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Foreign Government Recognizion
Foreign Government Recognizion: Summary of Argument in 2011
United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): Petitioner's claim that he is entitled under Section 214(d) to have the Secretary of State designate “Israel” as his place of birth on his passport and consular report of birth abroad should be dismissed on either of two grounds. The claim presents a nonjusticiable political question. But even if the claim is justiciable, Section 214(d) is an unconstitutional encroachment on Executive authority. Both conclusions flow from the Constitution's grant to the President of the exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns and determine the extent of their territorial sovereignty, as well as the power to determine the content of passports in connection with the conduct of United States foreign policy.
I. A. Longstanding Executive Branch practice, congressional acquiescence, and judicial precedent establish that the President's express constitutional authority to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” encompasses the exclusive power to recognize foreign states and their governments. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3. Presidents have unilaterally exercised this recognition power since the Washington Administration. And although Members of Congress have occasionally proposed bills that would involve the Legislature in recognition decisions, those efforts have been rebuffed as inconsistent with the Constitution's assignment of such matters to the Executive alone.
Developments
Courts, including this Court, have consistently held that the constitutional recognition power belongs exclusively to the President. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). This Court has also held that the recognition power includes all implied authorities necessary to effectuate its exercise. Id. at 229-230. One such implied authority is the President's power to determine on behalf of the United States the boundaries of foreign states. See Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
B. The President also has inherent authority to determine the content of passports insofar as it implements United States foreign policy. A passport is an official instrument of foreign policy through which the United States addresses foreign nations. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 294 (1981). Historically, the Executive has been assumed to have inherent authority to issue passports and determine their content, in the exercise of the President's constitutional power over national security and foreign relations. See id. at 293-294.
Today, passport statutes typically further Congress's own enumerated powers or aid the Executive's passport authority, without purporting to constrain the Executive's use of passports as instruments of foreign policy. On the rare occasion when a passport statute encroaches on the Executive's constitutional authorities, the President has declined to enforce it. Although Congress may enact passport legislation that is necessary and proper to implement its own enumerated powers, it may not regulate passports in a manner that constrains the President's exclusive authority to determine the content of passports as it relates to United States foreign policy, including determinations concerning the recognition of foreign states and their territorial sovereignty.
Details
II. The State Department's policy not to record “Israel” as the place of birth in the passports or consular records of birth abroad of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem implements the President's decision not to recognize any state's sovereignty over Jerusalem. That policy is also an exercise of the President's inherent authority to determine the content of passports in furtherance of his conduct of foreign policy. The description of a citizen's place of birth in passports operates as an official statement of whether the United States recognizes a state's sovereignty over the relevant territorial area. For this reason, the State Department has established detailed rules governing place-of-birth designations. Reversing its policy with respect to documents issued to U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem would have grave foreign-relations consequences.
III. Because petitioner's suit seeks to overturn a decision that the Constitution assigns exclusively to the President, it presents a political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Petitioner's reliance on an asserted statutory right does not alter that conclusion. Because a basic function of the courts is to interpret statutes and the Constitution, courts presented with a statutory claim that potentially seeks review of a question that the Constitution commits to another Branch should undertake a careful inquiry into the nature of the relief sought and the interaction of that claim with the constitutional commitment at issue. If adjudicating the purported statutory right would entail reviewing or directing a decision that is constitutionally committed to a political Branch, the court should determine that the statute encroaches on the authority vested in that Branch and dismiss the suit. In other words, Congress cannot, by creating a statutory right, confer on the courts the authority to decide a question that the Constitution commits to another Branch.
More about the Issue
Section 214(d) cannot be reconciled with the Constitution's grant of the recognition power to the President. By purporting to give petitioner the right to a judicial order directing the State Department to indicate in petitioner's passport that he was born in Israel, the provision seeks to define United States recognition policy. But the President has exclusive constitutional authority not to recognize any sovereignty over Jerusalem and to implement that determination in passports. Petitioner's Section 214(d) claim thus challenges a decision constitutionally committed to the President. The court of appeals therefore correctly dismissed this case as nonjusticiable.
IV. The question whether Section 214(d) is unconstitutional overlaps to a considerable extent with the question whether petitioner's claim for relief presents a nonjusticiable political question. Should the Court decide as a threshold matter that the case is justiciable, it should hold that Section 214(d) is unconstitutional because it encroaches on the President's exclusive constitutional authority to recognize foreign sovereigns.
Resources
See Also
- Diplomatic Relations
- Succession
- Continuity Of States
- Statehood Issues
- Executive Branch
- State Recognition