{"id":12398,"date":"2014-05-13T01:11:49","date_gmt":"2014-05-13T01:11:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lawin.org\/?p=12398"},"modified":"2014-05-13T01:11:49","modified_gmt":"2014-05-13T01:11:49","slug":"dictionary-of-statutory-interpretation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/dictionary-of-statutory-interpretation\/","title":{"rendered":"Dictionary of Statutory Interpretation"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dictionary of Statutory Interpretation<\/h1>\n

In the introduction to this legal Dictionary<\/a>, the author believes that, whatever the “merits of the descriptive vs. prescriptive debate regarding ordinary dictionaries, the task for a specialized legal dictionary is clear. It must be both descriptive and prescriptive. It must be descriptive in order to provide a complete picture of contemporary disputes about the judicial role.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the Dictionary cannot help but be drawn into a prescriptive stance when presenting material about the historical and contemporary context of statutory interpretation.” For example, according to Sidney Landau (“Dictionaries: The Art and Craft of Lexicography”, p. 20 (1989)), subject-field dictionaries are often normative and tend to be more encyclopedic. In the author’s opinion, it is “better to make these critical judgments explicit rather than allow them to creep surreptitiously into the descriptive material.<\/p>\n

For example, it will become obvious in reading this dictionary that I am suspicious of the modern textualist\u2019s reliance on the plain meaning of a statutory text, but I hope that I succeed in doing \u201cdescriptive\u201d justice to the views I critique. In other words, I hope to do for statutory interpretation what Arthur Leff was trying to do with his Legal Dictionary, only a small portion of which he completed before his untimely death”. The author mentions the letter from the Professor Arthur Leff to a Prospective Publisher, dated 22 November 1976, and published in a Journal of Yale University (94 Yale L.J. 1852, 1852 (1985)): \u201cWhat I conceive is a ‘dictionary\u2019 in which one cannot only look up the ‘meaning\u2019 of a word or phrase, but in addition, in many cases, get a commentary on it, albeit the author\u2019s personalized one.\u201d<\/p>\n

He also says that “This dictionary on statutory interpretation is in the (encyclopedic) tradition (see more here<\/a>). The entries in Chapter 1 (Definitions) include a discussion of historical backpopkin ground and contemporary issues in statutory interpretation, as well as definitions
\nand an explanation of why the entry is relevant for understanding how judges determine statutory meaning. Chapter 2 (Quotations) includes commentary about the historical and contemporary significance of the quoted material.<\/p>\n

Using This Legal Dictionary<\/h3>\n

In words of the author: “My tilt toward the encyclopedic and prescriptive leads to the following outline:<\/p>\n

Chapter 1 contains a brief definition of a word or phrase followed by materials explaining its history (historical note), its relevance for statutory interpretation, and the contemporary issues that the definition raises. However, these subheadings appear selectively-only when they help us to understand statutory interpretation.<\/p>\n

Chapter 2 presents quotations about statutory interpretation from cases, books and articles, along with explanatory and critical comments. The quotes were chosen because they highlight a significant point about statutory interpretation and are important either historically or in contemporary debates about how to determine the meaning of statutes.”<\/p>\n

Contents<\/h3>\n
    \n
  • Absurdity canon<\/li>\n
  • Affidavits by legislators<\/li>\n
  • Agency interpretation, see Deference to agency canon<\/li>\n
  • Ambiguity<\/li>\n
  • Appropriations laws<\/li>\n
  • Arrow theorem, see Law and Economics<\/li>\n
  • Author and audience<\/li>\n
  • Avoidance of unconstitutionality canon<\/li>\n
  • Background considerations<\/li>\n
  • Canon<\/li>\n
  • Canons, institutional (including list)<\/li>\n
  • Canons, linguistic (including list)<\/li>\n
  • Canons, substantive (including list)<\/li>\n
  • Casus omissus<\/li>\n
  • Change<\/li>\n
  • Clear statement rules<\/li>\n
  • Codification<\/li>\n
  • Collective action problem, see Law and Economics<\/li>\n
  • Common law<\/li>\n
  • Common understanding<\/li>\n
  • Consistent meaning canon<\/li>\n
  • Constitutional inspiration<\/li>\n
  • Constitutional vs. statutory interpretation<\/li>\n
  • Construction<\/li>\n
  • Context<\/li>\n
  • Contracts<\/li>\n
  • Declaratory statutes<\/li>\n
  • Deference to agency canon<\/li>\n
  • Derogation of common law canon<\/li>\n
  • Detailed text<\/li>\n
  • Dictionaries<\/li>\n
  • Dictionary Act<\/li>\n
  • Direct democracy<\/li>\n
  • Drafting history<\/li>\n
  • Ejusdem generis canon<\/li>\n
  • Entrenchment<\/li>\n
  • Equal protection violation<\/li>\n
  • Equitable interpretation (extensive and limiting)<\/li>\n
  • Expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon<\/li>\n
  • Extensive equitable interpretation, see Equitable interpretation (extensive and limiting)<\/li>\n
  • External context<\/li>\n
  • Federal common law<\/li>\n
  • Federalism canon<\/li>\n
  • Gaps<\/li>\n
  • Generality<\/li>\n
  • Genuine (vs. spurious) interpretation<\/li>\n
  • Golden Rule<\/li>\n
  • Historical vs. contemporary meaning<\/li>\n
  • History of a statute<\/li>\n
  • Holistic interpretation<\/li>\n
  • Holy Trinity, see Absurdity canon<\/li>\n
  • Implied cause of action or remedy<\/li>\n
  • Implied repeal, see No implied repeal of statute canon<\/li>\n
  • Impoundment<\/li>\n
  • Inaction canon<\/li>\n
  • Inconvenience<\/li>\n
  • Incorporation by reference<\/li>\n
  • Inertia in the legislature<\/li>\n
  • Initiative, see Direct democracy<\/li>\n
  • Institutional canons, see Canons, institutional<\/li>\n
  • Institutional competence<\/li>\n
  • Intent of the statute<\/li>\n
  • Intentionalism, see Legislative intent<\/li>\n
  • Internal context<\/li>\n
  • Interpretation<\/li>\n
  • Later legislative history<\/li>\n
  • Law and Economics<\/li>\n
  • Law and Literature<\/li>\n
  • Lawmaking responsibility<\/li>\n
  • Legal landscape<\/li>\n
  • Legal Process<\/li>\n
  • Legal Realism<\/li>\n
  • Legal science<\/li>\n
  • Legislative debates, see Legislative history-United States<\/li>\n
  • Legislative history-England<\/li>\n
  • Legislative history-States<\/li>\n
  • Legislative history-United States,<\/li>\n
  • Legislative incentives<\/li>\n
  • Legislative intent<\/li>\n
  • Legislative purpose<\/li>\n
  • Legislative supremacy, see Separation of Powers<\/li>\n
  • Legislature follow own rules<\/li>\n
  • Lenity canon<\/li>\n
  • Limiting equitable interpretation, see Equitable interpretation (extensive and limiting)<\/li>\n
  • Linear vs. back-and-forth approach<\/li>\n
  • Linguistic canons, see Canons, linguistic<\/li>\n
  • Literalism<\/li>\n
  • Mark-up, see Drafting history<\/li>\n
  • No implied repeal of statute canon<\/li>\n
  • No surplusage canon<\/li>\n
  • Normal usage<\/li>\n
  • Noscitur a sociis canon<\/li>\n
  • Omnibus legislation, see Type of document<\/li>\n
  • Open-ended text<\/li>\n
  • Original intent<\/li>\n
  • Original meaning, see Original intent<\/li>\n
  • Pari materia canon<\/li>\n
  • Plain meaning<\/li>\n
  • Pragmatism<\/li>\n
  • Preamble<\/li>\n
  • Pre-emption<\/li>\n
  • Presidential legislative history, see Legislative history-United States<\/li>\n
  • Private lawmaking, see Law and Economics<\/li>\n
  • Prospectivity canon<\/li>\n
  • Punctuation<\/li>\n
  • Purpose clause<\/li>\n
  • Purposivism<\/li>\n
  • Reason and Spirit, see Purposivism<\/li>\n
  • Reenactment canon<\/li>\n
  • Referendum, see Direct democracy<\/li>\n
  • Remedial canon<\/li>\n
  • Repeal of repealer statute<\/li>\n
  • Republicanism<\/li>\n
  • Retroactivity, see Prospectivity canon<\/li>\n
  • Scrivener\u2019s error<\/li>\n
  • Semantic ambiguity<\/li>\n
  • Separability<\/li>\n
  • Separation of Powers<\/li>\n
  • Severability, see Separability<\/li>\n
  • Spurious interpretation, see Genuine (vs. spurious) interpretation<\/li>\n
  • Statutes, see Type of document<\/li>\n
  • Statutes influencing the common law<\/li>\n
  • Statutory analogy<\/li>\n
  • Statutory interpretation statutes<\/li>\n
  • Substantive canons, see Canons, substantive<\/li>\n
  • Super stare decisis canon<\/li>\n
  • Syntactic ambiguity<\/li>\n
  • Technical vs. lay meaning<\/li>\n
  • Term of art<\/li>\n
  • Text<\/li>\n
  • Textualism<\/li>\n
  • Title<\/li>\n
  • Tradition<\/li>\n
  • Treaties, see Type of document<\/li>\n
  • Type of document<\/li>\n
  • Uncertainty about meaning<\/li>\n
  • Uniform Statute and Rule Construction<\/li>\n
  • Act (USRCA)<\/li>\n
  • United States Code, see Codification<\/li>\n
  • Vagueness<\/li>\n
  • Whole text canon<\/li>\n
  • Wills, see Type of document<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Quotations in the Book<\/h3>\n

    The Chapter 2 of the book is dedicated to quotations from the following jurists, cases and authors:<\/p>\n

      \n
    • Albertson\u2019s, Inc.<\/li>\n
    • American Trucking<\/li>\n
    • Aristotle<\/li>\n
    • Bishop, Joel (with list of 19th Century treatises)<\/li>\n
    • Blackstone, William<\/li>\n
    • Bonham\u2019s Case<\/li>\n
    • Brutus<\/li>\n
    • Calabresi, Guido<\/li>\n
    • Cardozo, Benjamin<\/li>\n
    • Carroll, Lewis<\/li>\n
    • Coke, Sir Edward<\/li>\n
    • Dickerson, Reed<\/li>\n
    • Easterbrook, Frank<\/li>\n
    • Eskridge, William N., Jr. & Frickey, Philip P.<\/li>\n
    • Frank, Jerome<\/li>\n
    • Frankfurter, Felix<\/li>\n
    • Hale, Matthew<\/li>\n
    • Hamilton, Alexander<\/li>\n
    • Hand, Learned<\/li>\n
    • Harlan, John Marshall, II<\/li>\n
    • Hart, Henry M., Jr. & Sacks, Albert<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      M., 314
      \nHengham, Judge, 317
      \nHeydon\u2019s Case, 318
      \nHolmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., 319
      \nHoly Trinity, 322
      \nJames, William, 324
      \nKent, James, 324
      \nMansfield, Lord, 325
      \nMarshall, John, 326
      \nPlowden, 328
      \nPosner, Richard, 329
      \nPound, Roscoe, 331
      \nRadin, Max, 333
      \nRutgers v. Waddington, 334
      \nScalia, Antonin, 335
      \nSedgwick, Theodore, 338
      \nShaw, Lemuel, 339
      \nStevens, John Paul, 342
      \nStory, Joseph, 344<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      Dictionary of Statutory Interpretation In the introduction to this legal Dictionary, the author believes that, whatever the “merits of the descriptive vs. prescriptive debate regarding ordinary dictionaries, the task for a specialized legal dictionary is clear. It must be both descriptive and prescriptive. It must be descriptive in order to provide a complete picture of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,81,52,66,5],"tags":[392,147,393,394,736],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12398"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12398"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12398\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12398"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12398"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lawin.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12398"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}