Sovereign Debt

Sovereign Debt

This section provides an overview of sovereign debt within the legal context of Combating Poverty in international economic law (Cross-Cutting Challenges).

Resources

See Also

debt default, debt restructuring, domestic debt, debt crisis, institutional investors, sovereign loans, sovereign borrowing

Further Reading

• Giuseppe Bianco, “Sovereign Debt,” Elgar Encyclopedia of International Economic Law, Cheltenham Glos (United Kingdom), Northampton, MA (United States)
• Aggarwal, V. (1996) Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
• Bikhchandani, S., and Sharna, S. (2001) Herd Behavior in Financial Markets. IMF Staff Papers (47) (3), 279–310.
• Blustein, P. (2005) And The Money Kept Rolling in (And Out). New York: Public Affairs.
• Bordo, M., and Oesterlinck, K. (2005) Do Political Changes Trigger Debt Default? And Do Defaults Lead to Political Change? (manuscript). Rutgers University and Université Libre de Bruxelles.
• Borensztein, E., and Panizza, U. (2006) Do Sovereign Defaults Hurt Exporters? (manuscript). Inter-American Development Bank.
• Buckley, R.P. (1999) Emerging Markets Debt: An Analysis of the Secondary Market. London: Kluwer Law International.
• Bulow, J., and Rogoff, K. (1989) LDC Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? American Economic Review (79), 43–50.
• Catao, L., Fostel, A., and Kapur, S. (2007) Persistent Gaps, Volatility Types and Default Traps. Paper presented at the Conference on New Perspectives in Financial Globalization, April 26–27. Washington, DC: IMF.
• Chancellor, E. (1999) Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation. New York: Plume.
• Cole, H., and Kehoe, P. (1997) Reviving Reputational Models of Sovereign Debt. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (winter), 21–30.
• Das, U.S., Papaioannou, M., and Trebesch, C. (2012) Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts. International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 12/203.
• Datz, G. (2009) What Life after Default? Time Horizons and the Outcome of the Argentine Debt Restructuring Deal. Review of International Political Economy (16) (3), 456–84.
• Datz, G. (2012) The Inextricable Link between Sovereign Debt and Pensions in Argentina, 1993–2010. Latin American Politics and Society (54) (1), 101–26.
• Datz, G., and Dancsi, K. (2013) The Politics of Pension Reform Reversal: A Comparative Analysis of Hungary and Argentina. East European Politics (29) (1), 83–100.
• De Paoli, B., Hoggarth, G., and Saporta, V. (2006) Costs of Sovereign Default. Bank of England, Financial Stability Paper No. 1.
• Dixit, A., and Londregan, J. (2000) Political Power and the Credibility of Government Debt. Journal of Economic Theory (94), 80–105.
• Dooley, M. (2000) International Financial Architecture and Strategic Default: Can Financial Crises be Less Painful? Paper presented at the Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series. Santa Cruz: University of California.
• Dornbusch, R., Goldfajn, I., and Valdes, R. (1995) Currency Crises and Collapses. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2), 219–93.
• Drazen, A. (1997) Towards a Political-Economic Theory of Domestic Debt. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5890. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
• Eaton, J., and Gersovitz, M. (1981) Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Review of Economic Studies (48) (2), 289–309.
• Eichengreen, B. (1989) The US Capital Market and Foreign Lending, 1920–1955. In J. Sachs (ed.) Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance. Volume 1: The International Financial System. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 107–56.
• Eichengreen, B. (1991) Historical Research on International Lending and Debt. Journal of Economic Perspectives (5) (2), 149–69.
• Eichengreen, B., and Portes, R. (1989) After the Deluge: Default, Negotiation, and Readjustment during the Interwar Years. In B. Eichengreen and P. Lindert (eds.) The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
• Enderlein, H., Trebesch, C., and Daniels, L. (2012) Sovereign Default Disputes: A Database of Government Coerciveness in Debt Crises. Journal of International Money and Finance (31) (2), 250–66.
• Fishlow, A. (1986) Lessons from the Past: Capital Markets during the 19th Century and the Interwar Period. In Kahler, M. (ed.) The Politics of International Debt. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• Gelos, R.G., Sahary, R., and Sandleris, G. (2004) Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access? International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 04/221. Washington, DC: IMF.
• Gelpern, A. (2012) Sovereign Restructuring after NML vs. Argentina: CACs Don’t Make Pari Passu Go Away. Credit Slips (blog), May 3.
• Gelpern, A., and Gulati, M. (2007) Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study. Washington University Law Review (84), 1627–715.
• Gelpern, A., and Gulati, M. (2011) Sovereign Snake Oil (manuscript). American University Washington College of Law and Duke University School of Law.
• Gelpern, A., and Setser, B. (2004) Domestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for Equal Treatment. Georgetown Journal of International Law (35) (4), 795–814.
• Helleiner, E. (2006) The Long and Winding Road: Towards a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime (manuscript). University of Waterloo.
• Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (2006) Living with Debt: How to Limit the Risks of Sovereign Finance. Washington, DC: IADB.
• Jorgensen, E., and Sachs, J. (1989) Default and Renegotiation of Latin American Foreign Bonds in the Interwar Period. In B. Eichengreen and P. Lindert (eds.) The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
• Kletzer, K., and Wright, B. (2000) Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter. American Economic Review (90) (3), 621–39.
• Levy-Yeyati, E., and Panizza, U. (2006) The Elusive Costs of Default. Washington, DC: IADB.
• Lindert, P. (1989) Response to Debt Crisis: What Is Different about the 1980s? In B. Eichengreen and P. Lindert (eds.) The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
• Lindert, P., and Morton, P. (1989) How Has Sovereign Debt Worked. In J. Sachs (ed.) Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Marx, D., Echague, J., and Sandleris, G. (2006) Sovereign Debt and the Debt Crisis in Emerging Countries: The Experience of the 1990s. In C. Jochnick and F.A. Preston (eds.) Sovereign Debt at the Crossroads. New York: Oxford University Press.
• McGillivray, F., and Smith, A. (2003) Who Can Be Trusted? Sovereign Debt and Leadership Change. New York: New York University, Mimeo.
• Miller, M. (2002) Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts – or No Change? International Economics Policy Briefs, No. PB02–03.
• Panizza, U. (2010). Is Domestic Debt the Answer to Debt Crises? In B. Herman, J.A. Ocampo, and S. Spiegel (eds.) Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crises. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F., and Zettlemeyer, J. (2009) The Economics and Law of Sovereign Default. Journal of Economic Literature (47) (3), 651–98.
• Reinhart, C., and Rogoff, K. (2009) This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Reinhart, C., and Sbrancia, M.B. (2011) The Liquidation of Government Debt. NBER Working Paper No. 16893.
• Richmond, C., and Dias, D. (2009) Duration of Capital Market Exclusion: An Empirical Investigation. UCLA: Manuscript. At https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1027844, accessed January 2, 2013.
• Rodman, D. (2006) Creditor Initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s. In C. Jochnick and F.A. Preston (eds.) Sovereign Debt at the Crossroads. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Rose, A. (2002) One Reason Countries Repay Their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade. NBER Working Paper 8853.
• Roubini, N., and Setser, B. (2004) Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies. Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics.
• Saiegh, S. (2001) Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage”? Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies, and Sovereign Borrowing (manuscript). University of Pittsburgh.
• Schultz, K., and Weingast, B. (2003) The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition. International Organization (57) (1), 1–40.
• Schumacher, J., Trebesch, C., and Enderlein, H. (2012) Sovereign Default in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976–2010 (unpublished manuscript). Free University Berlin and LMU Munich.
• Sturzenegger, F. (2003). Default Episodes in the 1990s: Factbook, Toolkit, and Preliminary Lessons. Paper presented at the Inter-American Seminar on Economics, NBER, July. Cambridge, MA.
• Sturzenegger, F., and Zettlemeyer, J. (2007) Defaults in the 1990s: Learning to Deal with Crises. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Tomz, M. (2002). Democratic Default: Domestic Audiences and Compliance with International Agreements (manuscript). Stanford University.
• Tomz, M. (2003). Who Wants to Repay the Foreign Debt? Public Opinion and Economic Sophistication in Argentina (manuscript). Stanford University.
• Tomz, M. (2007) Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Tomz, M., and Wright, M. (2005). Sovereign Debt, Default, and Bailouts (manuscript). Stanford University.
• Tomz, M., and Wright, M. (2007) Do Countries Default in “Bad Times”? Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper No. 2007–17.
• Winkler, M. (1933) Foreign Bonds: An Autopsy. Philadelphia: Rowland Swain Company.
• Wynne, H.W. (1951) State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.