LAWIN

International Regulatory Cooperation

International Regulatory Cooperation

Regulatory Cooperation and Concertation – the Example of TTIP Negotiations

This section provides an overview of regulatory cooperation and concertation – the example of ttip negotiations within the legal context of Regulatory Approaches in international economic law.

Resources

Further Reading

  • Thomas Cottier, “Regulatory Cooperation and Concertation – the Example of TTIP Negotiations,” Elgar Encyclopedia of International Economic Law, Cheltenham Glos (United Kingdom), Northampton, MA (United States)
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