational understandings. The President was thus operating within this longstanding tradition of Executive Branch interpretation when he relied on these understandings in his legal explanation to Congress on June 15, 2011.

Details

In light of this historical practice, a combination of four factors present in Libya suggests that the current situation does not constitute the kind of ÒhostilitiesÓ envisioned by the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day automatic pullout provision.

First, the mission is limited: By Presidential design, U.S. forces are playing a constrained and supporting role in a NATO-led multinational civilian protection operation, which is implementing a U.N. Security Council Resolution tailored to that limited purpose. This is a very unusual set of circumstances, not found in any of the historic situations in which the ÒhostilitiesÓ question was previously debated, from the deployment of U.S. armed forces to Lebanon, Grenada, and El Salvador in the early 1980s, to the fighting with Iran in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s, to the use of ground troops in Somalia in 1993. Of course, NATO forces as a whole are more deeply engaged in Libya than are U.S. forces, but the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day pullout provision was designed to address the activities of the latter.

Second, the exposure of the U.S. armed forces is limited: To date, the U.S. operations have not involved U.S. casualties or a threat of significant U.S. casualties. Nor do the U.S. current operations involve active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, and members of the U.S. military have not been involved in significant armed confrontations or sustained confrontations of any kind with hostile forces. Prior administrations have not found the 60-day rule to apply even in situations where significant fighting plainly did occur, as in Lebanon and Grenada in 1983 and Somalia in 1993. By highlighting this point, we in no way advocate a legal theory that is indifferent to the loss of non-American lives. But here, there can be little doubt that the greatest threat to Libyan civilians comes not from NATO or the United States military, but from Qadhafi. The Congress that adopted the War Powers Resolution was principally concerned with the safety of U.S. forces, and with the risk that the President would entangle them in an overseas conflict from which they could not readily be extricated. In this instance, the absence of U.S. ground troops, among other features of the Libya operation, significantly reduces both the risk to U.S. forces and the likelihood of a protracted entanglement that Congress may find itself practically powerless to end.

Third, the risk of escalation is limited: U.S. military operations have not involved the presence of U.S. ground troops, or any significant chance of escalation into a broader conflict characterized by a large U.S. ground presence, major casualties, sustained active combat, or expanding geographical scope. … Prior administrations have found an absence of ÒhostilitiesÓ under the War Powers Resolution in situations ranging from Lebanon to Central America to Somalia to the Persian Gulf tanker controversy, although members of the United States Armed Forces were repeatedly engaged by the other side’s forces and sustained casualties in volatile geopolitical circumstances, in some cases running a greater risk of possible escalation than here.

Fourth and finally, the military means we are using are limited: …The violence that U.S. armed forces have directly inflicted or facilitated after the handoff to NATO has been modest in terms of its frequency, intensity, and severity. The air-to-ground strikes conducted by the United States in Libya are a far cry from the bombing campaign waged in Kosovo in 1999…. The U.S. contribut
ion to NATO is likewise far smaller than it was in the Balkans in the mid-1990s …. Here, by contrast, the bulk of U.S. contributions to the NATO effort has been providing intelligence capabilities and refueling assets. A very significant majority of the overall sorties are being flown by the U.S. coalition partners, and the overwhelming majority of strike sorties are being flown by the U.S. partners. American strikes have been confined, on an as-needed basis, to the suppression of enemy air defenses to enforce the no-fly zone, and to limited strikes by Predator unmanned aerial vehicles against discrete targets in support of the civilian protection mission; since the handoff to NATO, the total number of U.S. munitions dropped has been a tiny fraction of the number dropped in Kosovo. All NATO targets, moreover, have been clearly linked to the Qadhafi regime’s systematic attacks on the Libyan population and populated areas, with target sets engaged only when strictly necessary and with maximal precision.

Had any of these elements been absent in Libya, or present in different degrees, a different legal conclusion might have been drawn. But the unusual confluence of these four factors, in an operation that was expressly designed to be limited—limited in mission, exposure of U.S. troops, risk of escalation, and military means employed—led the President to conclude that the Libya operation did not fall within the War Powers Resolution’s automatic 60-day pullout rule.

More about the Issue

Nor are we in a ÒwarÓ for purposes of Article I of the Constitution. As the Office of Legal Counsel concluded in its April 1, 2011 opinion,24 Reasonable minds may read the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution differently—as they have for decades. Scholars will certainly go on debating this issue. But that should not distract those of us in government from the most urgent question now facing us, which is not one of law but of policy: Will Congress provide its support for NATO’s mission in Libya at this pivotal juncture, ensuring that Qadhafi does not regain the upper hand against the people of Libya? The President has repeatedly stated that it is better to take military action, even in limited scenarios such as this, with strong Congressional engagement and support. However we construe the War Powers Resolution, we can all agree that it serves only Qadhafi’s interest for the United States to withdraw from this NATO operation before it is finished. under longstanding precedent the President had the constitutional authority to direct the use of force in Libya, for two main reasons. First, he could reasonably determine that U.S. operations in Libya would serve important national interests in preserving regional stability and supporting the credibility and effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council. Second, the military operations that the President anticipated ordering were not sufficiently extensive in Ònature, scope, and durationÓ to constitute a ÒwarÓ requiring prior specific Congressional approval under the Declaration of War Clause. Although time has passed, the nature and scope of the U.S. operations have not evolved in a manner that would alter that conclusion. To the contrary, since the transfer to NATO command, the U.S. role in the mission has become even more limited.

Libya in 2011

United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): The United States and the United Nations took several steps in response to the violent repression of peaceful protests by the regime of Muammar al-Qadafi beginning in February 2011. information on International Human Rights in this legal Encyclopedia discusses Libya’s suspension from the Human Rights Council. information on Diplomatic Relations, Succession, Continuity of States and Statehood Issues in this legal Encyclopedia discusses recognition and succession of the new regime in Libya. information on Nationality, Citizenship and Immigration in this legal Encyclopedia6 discusses the use of sanctions to target the Qadafi regime. And information on Nationality, Citizenship and Immigration in this legal Encyclopedia8 discusses the use of force in halting the violence against civilians in Libya. On February 26, 2011, the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 which was co-sponsored by the United States. U.N. Doc S/RES/1970. Among other things, Resolution 1970 referred the situation in Libya since February 15, 2011 to the ICC. This was the first affirmative vote by the United States for a referral to the ICC. On May 4, 2011, Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, addressed the Security Council following a briefing by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on his progress. Her remarks, available at (internet link) usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2011/162531.htm, are excerpted below.

Developments

Mr. President, this Council unanimously decided in Resolution 1970 to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. By doing so, the Council reflected the importance that the international community attaches to ensuring that those responsible for the widespread and systematic attacks against the Libyan people are held accountable.

The Prosecutor has highlighted the deeply troubling actions by the Libyan government and its security forces—including incidents in which Qadhafi forces fired at civilians, reports of torture, rape, deportations, enforced disappearances, the use of cluster munitions and heavy weaponry against civilian targets in crowded urban areas, and blocking humanitarian supplies. All of this underscores the gravity of what we are witnessing in Libya today. New reports make clear that the Qadhafi regime continues to directly target civilians. So the need for justice and accountability persists. These reports further underscore the message that we have repeated in the U.S. statements and in the U.S. diplomatic efforts: Qadhafi has lost any and all legitimacy to lead Libya.

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As the ICC process continues, it is important that the international community remain united in its commitment to protecting civilians and civilian-populated areas under the threat of attack, to ending violence against the Libyan people, and defending the universal rights we all share.

Mr. President, my government welcomes the swift and thorough work the Prosecutor has done. He has said that he plans to submit an application for an arrest warrant in the coming weeks. The specter of ICC prosecution is serious and imminent and should again warn those around Qadhafi about the perils of continuing to tie their fate to his. The Prosecutor has also indicated that further cases may be opened, as would be appropriate against individuals involved in further crimes that might be committed in the days ahead.

More about the Issue

On November 2, 2011, Ambassador Rice delivered remarks at the Security Council following ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s second briefing on actions taken pursuant to Resolution 1970. Excerpts follow from those remarks, which are available in full at (internet link) usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2011/176588.htm.

Libya in 2011

United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): I would like to begin by thanking the Prosecutor for his informative briefing and for his important contributions to laying the foundation for seeking the justice that Libyans so deserve.

The Security Council’s decision to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor reflected the importance that the international community attaches to ensuring accountability for the widespread and systematic attacks against the Libyan people that began in the dark days of February. Resolution 1970, adopted even as atrocities were being perpetrated, represented an historic milestone in the fight against impunity.

Justice and reconciliation e
fforts will be critical components of a successful transition that allows all of Libyan society to leave behind what has been, in many, many respects, a tragic and bloody past. An effective criminal justice system, with a competent judiciary and safeguards to guarantee humane treatment and due process, is crucial to the future of Libya. The new government must ensure that the rule of law, treatment safeguards, and due process protections are firmly in place.

Helping the Transitional National Council implement its commitments to respect human rights—and to proper detention procedures that meet Libya’s international obligations—must be a very high priority. We emphasize the importance of ensuring that the human rights of all in Libya—including former regime officials and detainees—are fully respected during and after this transition period.

More about Libya

The victims of Qadhafi’s terrorism and their families in Libya—and also in the United States—now know definitively that the era of Qadhafi’s violence has ended. Qadhafi engaged in countless barbaric acts, but this does not and cannot justify the apparently brutal way that he met his death. We welcome the TNC’s announcement of an investigation into Qadhafi’s death and will look to it to follow through by undertaking an effective inquiry. Independent and impartial investigations into abuses committed in Libya on both sides are the first step in fulfilling the TNC’s commitments to accountability and laying a foundation for a transition that embraces the rule of law. We remain deeply troubled by reports, including those mentioned by the Prosecutor, that sub-Saharan African migrants and others detained in ad hoc jails are being abused. Continued support by the international community, including through the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, will be vital to helping the Libyan people achieve the future they seek.

Developments

We must now move together to support the creation of an inclusive, democratic state in which all Libyans, of all backgrounds, have a future and an opportunity to participate in the rebuilding of their country.

We welcome the Prosecutor’s report that the TNC is fully cooperating with his investigation in accordance with Resolution 1970, and we encourage other States in which individuals subject to ICC arrest warrants may be found to ensure that they are brought to justice. We encourage the Prosecutor to continue to consult with the TNC.

We urge the speedy apprehension of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi and of Abdullah al-Senussi, who remain at large in the region. They must be brought to justice in a legitimate process governed by the rule of law. Ensuring justice for those who have endured unspeakable atrocities will be crucial to Libya’s ability to emerge from the ashes of dictatorship to become a country in which all of its citizens enjoy the full protection of the rule of law.

Libya

In relation to the international law practice and Libya in this world legal Encyclopedia, please see the following section:

International Criminal Law

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International, Hybrid, and Other Tribunals

Under this topic, in the Encyclopedia, find out information on International Criminal Court. Note: there is detailed information and resources, in relation with these topics during the year 2011, covered by the entry, in this law Encyclopedia, about Libya

Libya

In relation to the international law practice and Libya in this world legal Encyclopedia, please see the following section:

International Conflict Resolution, International Conflict Avoidance

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Peacekeeping and Related Issues

. Note: there is detailed information and resources, in relation with these topics during the year 2011, covered by the entry, in this law Encyclopedia, about Kosovo

Libya

In relation to the international law practice and Libya in this world legal Encyclopedia, please see the following section:

Use of Force, Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation

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Use of Force

Under this topic, in the Encyclopedia, find out information on Use of force issues related to specific conflicts. Note: there is detailed information and resources, in relation with these topics during the year 2011, covered by the entry, in this law Encyclopedia, about Libya

Resources

See Also

• Use Of Force
• Arms Control
• Disarmament
• Nonproliferation

Resources

See Also

• International Criminal Law
• Tribunals
• International Criminal Court
• Libya

Resources

See Also

• International Organization
• Foreign Relations
• Intergovernmental Organization
• Regional Organization
• Regional Integration

Resources

Notes and References

1. 9 1975 Leigh-Hoffmann Letter [Letter from State Department Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh and Department of Defense General Counsel Martin R. Hoffmann to Chairman Clement J. Zablocki (June 5, 1975), reprinted in War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation at Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong. (1975)], at 38.
2. 12 Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Wendy R. Sherman to Representative Benjamin Gilman, reprinted in 139 Cong. Rec. H7095 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993).
3. 24 Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, President’s Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (Apr. 1, 2011).

Resources

Notes and References

1. 9 1975 Leigh-Hoffmann Letter [Letter from State Department Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh and Department of Defense General Counsel Martin R. Hoffmann to Chairman Clement J. Zablocki (June 5, 1975), reprinted in War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation at Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong. (1975)], at 38.
2. 12 Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Wendy R. Sherman to Representative Benjamin Gilman, reprinted in 139 Cong. Rec. H7095 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993).
3. 24 Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, President’s Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (Apr. 1, 2011).

Hierarchical Display of Libya

Geography > Economic geography > CAEU countries

Libya

Concept of Libya

See the dictionary definition of Libya.

Characteristics of Libya

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Resources

Translation of Libya

• Spanish: Libia
• French: Libye
• German: Libyen
• Italian: Libia
• Portuguese: Líbia
• Polish: Libia

Thesaurus of Libya

Geography > Economic geography > CAEU countries > Libya

See also

• Import
• Re-import
• Import (EU)
• Originating product
• Certificate of origin

• Putting into free circulation

• APPU

• Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
• Libyan Arab Jamahiriya