Genealogies of Property

Main source: Waldron, Jeremy, “Property and Ownership”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

Genealogies of Property

From: Historical Overview of Property

In our philosophical tradition, arguments about the justification of property have often been presented as genealogies: as stories about the way in which private property might have emerged in a world that was hitherto unacquainted with the institution.

The best known are Lockean stories (Locke 1988 [1689] and Nozick 1974). One begins with a description of a state of nature and an initial premise about land belonging to nobody in particular. And then one tells a story about why it would be sensible for individuals to appropriate land and other resources for their personal use and about the conditions under which such appropriations would be justified. Individuals have needs and they find themselves surrounded with objects capable of satisfying those needs. But each person, X, is vaguely aware that the objects have not been furnished by God or nature for X’s use alone; others have a need for them as well. So what is X to do? One thing is clear: if X has to wait for some general meeting of everyone who might be affected by his use of the resources in his vicinity before he is allowed to use them then, as Locke put it, ‘man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him’ (Locke 1988 [1689], II, para. 28). So the individual goes ahead and takes what he needs (ibid., I, para. 86). He ‘mixes his labor’ with the object he needs, and by doing so he fulfills his fundamental duty of self-preservation, while also increasing the value of the resources he works on for the indirect benefit of others. The first phase of Locke’s story involves individuals satisfying their needs out of the common largesse in this virtuous and self-reliant way. The second phase of the story involves their exchanging surplus goods that they have appropriated with one another; rather than saying that such surpluses lapse back into the common heritage, Locke allows individuals to acquire, grow, or make more than they can use so that markets become possible and prosperity general (ibid., II, paras. 46-51). With markets and prosperity, however, comes inequality, avarice and envy, and the third and last stage of Locke’s account is the institution of government to protect the property rights that have grown up in this way (ibid., II, paras. 123 ff.) The story assumes that individuals are able to reason through these issues of who is entitled to appropriate and use and exchange goods without the tutelage of government, and that at neither the first stage nor the second stage is any social or political decision-making about property required.

In its most basic aspect, Locke’s genealogy has the character of a First Occupancy story. In the first instance, the legitimacy of an individual’s appropriation stems largely from the fact that it does not involve the direct expropriation of anyone else: by definition the ‘first occupancy’ is peaceful. There are, of course, strong elements of utilitarian and virtue theory in Locke’s account too-the productivity of labor and the privileging of what Locke calls ‘the Industrious and the Rational’ over the ‘Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious’ (ibid., II, para. 34). But the issue of historical priority is indispensable. Whose use of a given resource came first is crucial, and the order in which goods were subsequently transferred from hand to hand is indispensable for understanding the legitimacy of current entitlements. Robert Nozick (1974) has done more than anyone else to elucidate the form of this kind of ‘historical entitlement’ theory.

Not all genealogies of property have this shape. David Hume tells a completely different sort of story. On his approach, we begin by assuming that since time immemorial, people have been fighting over resources, so that the distribution of de facto possession at any given time is arbitrary, being driven by force, cunning, and luck. Now it is possible that such fighting will continue indefinitely. But it is also possible that it may settle down into a sort of stable equilibrium in which those in possession of significant resources and those tempted to grab resources from others find that the marginal costs of further predatory activity are equal to their marginal gains. Under these conditions, something like a ‘peace dividend’ may be available. Maybe everyone can gain, in terms of the diminution of conflict, the stabilizing of social relations, and the prospects for market exchange, by an agreement not to fight any more over possessions.

I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express’d, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour… (Hume 1978 [1739], p. 490).

Such a resolution, if it lasts, may amount over time to a ratification of de facto holdings as de jure property. As with Locke’s account, the state comes into the picture much later to reinforce conventions of property that emerge informally in this way (ibid., pp. 534 ff.). But notice how much more modest Hume’s story is than the Lockean account in the moral claims that it makes (see Waldron 1994). The stability of the emergent distribution has nothing to do with its justice, nor with the moral quality of the actions by which goods were appropriated. It may be fair or unfair, equal or unequal, but the parties already know that they cannot hope for a much better distribution by pitching their own strength yet again against that of others. (See also Buchanan 1975 for a modern version of this approach.)

As an account of the genesis of property, Hume’s theory has the advantage over its main rivals of acknowledging that the early eras of human history are eras of conflict largely unregulated by principle and opaque to later moral enquiry. It does not require us to delve into history to ascertain who did what to whom, and what would have happened if they had not. Once a settled pattern of possession emerges, we simply draw an arbitrary line and say, ‘Property entitlements start from here.’ The model has important normative consequences for the present as well. Those who are tempted to question or disrupt an existing distribution of property must recognize that far from ushering in a new era of justice, their best efforts are likely to inaugurate an era of conflict in which all bets are off and in which virtually no planning or cooperation is possible. The weakness of the Humean approach is the obverse of its strength. The moral considerations that it marginalizes actually do matter to us. For example, we would not be happy with a Humean convention ratifying slavery or cannibalism, but for all that Hume shows it may well be a feature of the equilibrium emerging from the age of conflict that some people are in possession of others’ bodies. The point is that even if Hume is right that the sentiment of justice is built up out of a convention to respect one another’s de facto possessions, that sentiment once established can take on a life of its own, so that it can subsequently be turned against the very equilibrium that engendered it (Waldron 1994).

A third variety of property-story makes the state and the social contract more fundamental than it is in either Locke’s or Hume’s approach. We are to imagine a period where people try and rely on their own physical and moral initiative to take possession of the resources which they need or want, but in which it become increasingly apparent that institution of reliable property arrangements is going to have to involve a social decision. Eventually property must be based on consent-the consent of everyone affected by decisions about the use and control of a given set of resources. This theory is associated with the normative political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1968 [1762]) and Immanuel Kant (1991 [1797]). As we have seen, the Lockean critique of this sort of approach was always that urgency of material need left no time for social consent. In fact the Rousseau /Kant approach has little difficulty with this point. There can be provisional appropriations made unilaterally (Ryan 1984, p. 80). But every such appropriation is subject in principle to the consent of all and must be offered up for social ratification. In other words, the urgency of immediate need is not taken as a basis of discrediting the review and redistribution of possession by society as a whole if serious distributive anomalies are emerging.

What all this actually yields in the way of a legitimate assignment of resources to individuals is a matter of the distributive principles that survive the test of ratification by the general will. Rawlsian, egalitarian and utilitarian approaches are all imaginable under the auspices of this account. The essence of the Rousseau/Kant approach is that society’s deployment of principles like these to evaluate existing distributions is never trumped by the history of entitlements and it is never excluded by the Humean conventions that may have emerged as a cosy equilibrium among those who are actually in possession.

What claims are being made about these stories? Are we to assume that one of them is literally true? Or what are we to infer from their falsity (if they are historically inaccurate)? Does it follow that property is illegitimate? A number of philosophers have suggested recently that a genealogy can make an important contribution to our understanding of a phenomenon even when it is not literally true: Bernard Williams (2002) has suggested this about language and the emergence of truth-telling, following Edward Craig (1990)’s genealogical account of our possession of the concept of knowledge. Robert Nozick has also discussed the value of what he calls ‘potential explanations’-stories that would explain how something happened if certain things were the case (some of which in fact are not the case): ‘To see how in principle, a whole realm could fundamentally be explained greatly increases our understanding of the realm…We learn much by seeing how the state could have arisen, even if it didn’t arise that way’ (Nozick 1974, pp. 8-9).

The genealogies we have considered may differ in this regard. The Rousseau/Kant approach helps us understand why private property is inherently a matter of social concern and the Humean approach helps us see the value of property in providing people with a fixed and mutually acknowledged basis on which the rest of social life can be built, whether or not it answers to our independent intuitions of justice. But the Lockean genealogy may explain little or nothing about property entitlements unless it is actually true. As Nozick acknowledges (1974, pp. 151-2), a modern state should not feel morally constrained by property holdings which might have had a Lockean pedigree but in fact do not. In this regard it is interesting that one of the main uses of Lockean theory these days is in defending the property rights of indigenous people-where a literal claim is being made about who had first possession of a set of resources and about the need to rectify the injustices that accompanied their subsequent expropriation (see Waldron 1992).

Finally, we should not forget that not all genealogies set out to flatter the practices or institutions they purport to explain. Karl Marx (1976 [1867]) ‘s account of primitive accumulation and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s non-normative description of the invention of property in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (Rousseau 1994 [1755]) are genealogies written more in a Nietzschean spirit of pathology than as part of any quest for justification. Such negative genealogies reminds us of the importance of Mill’s observation that in approaching the justification of private property we must remember that, ‘we must leave out of consideration its actual origin in any of the existing nations of Europe’ (Mill 1994 [1848], p. 7).
5. Justification: Liberty and Consequences

The justificatory issue might therefore be confronted directly, without invoking any sort of history or genealogical narrative.

In dealing with the pros and cons of private property as an institution, it has sometimes been suggested that the general justification of private property and the distribution of particular property rights can be treated as separate issues, rather in the way that some philosophers suggested that the general justification of punishment can be separated from the principles governing its distribution (Hart 1968, p. 4; see also Ryan 1984, p. 82 and Waldron 1988, p. 330). In neither case, though, is the separation complete: it holds for some general justifications and not for others. In the theory of punishment, a retributivist will believe that the principles governing punishment in general necessarily also regulate its particular distribution. And there are analogues in the theory of property. Robert Nozick (1974) argued that a theory of historical entitlement, along Lockean lines, provides both a complete justification of the institution and a set of strict criteria that govern its legitimate distribution. Property rights, according to Nozick, constrain the extent to which we are entitled to act on our intuitions and theories about distributive justice. Consequentialist theories, however, may be able to separate the institutional and distributive issues in this way, and some theories of liberty may be able to do this also (though the distribution of liberty is itself something about which most libertarians have firm-and egalitarian!-views). As we assess various distributive arguments, then, it is a good idea to keep in mind the question of whether or not they have direct or indirect distributive implications.

The most common form of justificatory argument is consequentialist: people in general are better off when a given class of resources is governed by a private property regime than by any alternative system. Under private property, it is said, the resources will be more wisely used, or used to satisfy a wider (and perhaps more varied) set of wants than under any alternative system, so that the overall enjoyment that humans derive from a given stock of resources will be increased. The most persuasive argument of this kind is sometimes referred to as ‘the tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). If everyone is entitled to use a given piece of land, then no one has an incentive to see that crops are planted or that the land is not over-used. Or if anyone does take on this responsibility, they themselves are likely to bear all the costs of doing so (the costs of planting or the costs of their own self-restraint), while any benefits of their prudence will accrue to all subsequent users. And in many cases there will be no benefits, since one individual’s planning or restraint will be futile unless others cooperate. So, under a system of common property, each commoner has an incentive to get as much as possible from the land as quickly as possible, since the benefits of doing this are in the short-term concentrated and assured, while the long-term benefits of self-restraint are uncertain and diffused. However, if a piece of hitherto common land is divided into parcels and each parcel is assigned to a particular individual who can control what happens there, then planning and self-restraint will have an opportunity to assert themselves. For now the person who bears the cost of restraint is in a position to reap all the benefits; so that if people are rational and if restraint (or some other form of forward-looking activity) is in fact cost-effective, there will be an overall increase in the amount of utility derived.

Arguments of this sort are familiar and important, but like all consequentialist arguments, they need to be treated with caution. In most private property systems, there are some individuals who own little or nothing, and who are entirely at the mercy of others. So when it is said that ‘people in general’ are better off under private property arrangements, we have to ask ‘Which people? Everyone? The majority? Or just a small class of owners whose prosperity is so great as to offset the consequent immiseration of the others in an aggregative utilitarian calculus?’ John Locke hazarded the suggestion that everyone would be better off. Comparing England, whose commons were swiftly being enclosed by private owners, to pre-colonial America, where the natives continued to enjoy universal common access to land, Locke speculated that ‘a King of a large and fruitful Territory there [i.e. in America] feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in England.’ (Locke 1988 [1689], II, para. 41) The laborer may not own anything, but his standard of living is higher on account of the employment prospects that are offered in a prosperous privatized economy. Alternatively, the more optimistic of the consequentialists cast their justifications in the language of what we would now call ‘Pareto-improvement’. Maybe the privatization of previously common land does not benefit everybody: but it benefits some and it leaves others no worse off than they were before. The homelessness and immiseration of the poor, on this account, is not a result of private property; it is simply the natural predicament of mankind from which a few energetic appropriators have managed to extricate themselves.

So far we have considered the consequentialist case for private property over common property. The consequentialist case for private property over collective property has more to do with markets than with the need for responsibility and self-restraint in resource use. The argument for markets is that in a complex society there are innumerable decisions to be made about the allocation of particular resources to particular production processes. Is a given ton of coal better used to generate electricity which will in turn be used to refine aluminum for manufacturing cooking pots or aircraft, or to produce steel which can be used to build railway trucks, which may in turn be used to transport either cattle feed or bauxite from one place to another? In most economies there are hundreds of thousands of distinct factors of production, and it has proved impossible for efficient decisions about their allocation to be made by central agencies acting in the name of the community and charged with overseeing the economy as a whole. In actually existing socialist societies, central planning turned out to be a way of ensuring economic paralysis, inefficiency and waste (Mises 1951). In market economies, decisions like these are made on a decentralized basis by thousands of individuals and firms responding to price signals, each seeking to maximize profits from the use of the productive resources under its control, and such a system often works efficiently. Some have speculated that there could be markets without private property (Rawls, 1971, p. 273), but this seems hopeless. Unless individual managers in a market economy are motivated directly or indirectly by considerations of personal profit in their investment and allocation decisions, they cannot be expected to respond efficiently to prices. Such motivation will occur only if the resources are privately owned, so that the loss is theirs (or their employer’s) when a market signal is missed and the gain is theirs (or their employer’s) when a profitable allocation is secured.

I said earlier that a consequentialist defense is in trouble unless it can show that everyone is better off under a private property system, or at least that no-one is worse off. Now, a society in which all citizens derive significant advantages from the privatization of the economy is perhaps not an impossible ideal. But in every existing private property system there is a class of people who own little or nothing and who are arguably much worse off under that system than they would be under a socialist alternative. A justificatory theory cannot ignore their predicament, if only because it is their predicament that poses the justificatory issue in the first place (Waldron 1993). A hard-line consequentialist may insist that the advantages to those who profit from private ownership outweigh the costs to the underclass. Philosophically, however, this sort of hard line is quite disreputable (Rawls 1971, pp. 22-33; Nozick 1974, pp. 32-3). If we take the individual rather than a notional entity like ‘the social good’ as the focal point of moral justification, then there ought to be something we can say to each individual why the institution we are defending is worthy of her support. Otherwise it is not at all clear why she should be expected to observe its rules (except when we have the power and the numbers to compel her to do so).

Maybe the consequentialist argument can be supplemented with an argument about desert in order to show that there is justice in some people’s enjoying the fruits of private property while others languish in poverty. If private property involves the wiser and more efficient use of resources, it is because someone has exercised virtues of prudence, industry, and self-restraint. People who languish in poverty, on this account, do so largely because of their idleness, profligacy or want of initiative. Now, theories like this are easily discredited if they purport to justify the actual distribution of wealth under an existing private property economy (Nozick 1974, pp. 158-9; Hayek 1976). But there is a more modest position which desert theorists can adopt: namely, that private property alone offers a system in which idleness is not rewarded at the expense of industry, a system in which those who take on the burdens of prudence and productivity can expect to reap some reward for their virtue which distinguishes them from those who did not make any such effort (Munzer 1990, pp. 285 ff.).

Many of the alleged market-advantages accrue only if private property is distributed in certain ways. Monopolistic control of the main factors of production by a few individuals or corporations can play havoc with market efficiency; and it can also lead to such great concentrations of private power as to offset any argument for property based on freedom, dissent or democracy. Distributive equity may be crucial also for non-consequentialist arguments. The idea that property-owning promotes virtue is, as we have seen, as old as Aristotle; and even today it is used by civic republicans as an argument against economic collectivism. According to this argument, if most economic resources are owned in common or controlled collectively for everyone’s benefit, there is no guarantee that citizen’s conditions of life will be such as to promote republican virtue. In a communist or collectivist society, citizens may behave either as passive beneficiaries of the state or irresponsible participants in a tragedy of the commons. If a generation or two grow up with that character then the integrity of the whole society is in danger. These arguments are interesting, but it is worth noting how sensitive they are to the distribution of property (Waldron 1986, pp. 323-42). As T.H. Green observed, a person who owns nothing in a capitalist society ‘might as well, in respect of the ethical purposes which the possession of property should serve, be denied rights of property altogether’ (Green 1941 [1895], p. 219).

Lastly I want to consider justificatory arguments that connect property with liberty. Societies with private property are often described as free societies. Part of what this means is surely that owners are free to use their property as they please; they are not bound by social or political decisions. (And correlatively, the role of government in economic decision-making is minimized.) But that cannot be all that is meant, for it would be equally apposite to describe private property as a system of unfreedom, since it necessarily involves the social exclusion of people from resources that others own. All property systems distribute freedoms and unfreedoms; no system of property can be described without qualification as a system of liberty. Someone may respond that the liberty to use what belongs to another is license not liberty, and so its exclusion should not really count against a private property system in the libertarian calculus. But the price of this maneuver is very high: not only does it commit the libertarian to a moralized conception of freedom of the sort that he usually shies away from (as in case of positive liberty), but it also means that liberty, so defined, can no longer be invoked to support property except in a question-begging way (Cohen 1982).

Two other things might be implied by the libertarian characterization. The first is a point about independence: a person who owns a significant amount of private property-a home, say, and a source of income-has less to fear from the opinion and coercion of others than the citizen of a society in which some other form of property predominates. The former inhabits, in a fairly literal sense, the ‘private sphere’ that liberals have always treasured for individuals-a realm of action in which he need answer to no-one but himself. But like the virtue argument, this version of the libertarian case is also sensitive to distribution: for those who own nothing in a private property economy would seem to be as unfree-by this argument-as anyone would be in a socialist society.

That last point may be too quick, however, for there are other indirect ways in which private property contributes to freedom. Milton Friedman (1962) argues that political liberty is enhanced in a society where the means of intellectual and political production (printing presses, photocopying machines, computers) are controlled by a number of private individuals, firms, and corporations-even if that number is not very large. In a capitalist society, a dissident has the choice of dealing with several people (other than state officials) if he wants to get his message across, and many of them are prepared to make their media available simply on the basis of money, without regard to the message. In a socialist society, by contrast, those who are politically active either have to persuade state agencies to disseminate their views, or risk underground publication. More generally, Friedman argues, a private property society offers those who own nothing a greater variety of ways in which they earn a living-a larger menu of masters, if you like-than they would be offered in a socialist society. In these ways, private property for some may make a positive contribution to freedom-or at least an enhancement of choice-for everyone.
Bibliography

Ackerman, Bruce (1977), Private Property and the Constitution, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Aquinas, Thomas, [ST] Summa Theologiae [1272], in Paul E. Sigmund (ed.) St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, New York: W.W. Norton, 1988.
Aristotle, The Politics [c. 330 BCE], Stephen Everson (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Benn, S.I., and and Peters, R.S. (1959), Social Principles and the Democratic State, London: George Allen and Unwin.
Bentham, Jeremy (1931), The Theory of Legislation [1802], C.K. Ogden (ed.), London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
Blackstone, William (2001), Blackstone’s commentaries on the Laws of England [1763], Wayne Morrison (ed.), London: Cavendish Publishing.
Buchanan, James M. (1975), The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cohen, G.A. (1979) ‘Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat,’ in Alan Ryan (ed.) The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honor of Isaiah Berlin, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, G.A. (1995), Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Craig, E.J. (1990), Knowledge and the State of Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Friedman, Milton (1962), Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gallie,W.B. (1956) ‘Essentially Contested Concepts,’ Proceedings of the Aristotlean Society, 56: 167-188.
Green, T.H. (1941), Lectures on the Principles of Politicla Obligation [1895], London: Longmans Green & Co.
Grey, T.C. (1980), ‘The Disintegration of Property,’ in J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.) Nomos XXII: Property (New York: New York University Press.
Hardin, Garrett (1968), ‘The Tragedy of the Commons,’ Science, 162: 1243-8.
Hart, H.L.A. (1968), Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hayek, F.A. (1976), The Mirage of Social Justice Law, Volume II of Law, Legislation and Liberty, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Hegel, G.W. F. (1967), The Philosophy of Right [1821], T.M. Knox (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hobbes,Thomas (1983), De Cive: The English Version [1647], Howard Warrender (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Honore, A.M. (1961), ‘Ownership’ in A.G. Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horne, Thomas A. (1990), Property Rights and Poverty: Political Argument in Britain, 1605-1834, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Hume, David (1978), A Treatise of Human Nature [1739] L.A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kant, Immanuel (1991) The Metaphysics of Morals [1797], Mary Gregor (trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
King, Desmond and Waldron, Jeremy (1988) ‘Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Rights,’ British Journal of Political Science, 18: 415-43.
Lewis, David K. (1969), Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Locke, John (1988), Two Treatises of Government [1689] Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marx, Karl (1972), Theories of Surplus Value [1862], London: Lawrence and Wishart.
— (1976), Capital, Volume I [1867], Ben Fowkes (trans.), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Mill, John Stuart (1994), Principles of Political Economy [1848], Jonathan Riley (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mises, Ludwig von (1951) Socialism, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Munzer, Stephen R. (1990), A Theory of Property, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nozick, Robert (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Plato, Republic [c. 370 BCE], Robin Waterfield (trans.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Pufendorf, Samuel (1991), On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law [1673], Jame Tully (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Radin, Margaret Jane (1982) ‘Property and Personhood,’ Stanford Law Review, 34: 957-1014.
Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1994), Discourse on the Origin of Inequality [1755], Franklin Philip (trans.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
— (1968), The Social Contract [1762], Maurice Cranston (trans.) Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Ryan, Alan (1984), Property and Political Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Waldron, Jeremy (1988), The Right to Private Property, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
— (1992), ‘Superseding Historic Injustice,’ Ethics, 103: 4-28.
— (1993), ‘Property, Justification and Need,’ Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 6: 185-215.
— (1994), ‘The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of Property,’ Social Philosophy and Policy, 11: 85-123.
Williams, Bernard (2002), Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Other Internet Resources

The Right to Private Property, by Tibor Machan, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Conclusion

Notes

See Also

References and Further Reading

About the Author/s and Reviewer/s

Author: international

Mentioned in these Entries

Historical Overview of Property, Property and Ownership in Philosophy, Rousseau.


Posted

in

, , ,

by

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *