Lebron V Rumsfeld

Lebron V Rumsfeld

Lebron v Rumsfeld in 2011

United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): On July 18, 2011, the United States filed a brief as amicus curiae in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lebron v. Rumsfeld. No. 11-6480, 2011 WL 2790757. The U.S. brief argued that the Court of Appeals should affirm the district court's decision dismissing the claims against current and former U.S. government officials. The claims were brought by Jose Padilla, an American citizen, and his mother (Lebron), alleging that Padilla's detention as an “enemy combatant” violated federal statutory and constitutional rights. For background on Padilla and previous challenges to his detention, see this world legal encyclopedia in relation with the year 2002 at 998-1000; World Encyclopedia of Law 2003 at 1028-29; and World Encyclopedia of Law 2005 at 1018. Plaintiffs brought their claims (1) pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents and its progeny, which allow the judiciary to imply a cause of action against federal officials for constitutional violations in certain circumstances, and (2) pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The U.S. brief argued that a Bivens action should not be recognized in the context of this case, in light of its national security and war powers implications and the fact that Congress had created other mechanisms to prevent detainee mistreatment and challenge military detention. The U.S. brief also asserted that, even if a Bivens action were recognized, qualified immunity shielded the defendants. Excerpts follow from the U.S. brief (with footnotes and citations to the record omitted).

**** This appeal presents a dispositive threshold issue, which supports dismissal of all of the claims asserted by plaintiffs under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). As the district court held, “'special factors' are present in this case which counsel hesitation in creating a right of action … in the absence of express Congressional authorization.” Those factors “include the potential impact of a Bivens claim on the Nation's military affairs, foreign affairs, intelligence, and national security” given that the decision to detain Padilla was “made in light of the most profound and sensitive issues of national security, foreign affairs and military affairs.” As the court explained, creating a cause of action would “by necessity entangle[] the Court in issues normally reserved for the Executive Branch, such as those issues related to national security and intelligence”; it would launch “a massive discovery assault in the intelligence agencies” and it “could “raise numerous complicated state secret issues.” Additionally, creating a Bivens remedy is particularly inappropriate in this context given that “Congress, fully aware of the body of litigation arising out of the detention of persons following September 11, 2001, has not seen fit to fashion a statutory cause of action to provide for… money damages.”

Developments

Here, where Padilla's damage claims directly relate, inter alia, to the President's war powers, including whether and when a person captured in this country during an armed conflict can be held in military detention under the laws of war, it would be particularly inappropriate for this Court to unnecessarily reach the merits of the constitutional claims. As Justice Kennedy noted in the Supreme Court's denial of review of the Fourth Circuit's ruling after Padilla was transferred to civilian criminal custody, “[t]hat Padilla's claims raise fundamental issues respecting the separation of powers, including consideration of the role and function of the courts, also counsels against [unnecessarily] addressing those claims.” Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S.Ct. 1649, 1650 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). That advice applies equally to Padilla's claims here.

In Bivens, the Supreme Court “recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (2009). In creating a common law action under the Fourth Amendment against federal officials for conducting a warrantless search for drugs, the Court reasoned that there were “no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-397.

Subsequent to Bivens, the Supreme Court's “more recent decisions have responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts.” Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988). …

Details

Here, there are multiple special factors counseling against recognition of a Bivens claim, and those factors, “[t]aken together,” Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983), counsel strongly against creating a Bivens remedy.

A. A Bivens Remedy Should Not Be Created Because This Case Directly Implicates National Security and War Powers The national security and war powers context presented by the claims here clearly counsels against the recognition of a Bivens action.

Even outside the Bivens context, the courts have recognized that “[m]atters intimately related to * * * national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981). As the Supreme Court explained, “unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.” Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). Thus, it is hardly surprising that courts have been particularly careful not to intrude upon quintessential sovereign prerogatives by creating a Bivens remedy in contexts involving armed conflict and national security.…

Here, the context of Padilla's Bivens claims plainly implicates these matters. Padilla was detained by the military upon the decision of the President to designate him an “enemy combatant.” He claims that the military detention was unconstitutional and seeks money damages from those who implemented this Presidential directive. His detention-related Bivens claims would require a court to consider the legality of a decision by the President to detain Padilla as an “enemy combatant.” Padilla also seeks damages in regard to the lawfulness of his treatment while in military detention. Thus, a court would have to inquire into, and rule on the lawfulness of, the conditions of Padilla's military confinement and the interrogation techniques employed against him. Congress has not provided any such cause of action, and, as the district court concluded, a court should not create a remedy in these circumstances given the national security and war powers implications.…

B. A Bivens Remedy Should Not Be Created Because Congress has Created Other Mechanisms To Protect Padilla's Interests, But Chosen Not to Create a Damage Remedy.

In the national security and war powers context, “it is irrelevant to a special factors analysis whether the laws currently on the books afford * * * an adequate federal remedy.” [United States v.] Stanley, 483 U.S. [669] at 683 [(1987)]. That being said, in addition to these compelling separation of powers factors suggesting hesitation, Congress has addressed Padilla's claimed harm in a manner that also calls for the federal courts to stay their hand in creating a damage remedy.

Even outside the national security and war powers context, where there is “any alternative, existing process for protecting” the plaintiff's interests, such existing process would raise the inference that Congress “expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand” and “refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.” Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550, 554 (2007). The congressionally-authorized mechanism need not provide for a damages action. See Zimbelman v. Savage, 228 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2000). Instead, it is more than sufficient that it reflect Congress's chosen method for protecting the interest at stake, including its judgment as to who should and should not benefit from the scheme. …

More about the Issue

Here, Congress has provided a set of mechanisms to prevent detainee mistreatment by the military and to challenge unlawful detention. These mechanisms must be viewed in the unique context presented: action by the U.S. military in carrying out its war powers where courts normally refrain from intervening, as we have discussed. Given Congress's delineation of when court involvement is appropriate and the war powers context of this case, no Bivens damages remedy should be created.

1. As to the lawfulness of detention and access to counsel claims, here there was an alternative congressionally authorized mechanism to protect the very interest he asserts. See 28 U.S.C. ¤ 2241. By bringing a habeas action, Padilla was able to challenge the lawfulness of his detention and seek access to counsel to make that remedy meaningful. As we know, two days after military detention was authorized, Padilla's counsel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his military detention, and counsel access was sought. Eventually, this Court upheld his detention as lawful based upon facts stipulated by Padilla to resolve “whether the President has the authority to detain Padilla.” Padilla, 423 F.3d at 390 n.. This Court also recognized the “importan[ce of] … restrict[ing] the detainee's communication with confederates so as to ensure that the detainee does not pose a continuing threat.” Id. at 395.

Thus, Padilla had a congressionally-authorized mechanism for challenging the lawfulness of his detention. In the wartime context presented, the habeas process should preclude the creation of a Bivens remedy. The fact that the habeas statute provides no damage remedy or personal redress against Defense Department officials is not a ground for supplementing that remedy with a judicially-created money damage claim. See Zimbelman, 228 F.3d at 371. The wartime context, and the habeas statute together provide “a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages” in regard to Padilla's claim of unlawful military detention. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.

2. With respect to allegations regarding Padilla's treatment, Congress has provided a set of enforcement mechanisms to prevent detainee mistreatment by the military. This scheme, combined with the unique context of the case, are convincing reasons to refrain creating a damages remedy.

Lebron v Rumsfeld in 2011

United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): First, as former Secretary Rumsfeld argues, the military is governed by a comprehensive system of military discipline that provides for the reporting of and investigation into any credible claims of detainee mistreatment. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. … This scheme, created by the political branches pursuant to their near-plenary authority over military matters, is designed to protect the interests of detainees, and comprises the “alternative, existing process for protecting” the plaintiff's interests that Congress selected. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.…

Further, Congress created special compensation schemes for personal injuries caused by the military. See Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733…. In the Military Claims Act, Congress provided that the military “may settle, and pay in an amount not more than 0,000, a claim against the United States for … personal injury … caused by a civilian officer or employee … or a member of the … Navy … acting within the scope of his employment, or otherwise incident to noncombat activities of that department.” 10 U.S.C. § 2733(a). This compensation statute is one of “the various 'enactments by Congress which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries' ” caused by the military, and show that an additional Bivens remedy should not be created in this context. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299.

To be sure, military regulations might preclude or limit a claim brought by an “enemy combatant” detainee like Padilla. Cf. 32 C.F.R. § 750.45(a)(5) (allowing only property claims to be brought by prisoners of war); 32 C.F.R. § 750.44(I) (precluding claims by a “national… of a country in armed conflict with the United States, or an ally of such country, unless the claimant is determined to be friendly to the United States”). But the fact the Congress conferred upon the Secretary of the Navy the authority to define and limit the circumstances when such claims would be appropriate is a strong sign that this Court should not “add layers of process to what Congress has already provided” (Zimbelman, 228 F.3d at 371) by creating a Bivens remedy.

Additionally, Congress has repeatedly considered the rights of wartime enemies detained and interrogated in U. S. custody. See, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act, § 1003(a) (prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees). While Congress has created and bolstered mechanisms to ensure that detainee treatment is lawful and appropriate, it has notably declined to create a damages remedy. Thus, in addition to the alternative review mechanisms described above, the fact that Congress has considered the issue, yet not created a damages remedy in court, should preclude the creation of a Bivens remedy here. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. In short, “Congress is in a far better a position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation against those who act on the public's behalf,” and “can tailor any remedy to the problem perceived, thus lessening the risk of raising a tide of suits threatening legitimate initiative on the part of the Government's employees.” Id. at 562…

More about Lebron v Rumsfeld

In sum, judicial creation of a damages remedy is inappropriate because this case implicates national security and war powers where the judicial branch normally stays its hand, and Congress has enacted other mechanisms to protect Padilla's interests. This Court should therefore affirm the holding of the district court declining to create a Bivens remedy, without reaching the merits of his claims.

II. THE BIVENS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

If this Court holds that no Bivens remedy should be created here, then it need not and should not reach the issue of qualified immunity in regard to those claims. If the Court does, however, reach this issue, it should hold that the district court properly found the defendants entitled to qualified immunity.

Lebron v. Rumsfeld

In relation to the international law practice and Lebron v. Rumsfeld in this world legal Encyclopedia, please see the following section:

Use of Force, Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation

About this subject:

Use of Force

Under this topic, in the Encyclopedia, find out information on:

  • Detainees
  • U.S. court decisions and proceeding
  • Former detainees: civil suits against U.S. officials

. Note: there is detailed information and resources, in relation with these topics during the year 2011, covered by the entry, in this law Encyclopedia, about Lebron v. Rumsfeld

Resources

See Also

  • Use Of Force
  • Arms Control
  • Disarmament
  • Nonproliferation
  • Detainees
  • Court Decisions
  • Court Proceedings

Resources

Notes and References

  1. **** Editor's note: On January 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion affirming the district court's dismissal of all claims. 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012).

Resources

Notes and References

  1. **** Editor's note: On January 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion affirming the district court's dismissal of all claims. 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012).

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