Judicial Proceedings for Return of Child

Judicial Proceedings for Return of Child

Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction

Right To Seek Return

When a person’s custody rights have been breached by the wrongful removal or retention of the child by another, he or she can seek return of the child pursuant to the Convention. This right of return is the core of the Convention. The Convention establishes two means by which the child may be returned. One is through direct application by the aggrieved person to a court in the Contracting State to which the child has been taken or in which the child is being kept. Articles 12, 29. The other is through application to the Central Authority to be established by every Contracting State. Article 8.

These remedies are not mutually exclusive; the aggrieved person may invoke either or both of them. Moreover, the aggrieved person may also pursue remedies outside the Convention. Articles 18, 29 and 34. This part of the report describes the Convention’s judicial remedy in detail. The administrative remedy is discussed in IV, infra. Articles 12 and 29 authorize any person who claims a breach of custody rights within the meaning of Article 3 to apply for the child’s return directly to the judicial authorities of the Contracting State where the child is located. A petition for return pursuant to the Convention may be filed any time after the child has been removed or retained up until the child reaches sixteen. While the window of time for filing may be wide in a particular case without threat of technically losing rights under the Convention, there are numerous reasons to commence a return proceeding promptly if the likelihood of a voluntary return is remote. The two most crucial reasons are to preclude adjudication of custody on the merits in a country other than the child’s habitual residence (see discussion of Article 16, infra) and to maximize the chances for the child’s return by reducing the alleged abductor’s opportunity to establish that the child is settled in a new environment (see discussion of Article 12, infra). A petition for return would be made directly to the appropriate court in the Contracting State where the child is located.

If the return proceedings are commenced less than one year from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, Article 12 requires the court to order the return of the child forthwith. If the return proceedings are commenced a year or more after the alleged wrongful removal or retention, the court remains obligated by Article 12 to order the child returned unless it is demonstrated that the child is settled in its new environment. Under Article 29 a person is not precluded from seeking judicially-ordered return of a child pursuant to laws and procedures other than the Convention. Indeed, Articles 18 and 34 make clear that nothing in the Convention limits the power of a court to return a child at any time by applying [*10508] other laws and procedures conducive to that end. Accordingly, a parent seeking return of a child from the United States could petition for return pursuant to the Convention, or in the alternative or additionally, for enforcement of a foreign court order pursuant to the UCCJA. For instance, an English father could petition courts in New York either for return of his child under the Convention and/or for recognition and enforcement of his British custody decree pursuant to the UCCJA. If he prevailed in either situation, the respective court could order the child returned to him in England.

The father in this illustration may find the UCCJA remedy swifter than invoking the Convention for the child’s return because it is not subject to the exceptions set forth in the Convention.

Legal Advice and Costs

Article 25 provides for the extension of legal aid and advice to foreign applicants on the same basis and subject only to the same eligibility requirements as for nationals of the country in which that aid is sought. Article 26 prohibits Central Authorities from charging applicants for the cost and expenses of the proceedings or, where applicable, those arising from the participation of legal counsel or advisers. This provision will be of no help to an applicant, however, if the Contracting State in question has made a reservation in accordance with Articles 26 and 42 declaring that it shall not be bound to assume any costs resulting from the participation of legal counsel or advisers or from court proceedings, except insofar as those costs may be covered by its system of legal aid and advice. It is expected that the United States will enter a reservation in accordance with Articles 26 and 42. This will place at least the initial burden of paying for counsel and legal proceedings on the applicant rather than on the federal government. Because the reservation is nonreciprocal, use of it will not automatically operate to deny applicants from the United States free legal services and judicial proceedings in other Contracting States. However, if the Contracting State in which the child is located has itself made use of the reservation in question, the U.S. applicant will not be eligible for cost-free legal representation and court proceedings.

Pleading Requirements

The Convention does not expressly set forth pleading requirements that must be satisfied by an applicant who commences a judicial return proceeding. In contrast, Article 8 sets forth the basic requirements for an application placed before a Central Authority (discussed IV.C(1), infra) for the return of the child. Since the objective is identical — the child’s return — whether relief is sought through the courts or through intercession of the Central Authority, it follows that a court should be provided with at least as much information as a Central Authority is to be provided in a return application filed in compliance with Article 8. To ensure that all necessary information is provided, the applicant may wish to append to the petition to the court a completed copy of the recommended model form for return of a child (see Annex A to this analysis).

In addition to providing the information set forth in Article 8, the petition for return should allege that the child was wrongfully removed or retained by the defendant in violation of custody rights that were actually being exercised by the petitioner. The petition should state the source of the custody rights, the date of the wrongful conduct, and the child’s age at that time. In the prayer for relief, the petitioner should request the child’s return and an order for payment by the abducting or retaining parent of all fees and expenses incurred to secure the child’s return. Any return petition filed in a court in the United States pursuant to the Convention must be in English. Any person in the United States who seeks return of a child from a foreign court must likewise follow the requirements of the foreign state regarding translation of legal documents. See Perez-Vera Report, paragraph 132 at page 467.

Admissibility of Evidence

Under Article 30, any application submitted to the Central Authority or petition submitted to the judicial authorities of a Contracting State, and any documents or information appended thereto, are admissible in the courts of the State. Moreover, under Article 23, no legalization or similar formalities may be required. However, authentication of private documents may be required. According to the official report, “any requirement of the internal law of the authorities in question that copies or private documents be authenticated remains outside the scope of this provision.” Perez-Vera Report, paragraph 131 at page 467.

Judicial Promptitude/Status Report

Once an application for return has been filed, the court is required by Article 11 “to act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.” To keep matters on the fast track, Article 11 gives the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State the right to request a statement from the court of the reasons for delay if a decision on the application has not been made within six weeks from the commencement of the proceedings.

Judicial Notice

In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention of a child within the meaning of Article 3, Article 14 empowers the court of the requested State to take notice directly of the law and decisions in the State of the child’s habitual residence. Standard procedures for the proof of foreign law and for recognition of foreign decisions would not need to be followed and compliance with such procedures is not to be required.

Court Determination of “Wrongfulness”

Prior to ordering a child returned pursuant to Article 12, Article 15 permits the court to request the applicant to obtain from the authorities of the child’s State of habitual residence a decision or other determination that the alleged removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3. Article 15 does not specify which “authorities” may render such a determination. It therefore could include agencies of government (e.g., state attorneys general) and courts. Central Authorities shall assist applicants to obtain such a decision or determination. This request may only be made where such a decision or determination is obtainable in that State.

This latter point is particularly important because in some countries the absence of the defendant-abductor and child from the forum makes it legally impossible to proceed with an action for custody brought by the left-behind parent. If an adjudication in such an action were a prerequisite to obtaining a determination of wrongfulness, it would be impossible for the petitioner to comply with an Article 15 request. For this reason a request for a decision or determination on wrongfulness can not be made in such circumstances consistent with the limitation in Article 15. Even if local law permits an adjudication of custody in the absence of the child and defendant (i.e., post-abduction) or would otherwise allow a petitioner to obtain a determination of wrongfulness, the provisions of Article 15 will probably not be resorted to routinely. That is so because doing so would convert the purpose of the Convention from seeking to restore the factual status quo prior to an abduction to emphasizing substantive legal relationships. A further consideration in deciding whether to request an applicant to comply with Article 15 is the length of time it will take to obtain the required determination.

In countries where such a determination can be made only by a court, if judicial dockets are seriously backlogged, compliance with an Article 15 order could significantly prolong disposition of the return petition, which in turn would extend the time that the child is kept in a state of legal and emotional limbo. If “wrongfulness” can be established some other way, for instance by taking judicial notice of the law of the child’s habitual residence as permitted by Article 14, the objective of Article 15 can be satisfied without further prejudice to the child’s welfare or undue delay of the return proceeding. This would also be consistent with the Convention’s desire for expeditious judicial proceedings as evidenced by Article 11.

In the United States, a left-behind parent or other claimant can petition for custody after the child has been removed from the forum. The right of action is conferred by the UCCJA, which in many states also directs courts to hear such petitions expeditiously. The result of such proceeding is a temporary or permanent custody determination allocating custody and visitation rights, or joint custody rights, between the parties. However, a custody determination on the merits that makes no reference to the Convention may not by itself satisfy an Article 15 request by a foreign court for a determination as to the wrongfulness of the conduct within the meaning of Article 3. Therefore, to ensure compliance with a possible Article 15 request the parent in the United States would be well-advised to request an explicit finding as to the wrongfulness of the alleged removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3 retention within the mearning of Article 3 in addition to seeking custody.

Constraints Upon Courts in Requested States in Making Substantive Custody Decisions

Article 16 bars a court in the country to which the child has been taken or in which the child has been retained from considering the merits of custody claims once it has received notice of the removal or retention of the child. The constraints continue either until it is determined that the child is not to be returned under the Convention, or it becomes evident that an application under the Convention will not be forthcoming within a reasonable time following receipt of the notice. A court may get notice of a wrongful removal or retention in some manner other than the filing of a petition for return, for instance by communication from a Central Authority, from the aggrieved party (either directly or through counsel), or from a court in a Contracting State which has stayed or dismissed return proceedings upon removal of the child from that State.

No matter how notice may be given, once the tribunal has received notice, a formal application for the child’s return pursuant to the Convention will normally be filed promptly to avoid a decision on the merits from being made. If circumstances warrant a delay in filing a return petition, for instance pending the outcome of private negotiations for the child’s return or interventions toward that end by the Central Authority, or pending determination of the location of the child and alleged abductor, the aggrieved party may nevertheless wish to notify the court as to the reason(s) for the delay so that inaction is not viewed as a failure to proceed under the Convention.

Duty To Return not Absolute

The judicial duty to order return of a wrongfully removed or retained child is not absolute. Temporal qualifications on this duty are set forth in Articles 12, 4 and 35. Additionally, Articles 13 and 20 set forth grounds upon which return may be denied.

1. Temporal Qualifications

Articles 4, 35 and 12 place time limitations on the return obligation.

Article 4

Pursuant to Article 4, the Convention ceases to apply once the child reaches age sixteen. This is true regardless of when return proceedings were commenced and irrespective of their status at the time of the child’s sixteenth birthday. See I.A., supra.

Article 35

Article 35 limits application of the Convention to wrongful removals or retentions oocurring after its entry into force between the two relevant Contracting States. But see I.C., supra.

Article 12

Under Article 12, the court is not obligated to return a child when return proceedings pursuant to the Convention are commenced a year or more after the alleged removal or retention and it is demonstrated that the child is settled in its new environment. The reporter indicates that “[T]he provision does not state how this fact is to be proved, but it would seem logical to regard such a task as falling upon the abductor or upon the person who opposes the return of the child . . .” Perez-Vera Report, paragraph 109 at page 459. If the Convention is to succeed in deterring abductions, the alleged abductor must not be accorded preferential treatment by courts in his or her country of origin, which, in the absence of the Convention, might be prone to favor “home forum” litigants. To this end, nothing less than substantial evidence of the child’s significant connections to the new country is intended to suffice to meet the respondent’s burden of proof.

Moreover, any claims made by the person resisting the child’s return will be considered in light of evidence presented by the applicant concerning the child’s contacts with and ties to his or her State of habitual residence. The reason for the passage of time, which may have made it possible for the child to form ties to the new country, is also relevant to the ultimate disposition of the return petition. If the alleged wrongdoer concealed the child’s whereabouts from the custodian necessitating a long search for the child and thereby delayed the commencement of a return proceeding by the applicant, it is highly questionable whether the respondent should be permitted to benefit from such conduct absent strong countervailing considerations.

Article 13 Limitations on the Return Obligation

Legislative history

In drafting Articles 13 and 20, the representatives of countries participating in negotiations on the Convention were aware that any exceptions had to be drawn very narrowly lest their application undermine the express purposes of the Convention — to effect the prompt return of abducted children. Further, it was generally believed that courts would understand and fulfill the objectives of the Convention by narrowly interpreting the exceptions and allowing their use only in clearly meritorious cases, and only when the person opposing return had met the burden of proof. Importantly, a finding that one or more of the exceptions provided by Articles 13 and 20 are applicable does not make refusal of a return order mandatory. The courts retain the discretion to order the child returned even if they consider that one or more of the exceptions applies. Finally, the wording of each exception represents a compromise to accommodate the different legal systems and tenets of family law in effect in the [*10510] countries negotiating the Convention, the basic purpose in each case being to provide for an exception that is narrowly construed.

Non-exercise of custody rights

Under Article 13(a), the judicial authority may deny an application for the return of a child if the person having the care of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of the removal or retention, or had consented to or acquiesced in the removal or retention. This exception derives from Article 3(b) which makes the Convention applicable to the breach of custody rights that were actually exercised at the time of the removal or retention, or which would have been exercised but for the removal or retention. The person opposing return has the burden of proving that custody rights were not actually exercised at the time of the removal or retention, or that the applicant had consented to or acquiesced in the removal or retention.

The reporter points out that proof that custody was not actually exercised does not form an exception to the duty to return if the dispossessed guardian was unable to exercise his rights precisely because of the action of the abductor. PerezVera Report, paragraph 115 at page 461. The applicant seeking return need only allege that he or she was actually exercising custody rights conferred by the law of the country in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention.

The statement would normally include a recitation of the circumstances under which physical custody had been exercised, i.e., whether by the holder of these rights, or by a third person on behalf of the actual holder of the custody rights. The applicant would append copies of any relevant legal documents or court orders to the return application. See Article 8.

Grave risk of harm/intolerable situation

Under Article 13(b), a court in its discretion need not order a child returned if there is a grave risk that return would expose the child to physical harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. This provision was not intended to be used by defendants as a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child’s best interests. Only evidence directly establishing the existence of a grave risk that would expose the child to physical or emotional harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation is material to the court’s determination. The person opposing the child’s return must show that the risk to the child is grave, not merely serious.

A review of deliberations on the Convention reveals that “intolerable situation” was not intended to encompass return to a home where money is in short supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited than in the requested State. An example of an “intolerable situation” is one in which a custodial parent sexually abuses the child. If the other parent removes or retains the child to safeguard it against further victimization, and the abusive parent then petitions for the child’s return under the Convention, the court may deny the petition. Such action would protect the child from being returned to an “intolerable situation” and subjected to a grave risk of psychological harm.

Child’s preference

The third, unlettered paragraph of Article 13 permits the court to decline to order the child returned if the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of the child’s views. As with the other Article 13 exceptions to the return obligation, the application of this exception is not mandatory. This discretionary aspect of Article 13 is especially important because of the potential for brainwashing of the child by the alleged abductor. A child’s objection to being returned may be accorded little if any weight if the court believes that the child’s preference is the product of the abductor parent’s undue influence over the child.

Role of social studies

The final paragraph of Article 13 requires the court, in considering a respondent’s assertion that the child should not be returned, to take into account information relating to the child’s social background provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority in the child’s State of habitual residence. This provision has the dual purpose of ensuring that the court has a balanced record upon which to determine whether the child is to be returned, and preventing the abductor from obtaining an unfair advantage through his or her own forum selection with resulting ready access to evidence of the child’s living conditions in that forum.

Article 20

Article 20 limits the return obligation of Article 12. It states: “The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The best explanation for this unique formulation is that the Convention might never have been adopted without it. The negotiating countries were divided on the inclusion of a public policy exception in the Convention. Those favoring a public policy exception believed that under some extreme circumstances not covered by the exceptions of Article 13 a court should be excused from returning a child to the country of habitual residence.

In contrast, opponents of a public policy exception felt that such an exception could be interpreted so broadly as to undermine the fabric of the entire Convention. A public policy clause was nevertheless adopted at one point by a margin of one vote. That clause provided: “Contracting States may reserve the right not to return the child when such return would be manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of the law relating to the family and children in the State addressed.”

To prevent imminent collapse of the negotiating process engendered by the adoption of this clause, there was a swift and determined move to devise a different provision that could be invoked on the rare occasion that return of a child would utterly shock the conscience of the court or offend all notions of due process. The resulting language of Article 20 has no known precedent in other international agreements to serve as a guide in its interpretation. However, it should be emphasized that this exception, like the others, was intended to be restrictively interpreted and applied, and is not to be used, for example, as a vehicle for litigating custody on the merits or for passing judgment on the political system of the country from which the child was removed. Two characterizations of the effect to be given Article 20 are recited below for illumination.

The following explanation of Article 20 is excerpted from paragraph 118 of the Perez-Vera Report at pages 461-2:

“It is significant that the possibility, acknowledged in article 20, that the child may not be returned when its return ‘would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ has been placed in the last article of the chapter; it was thus intended to emphasize the always clearly exceptional nature of this provision’s application. As for the substance of this provision, two comments only are required. Firstly, even if its literal meaning is strongly reminiscent of the terminology used in international texts concerning the protection of human rights, this particular rule is not directed at developments which have occurred on the international level, but is concerned only with the principles accepted by the law of the requested State, either through general international law and treaty law, or through internal legislation. Consequently, so as to be able to refuse to return a child on the basis of this article, it will be necessary to show that the fundamental principles of the requested State concerning the subject-matter of the Convention do not permit it; it will not be sufficient to show merely that its return would be incompatible, even manifestly incompatible, with these principles. Secondly, such principles must not be invoked any more frequently, nor must their invocation be more readily admissible than they would be in their application to purely internal matters. Otherwise, the provision would be discriminatory in itself, and opposed to one of the most widely recognized fundamental principles in internal laws. A study of the case law of different countries shows that the application by ordinary judges of the laws on human rights and fundamental freedoms is undertaken with a care which one must expect to see maintained in the international situations which the Convention has in view.”

A. E. Anton, Chairman of the Commission on the Hague Conference on Private International Law that drafted the Convention, explained Article 20 in his article, “The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction,” 30 I.C.L.Q. 537, 551-2 (July, 1981), as follows: Its acceptance may in part have been due to the fact that it states a rule which many States would have been bound to apply in any event, for example, by reason of the terms of their constitutions. The reference in this provision to “the fundamental principles of the requested State” make it clear that the reference is not one to international conventions or declarations concerned with the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms which have been ratified or accepted by Contracting States. It is rather to the fundamental provisions of the law of the requested State in such matters . . . If the United Kingdom decides to ratify the Hague Convention, it will, of course, be for the implementing legislation or the courts to specify what provisions of United Kingdom law come within the scope of Article 20. The Article, however, is merely permissive and it is to be hoped that States will exercise restraint in availing themselves of it.

J. Return of the Child

Assuming the court has determined that the removal or retention of the child was wrongful within the meaning of the Convention and that no exceptions to the return obligation have been satisfactorily established by the respondent, Article 12 provides that “the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.” The Convention does not technically require that the child be returned to his or her State of habitual residence, although in the classic abduction case this will occur. If the petitioner has moved from the child’s State of habitual residence the child will be returned to the petitioner, not the State of habitual residence.

Return Order not on Custody merits

Under Article 19, a decision under the Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue. It follows that once the factual status quo ante has been restored, litigation concerning custody or visitation issues could proceed. Typically this will occur in the child’s State of habitual residence.

Costs, Fees and Expenses Shifted to Abductor

In connection with the return order, Article 26 permits the court to direct the person who removed or retained the child to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the applicant to secure the child’s return, including expenses, costs incurred or payments made for locating the child, costs of legal representation of the applicant, and those of returing the child. The purposes underlying Article 26 are to restore the applicant to the financial position he or she would have been in had there been no removal or retention, as well as to deter such conduct from happening in the first place. This fee shifting provision has counterparts in the UCCJA (sections 7(g), 8(c), 15(b)) and the PKPA (28 U.S.C. 1738A note).