Strategic Trade Policy

Strategic Trade Policy

Strategic Trade Policy and International Trade Economy

In relation to international trade economy, Christopher Mark (1993) provided the following definition of Strategic Trade Policy: A broad term for approaches joining conventional trade theory with industrial organization theory, in order to analyze trade in products for which producing firms are pan of oligopolistic industries in their home markets, and in which strategic interactions among firms and governments occur. See also managed trade and industrial policy.

Resources

See Also

international trade, trade policy, political economy, free trade, protectionism, international institutions

Further Reading

  • Alt, J.E., and Gilligan, M.J. (1994) The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions. Journal of Political Philosophy 2(2), 165–92.
  • Bagwell, K., and Staiger, R.W. (1999) An Economic Theory of GATT. American Economic Review 89(1), 215–48.
  • Bagwell, K., Mavroidis, P.C., and Staiger, R.W. (2002) It’s a Question of Market Access. American Journal of International Law 96(1), 56–76.
  • Baldwin, R.E. (1985) The Political Economy of US Import Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Baldwin, R.E. (1989) US Trade Policy: Recent Changes and Future US Interests. American Economic Review 79(2), 128–33.
  • Bergsten, C.F., and Williamson, J. (1983) Exchange Rates and Trade Policy. In W.R. Cline (ed.) Trade Policy in the 1980s. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, pp. 99–120.
  • Bhagwati, J.N. (1991) The World Trading System at Risk. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Blonigen, B.A., and Bown, C.P. (2003) Antidumping and Retaliation Threats. Journal of International Economics 60, 249–73.
  • Bohara, A.K., and Kaempfer, W.H. (1991) Testing the Endogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US: Further Evidence. Economics Letters 35(3), 311–15.
  • Bown, C.P. (2004) On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement. Review of Economics and Statistics 86(3), 811–23.
  • Bradford, S. (2003) Protection and Jobs: Explaining the Structure of Trade Barriers Across Industries. Journal of International Economics 61(1), 19–39.
  • Busch, M.L. (2007) Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. International Organization 61(4), 735–61.
  • Busch, M.L., and Pelc, K.J. (in press) The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization. International Organization.
  • Busch, M.L., and Reinhardt, E. (1999) Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of US Nontariff Barriers. American Journal of Political Science 43(4), 1028–50.
  • Busch, M.L., and Reinhardt, E. (2000) Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in US Industry. American Journal of Political Science 44(4), 720–32.
  • Busch, M.L., and Reinhardt, E. (2003) Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement. Journal of World Trade 37(4), 719–35.
  • Busch, M.L., Racibroski, R., and Reinhardt, E. (2009) Does the Rule of Law Matter? The WTO and US Antidumping Investigations. Unpublished manuscript, Georgetown University.
  • Corden, W.M. (1993) The Revival of Protectionism in Developed Countries. In D. Salvatore (ed.) Protectionism and World Welfare. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 54–79.
  • Davis, C.L. (2004) International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization. American Political Science Review 98(1), 153–69.
  • Deardoff, A., and Stern, R.M. (1987) Current Issues in Trade Policy. In R.M. Stern (ed.) US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 15–68.
  • Destler, I.M. (1992) American Trade Politics. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
  • Dornbusch, R., and Frankel, J.A. (1987) Macroeconomics and Protection. In R.M. Stern (ed.) US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 77–130.
  • Downs, G.W., Rocke, D.M., and Barsoom, P.N. (1996) Is the Good News About Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization 50(3), 379–406.
  • Dutt, P., and Mitra, D. (2005) Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation. Review of Economics and Statistics 87(1), 59–72.
  • Ehrlich, S.D. (2007) Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies. International Organization 61(3), 571–605.
  • Epstein, D., and O’Halloran, S. (1996) The Partisan Paradox and the US Tariff, 1877–1934. International Organization 50(2), 301–24.
  • Finlayson, J.A., and Zacher, M.W. (1981) The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions. International Organization 35(4), 561–602.
  • Frye, T., and Mansfield, E.D. (2004) Timing is Everything: Elections and Trade Liberalization in the Postcommunist World. Comparative Political Studies 37(4), 371–98.
  • Gardner, G.W., and Kimbrough, K.P. (1989) The Behavior of US Tariff Rates. American Economic Review 79(1), 211–18.
  • Garrett, G., Kelemen, R.D., and Schultz, H. (1998) The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union. International Organization 52(1), 149–76.
  • Gawande, K., and Bandyopadhyay, U. (2000) Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection. Review of Economics and Statistics 82(1), 139–52.
  • Gawande, K., and Krishna, P. (2003) Political Economy of US Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches. In E.K. Choi and J. Harrigan (eds.) Handbook of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 213–50.
  • Gilligan, M.J. (1997) Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
  • Goldberg, P.K., and Maggi, G. (1999) Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review 89(5), 1135–55.
  • Goldstein, J., and Martin, L.L. (2000) Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note. International Organization 54(4), 219–48.
  • Goldstein, J., Rivers, D., and Tomz, M. (2007) Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of GATT and the WTO on World Trade. International Organization 61(1), 37–67.
  • Grossman, G.M., and Helpman, E. (1994) Protection for Sale. American Economic Review 84(4), 833–50.
  • Henisz, W.J. (2000) The Institutional Environment For Economic Growth. Economics and Politics 12(1), 1–31.
  • Henisz, W.J., and Mansfield, E.D. (2006) Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness. International Studies Quarterly 50(1), 189–212.
  • Hiscox, M.J. (2002) International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Ikenberry, G.J., Lake, D.A., and Mastanduno, M. (1988) Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy. International Organization 42(1), 1–14.
  • Irwin, D.A. (1994) The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906. Journal of Law and Economics 37(1), 75–108.
  • Irwin, D.A. (1996) Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy? Evidence from the British General Election of 1923. In R.C. Feenstra, G.M. Grossman, and D.A. Irwin (eds.) The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Essays in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 53–76.
  • Irwin, D.A., and Kroszner, R. (1999) Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: the Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley. Journal of Law and Economics 42, 643–73.
  • Karol, D. (2007) Does Constituency Size Affect Elected Officials’ Trade Policy Preferences? Journal of Politics 69(2), 483–94.
  • Katzenstein, P.J. (ed.) (1978) Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
  • Keohane, R.O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Kono, D.Y. (2006) Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. American Political Science Review 100(3), 369–84.
  • Krasner, S.D. (1978a) Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Krasner, S.D. (1978b) United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unraveling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness. In P.J. Katzenstein (ed.) Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 51–88.
  • Lewis-Beck, M.S. (1988) Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
  • Lohmann, S., and O’Halloran, S. (1994) Divided Government and US Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence. International Organization 48(4), 595–632.
  • Magee, S. (1980) Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. In P. Oppenheimer (ed.) Issues in International Economics. London: Oriel Press, pp. 138–53.
  • Magee, S.P., Brock, W.A., and Young, L. (1989) Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Mansfield, E.D., and Busch, M.L. (1995) The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis. International Organization 49(4), 723–49.
  • Mansfield, E.D., Milner, H.V., and Rosendorff, B.P. (2000) Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade. American Political Science Review 94(2), 305–21.
  • Mansfield, E.D., Milner, H.V., and Rosendorff, B.P. (2002) Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization 56(3), 477–513.
  • Mansfield, E.D., and Mutz, D.C. (2009) Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. International Organization 63(3), 425–57.
  • Mayda, A.M., and Rodrik, D. (2005) Why are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others? European Economic Review 49(6), 1393–1430.
  • McCalman, P. (2004) Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: An Empirical Investigation. Review of International Economics 12(1), 81–94.
  • McGillivray, F. (2004) Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Milner, H.V. (1988) Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Milner, H.V., and Judkins, B. (2004) Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left–Right Divide on Trade Policy? International Studies Quarterly 48(1), 95–120.
  • Milner, H.V., and Kubota, K. (2005) Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. International Organization 59(1), 107–43.
  • Mitra, D., Thomakos, D.D., and Ulubasoglu, M.A. (2002) “Protection for Sale” in a Developing Country: Democracy vs. Dictatorship. Review of Economics and Statistics 84(3), 497–508.
  • Nelson, D. (1988) Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey. American Journal of Political Science 32(3), 796–837.
  • Nielson, D.L. (2003) Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 47(3), 470–91.
  • Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • O’Rourke, K.H., and Sinnott, R. (2002) The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence. In S.M. Collins and D. Rodrik (eds.) Brookings Trade Forum. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 157–206.
  • Ozden, C., and Reinhardt, E. (2005) The Perversity of Preferences: GSP and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976–2000. Journal of Development Economics 78(1), 1–21.
  • Rodrik, D. (1994) The Rush to Free Trade in the Developing World: Why so Late? Why Now? Will It Last? In S. Haggard and S.B. Webb (eds.) Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 61–88.
  • Rodrik, D. (1995) The Political Economy of Trade Policy. In G. Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds.) Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1457–94.
  • Rogowski, R. (1989) Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Rogowski, R., and Kayser, M.A. (2002) Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries. American Journal of Political Science 46(3), 526–39.
  • Rose, A.K. (2003) Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade? American Economic Review 94(1), 98–114.
  • Rosendorff, B.P. (2005) Politics and Design of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Procedure. American Political Science Review 99(3), 389–400.
  • Russett, B.M., and Oneal, J.R. (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton.
  • Scheve, K.F., and Slaughter, M.J. (2001) What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences? Journal of International Economics 54(2), 267–92.
  • Simmons, B.A. (1994) Who Adjusts?: Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Simmons, B.A. (1998) Compliance with International Agreements. Annual Review of Political Science 1, 75–93.
  • Smith, J.M. (2003) WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of Procedure in Appellate Body Rulings. World Trade Review 2(1), 65–100.
  • Stolper, W.F., and Samuelson, P.A. (1941) Protection and Real Wages. Review of Economic Studies 9(1), 58–73.
  • Subramanian, A., and Wei, S. (2007) The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly. Journal of International Economics 72(1), 151–75.
  • Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Verdier, D. (1998) Democratic Convergence and Free Trade. International Studies Quarterly 42(1), 1–24.

Posted

in

, ,

by

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *