Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines also contain the so-called “Non-Proliferation Principle,” adopted in 1994, whereby a supplier, notwithstanding other provisions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, authorises a transfer only when satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Principle seeks to cover the rare but important cases where adherence to the NPT or to a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty may not by itself be a guarantee that a State will consistently share the objectives of the Treaty or that it will remain in compliance with its Treaty obligations.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines are consistent with, and complement, the various international, legally binding instruments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk).

The Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines are implemented by each Participating Government (PG) in accordance with its national laws and practices.

Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements.

Current Participating Governments (PGs) are:

ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELARUS, BELGIUM, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, CANADA, CHINA, CROATIA, CYPRUS, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, ESTONIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY, JAPAN, KAZAKHSTAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MEXICO, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SERBIA, SLOVAKIA, SLOVENIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, UKRAINE, UNITED KINGDOM, and UNITED STATES

The European Commission participates as observer.

History

1974 – The NSG was created following the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by a non-nuclear-weapon State, which demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused.

1978 – The Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines were published in 1978 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as IAEA document INFCIRC/254 (subsequently amended), to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities.

1990 – At the 1990 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a number of recommendations were made by the committee reviewing the implementation of Article III, which had a significant impact on the NSG’s activities in the 1990s.

1992 – In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to establish Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and technology (items which have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications), which could make a significant contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity. These Dual-Use Guidelines were published as Part 2 of INFCIRC/254, and the original Guidelines published in 1978 became Part 1 of INFCIRC/254.

1995 – The endorsement at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) of the full-scope Safeguards policy, already adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1992, clearly reflected the conviction of the international community that this nuclear supply policy is a vital element to promote shared nuclear non-proliferation commitments and obligations.

2000 – NSG Participating Governments (PGs) prepared a comprehensive information paper on the NSG for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. This was disseminated on the IAEA website as INFCIRC/539/Rev. 1 (Corr.) in November 2000, under the title “The NSG: Its Origins, Roles and Activities” .

2004 – The 2004 Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary (Göteborg) decided to adopt a “catch-all” mechanism in the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, to provide a national legal basis to control the export of nuclear related items that are not on the control lists, when such items are or may be intended for use in connection with a nuclear weapons programme

2005 – The 2005 Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary (Oslo) adopted a decision that supplier and recipient states should elaborate appropriate measures to invoke fall-back safeguards if the IAEA can no longer undertake its Safeguards mandate in a recipient state.

2008 – At an extraordinary Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary in Vienna, convened by the 2008 NSG Chair (Germany), PGs adopted a policy statement on civil nuclear cooperation with the IAEA-safeguarded Indian civil nuclear program – INFCIRC/734(corrected

2010 – To keep pace with advances in technology, market trends and security challenges, the 2010 Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary (Christchurch) agreed to establish a technical group to conduct a fundamental review of the NSG’s Trigger and Dual-Use Lists. The technical working group was called the Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE).

2011 – The 2011 Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary (Noordwijk) agreed to strengthen the NSG Part 1 Guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies (paragraph 6 and paragraph 7).

2012 – The 2012 Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary (Seattle) endorsed the recommendation of the NSG Consultative Group (CG) to approve 26 technical proposals from the DMTE. The Plenary also approved an amendment to the NSG Part 1 Guidelines, adding a new paragraph 12 entitled “Support for Access to Nuclear Fuel for Peaceful Uses” .

2013 – The Fundamental Review was completed at the 2013 NSG Plenary (Prague). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published all 54 agreed amendments in revised IAEA documents INFCIRC/254/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Part 2 on 13 November 2013. The 2013 NSG Plenary agreed to amend Paragraph 3.a and Annex C of the Part 1 Guidelines to reference recognized IAEA recommendations for physical protection and agreed to launch the new, revised NSG website to facilitate information sharing with the public in multiple languages.

Guidelines

Guidelines for nuclear Transfers

The fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls should apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon state and, in the case of controls on retransfers, to transfers to any State. In this connection, suppliers have defined the so-called trigger list. This list includes guidelines for nuclear transfers such as physical protection, safeguards, special controls on sensitive exports, special arrangements for export of enrichment facilities, controls on material usable for nuclear weapons, controls on retransfers as well as supporting activities. Annexes of the guidelines govern the export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. These include in the first annex (Annex A) material and equipment as well as technology associated with each of the items on the trigger list.

The second annex (Annex B) includes clarification of items on the trigger list:

– nuclear reactors and equipment therefor;
– non-nuclear material for reactors;
– plants and equipment for reprocessing;
– plants and equipment for fabrication of nuclear fuel elements;
– plants and equipment for separation of isotopes;
– plants for heavy water production; and
– plants and equipment for conversion.

A further annex (Annex C) describes criteria for levels of physical protection.

Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software, and related technology (INFCIRC/254, Part 2)

With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, suppliers have considered procedures in relation to the transfer of certain equipment, materials, software, and related technology that could make a major contribution to a “nuclear explosive activity,” an “unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity” or acts of nuclear terrorism. In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common definitions, and an export control list of equipment, materials, software, and related technology.

This second set of Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines governs the export of nuclear related dual-use items and technologies, that is, items that can make a major contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but which have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in industry. The list includes Guidelines for the transfer of dual-use goods which are listed in the annex. The annex lists the following categories:

– industrial equipment;
– materials;
– uranium isotope separation equipment and components (other than trigger list items);
– heavy water production plant related equipment (other than trigger list items);
– test and measurement equipment for the development of nuclear explosive devices;
– components for nuclear explosive devices.