National Defense

Economic Defense Cost

The question of “How much is enough ” when it comes to estimating the optimal defense spending of nations does not offer easy answers. The peace and disarmament lobbies argue that the state’s disbursements in defense and social welfare lead to a zero-sum game. Thus, increases in defence spending must inevitably lead to reductions in social welfare, and vice versa. This is a maximalist position, as the maintenance of the armed forces and paramilitary units is essentially intended to ensure national security. Modern defence forces should be able to dissuade enemy nations from eroding the territorial integrity of a State or restricting its national sovereignty.

U.S. Presidential Statements on 2013 and 2014 National Defense Authorization Acts in 2013

United States views on international law [1] in relation to U.S. Presidential Statements on 2013 and 2014 National Defense Authorization Acts: On January 2, 2013, President Obama signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. Pub. Law No. 112–239. The President issued a signing statement expressing concerns about several provisions in the legislation, which he signed because of its overall benefits to the U.S. military. Daily Comp. Pres. Docs. 2013 DCPD No. 00004, pp. 1-3. In particular, the legislation contains several provisions relating to detainees. Excerpts from the President’s signing statement relating to detainees appear below.

Some Aspects of U.S. Presidential Statements on 2013 and 2014 National Defense Authorization Acts

Several provisions in the bill also raise constitutional concerns. Section 1025 places limits on the military’s authority to transfer third country nationals currently held at the detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan. That facility is located within the territory of a foreign sovereign in the midst of an armed conflict. Decisions regarding the disposition of detainees captured on foreign battlefields have traditionally been based upon the judgment of experienced military commanders and national security professionals without unwarranted interference by Members of Congress. Section 1025 threatens to upend that tradition, and could interfere with my ability as Commander in Chief to make time-sensitive determinations about the appropriate disposition of detainees in an active area of hostilities. Under certain circumstances, the section could violate constitutional separation of powers principles. If section 1025 operates in a manner that violates constitutional separation of powers principles, my Administration will implement it to avoid the constitutional conflict.

Developments

Sections 1022, 1027 and 1028 continue unwise funding restrictions that curtail options available to the executive branch. Section 1027 renews the bar against using appropriated funds for fiscal year 2012 to transfer Guantanamo detainees into the United States for any purpose. I continue to oppose this provision, which substitutes the Congress’s blanket political determination for careful and fact-based determinations, made by counterterrorism and law enforcement professionals, of when and where to prosecute Guantanamo detainees. For decades, Republican and Democratic administrations have successfully prosecuted hundreds of terrorists in Federal court. Those prosecutions are a legitimate, effective, and powerful tool in our efforts to protect the Nation, and in certain cases may be the only legally available process for trying detainees. Removing that tool from the executive branch undermines our national security. Moreover, this provision would, under certain circumstances, violate constitutional separation of powers principles.

Details

Section 1028 fundamentally maintains the unwarranted restrictions on the executive branch’s authority to transfer detainees to a foreign country. This provision hinders the Executive’s ability to carry out its military, national security, and foreign relations activities and would, under certain circumstances, violate constitutional separation of powers principles. The executive branch must have the flexibility to act swiftly in conducting negotiations with foreign countries regarding the circumstances of detainee transfers. The Congress designed these sections, and has here renewed them once more, in order to foreclose my ability to shut down the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. I continue to believe that operating the facility weakens our national security by wasting resources, damaging our relationships with key allies, and strengthening our enemies. My Administration will interpret these provisions as consistent with existing and future determinations by the agencies of the Executive responsible for detainee transfers. And, in the event that these statutory restrictions operate in a manner that violates constitutional separation of powers principles, my Administration will implement them in a manner that avoids the constitutional conflict.

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On December 26, 2013, the President signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. Pub. Law. No. 113-66. President Obama’s signing statement again expressed concerns about provisions in the law relating to detainees. Daily Comp. Pres. Docs. 2013 DCPD No. 00876, pp. 1-2 (Dec. 26, 2013). Excerpts follow from the President’s signing statement.

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For the past several years, the Congress has enacted unwarranted and burdensome restrictions that have impeded my ability to transfer detainees from Guantanamo. Earlier this year I again called upon the Congress to lift these restrictions and, in this bill, the Congress has taken a positive step in that direction. Section 1035 of this Act gives the Administration additional flexibility to transfer detainees abroad by easing rigid restrictions that have hindered negotiations with foreign countries and interfered with executive branch determinations about how and where to transfer detainees. Section 1035 does not, however, eliminate all of the unwarranted limitations on foreign transfers and, in certain circumstances, would violate constitutional separation of powers principles. The executive branch must have the flexibility, among other things, to act swiftly in conducting negotiations with foreign countries regarding the circumstances of detainee transfers. Of course, even in the absence of any statutory restrictions, my Administration would transfer a detainee only if the threat the detainee may pose can be sufficiently mitigated and only when consistent with our humane treatment policy. Section 1035 nevertheless represents an improvement over current law and is a welcome step toward closing the facility.

Resources

Notes

1. U.s. Presidential Statements on 2013 and 2014 National Defense Authorization Acts in the Digest of United States Practice in International Law