Electoral Systems
Election: Electoral Systems
Introduction to Electoral Systems
The manner in which governments organize elections and determine winners also affects participation rates. Majority systems require that a victorious candidate receive more than 50 percent of the vote. Under a plurality system, winning candidates need only receive more votes than any opponent. Systems of proportional representation award legislative seats to competing political parties in rough proportion to their percentage of the popular votes cast. European nations commonly use this electoral system. Virtually all national elections in the United States use the plurality system, although the majority system survives in some primary, state, and local elections, especially in Southern states.
In general, proportional representation works to the advantage of smaller or weaker groups in society, while plurality and majority rules tend to help larger and more powerful forces. In Europe, for example, a party that wins 10 percent of the national vote might win 10 percent of the parliamentary seats. In the United States, by contrast, a party that wins 10 percent of the vote will probably win no seats in Congress. Proportional representation tends to increase the number of competitive political parties within an electoral system-for example, the multiparty systems in Europe. Because they offer smaller parties little chance of success, plurality and majority systems usually reduce the number of competitive political parties-for example, the mostly two-party system in the United States.
Proportional representation systems boost participation by increasing the value of a vote to smaller or more marginal portions of a national population. In the United States, plurality or majority systems have reduced the incentive to vote of citizens who do not identify closely with the Democratic or Republican Party. Disillusionment with the major parties and their candidates for office has led not only to declining rates of voter participation, but to an increase in the percentage of voters who identify themselves as “independent.”” (1)
Related Fields
Related topics include:
Electoral System
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Electoral College
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Voting
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In this Section
Election, Voter Registration, Electoral Systems, Election Types, How Voters Decide, Electoral Realignments, Electorate (including Electorate Historical, Electorate Gender, Electorate Race and Social Position, Electorate Property and Poll Tax and Residence) and Electronic Voting (including Electronic Voting Origins and Electronic Voting Problems)
Mixed Electoral Systems in Constitutional Law
From the Comparative Constitutions Project: Mixed electoral systems have TWO methods of choosing members of the legislature. A good example is Germany. In Germany, about half the legislatures are chosen through single member districts, and the remaining members are chosen through proportional representation.Money BillsSome constitutions refer to money bills, rather than budget, finance, spending, or tax bills. However, the exact meaning of a money bill is determined by the context in which it is used. For instance, in India it is clear that money bills refer only to tax bills. However, in Pakistan, it is clear money bills refer to budget, finance, spending, AND tax bills.
Resources
Notes and References
See Also
- Electoral System
- Electoral College
- Voting
Further Reading
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Guide to Electoral Systems
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