Interpretivist Theories of Law

Papers and Books

• Larry Alexander (1987). Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin’s Theory of Law. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 6 (3):419 – 438. In Law’s Empire Dworkin remains committed to carving out a middleground between natural law and legal positivism. But natural law andlegal positivism are best viewed as complementary answers to differ-ent questions, There is no middle ground between them. Nor is thequestion that Dworkin’s Integrity asks one that could be coherentlyanswered i f it were an important question. Fortunately, it is not.
• Mark Alfano (2009). Hypothetical Intentionalism in Statutory Interpretation. US-China Law Review 6 (12):54-58.
• Thom Brooks (2007). Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism: Dworkin and Hegel on Legal Theory. Georgia State University Law Review 23 (3):513-60. In this article, I argue that – despite the absence of any clear influence of one theory on the other – the legal theories of Dworkin and Hegel share several similar and, at times, unique positions that join them together within a distinctive school of legal theory, sharing a middle position between natural law and legal positivism. In addition, each theory can help the other in addressing certain internal difficulties.
• Thom Brooks (2005). Hegel’s Ambiguous Contribution to Legal Theory. Res Publica 11 (1):85-94. Hegel’s legacy is particularly controversial, not least in legal theory. He has been classified as a proponent of either natural law, legal positivism, the historical school, pre-Marxism, postmodern critical theory, and even transcendental legal theory. To what degree has Hegel actually influenced contemporary legal theorists? This review article looks at Michael Salter’s collection Hegel and Law. I look at articles on civil disobedience, contract law, feminism, and punishment. I conclude noting similarities between Hegel’s legal theory and that of Ronald Dworkin.
• Brian E. Butler (2001). Is All Judicial Decision-Making Unavoidably Interpretive? Legal Studies Forum (3&4):315-329.
• Brian E. Butler (2000). Posner’s Problem with Moral Philosophy. The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 7:325-343.
• Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2011). Law is Not (Best Considered) an Essentially Contested Concept. International Journal of Law in Context 7:209-232. I argue that law is not best considered an essentially contested concept. After first explaining the notion of essential contestability and disaggregating the concept of law into several related concepts, I show that the most basic and general concept of law does not fit within the criteria generally offered for essential contestation. I then buttress this claim with the additional explanation that essential contestation is itself a framework for understanding complex concepts and therefore should only be applied when it is (…)
• Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2008). Archimedean Metaethics Defended. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):508-529. We sometimes say our moral claims are “objectively true,” or are “right, even if nobody believes it.” These additional claims are often taken to be staking out metaethical positions, representative of a certain kind of theorizing about morality that “steps outside” the practice in order to comment on its status. Ronald Dworkin has argued that skepticism about these claims so understood is not tenable because it is impossible to step outside such practices.
• Pavlos Eleftheriadis. The Law of Laws. Transnational Legal Theory 1 (3). How can legal orders coexist? Contemporary lawyers and philosophers frequently accept that a legal system operates under its own terms and is shaped by its own participants. Any problems posed by the plurality of legal orders in the world are to be dealt with by each legal order separately. So persons that are caught in transnational disputes because they are subject to two or more jurisdictions, have recourse to private international law, which is always part of domestic law.
• David Fagelson (2002). Justice As Integrity: Objectivity And Social Meaning In Legal Theory. Social and Legal Studies 11 (4):569-588.
• Ross Motabhoy (2012). A Critical Examination of Jiri Priban’s “Doing What Comes Naturally, or a Walk on the Wild Side? Stanlet Fish’s Antifoundationalist Concept of Law, It’s Closure and Force”. Dissertation, University of Kent.

Resources

See Also

• Legal Positivism
• Natural Law Theory
• Legal Realism
• Mixed Theories of Law
• Nature of Law