Ecclesiastical Laws

Ecclesiastical Laws

Principles of Ecclesiastical Laws

In 1918, in the book “A Commentary and Summary of the New Code of Canon Law”, the author, Rev. Stanislaus Woywod wrote (references were to the old Code of Canon Law, no the 1983 Code of Canon Law):

  • The laws are instituted when they are promulgated. A law is not presumed to be personal but rather territorial unless the law indicates that it is to be considered personal. In the common law of the Church it makes little difference whether a law is personal or territorial, but in particular laws for dioceses or countries the distinction is important for the reason that the law, if territorial, does not bind outside the limits of the diocese or country. (Canon 8.}
  • The laws issued by the Holy See are promulgated by being published in the official magazine of the Holy See, the Acta Apostolicae Sedis, unless a special mode of promulgation should be prescribed in special cases. The laws do not begin to bind in conscience until three months from the date of the number of the magazine containing the law have elapsed, unless the nature of the law is such that its immediate enforcement is evident, or the law itself should provide a longer or shorter period of “vacation.” (Canon 9.)
  • Laws concern future actions and not those done before the law was made, unless they make special mention of past actions. (Canon 10.)
  • Those laws only are to be considered invalidating or inhabilitating which explicitly or equivalently state that an action is null and void, or that a person is incapable of acting. (Canon 11.)
  • Unbaptized persons are not held to laws which are purely Church laws, nor baptized persons who have not a sufficient use of their mind, nor children under seven years of age though they may have sufficient knowledge and judgment, unless the law does in some instances declare the latter to be held to its observance. (Canon 12.)
  • The word purely is to be emphasized in this Canon, because laws which are an explanation or application of the natural or the positive Divine law bind every human being as soon as there is sufficient understanding of the law and consequent responsibility, apart from any definite age.
  • The general laws of the Church bind all persons for whom they are issued anywhere in the world. Laws issued for a particular territory, e. g., a diocese or a nation, bind those persons who have a domicile or a quasi-domicile in that territory and actually live there. For those who are absent from their own place for a while the following Canon provides. (Canon 13.)
  • Those persons who have a domicile or quasi-domicile but are for a time staying in another place are called in law “peregrini.” They are not held to the observance of the particular laws of their own diocese or country while absent unless the transgression of these regulations causes some harm in their own place, or in case the laws are personal. They are not held to the particular laws of the diocese or country in which they are travelling with the exception of those laws that concern public order or determine the formalities of legal transactions.
  • They are, however, bound to observe the general laws of the Church, even those that
    have been abolished for their own place. Thus, for instance, an American travelling in Europe is bound to observe the holidays of obligation, fasts, etc., that may by papal indult have been abolished in America. On the other hand, the pcregrinus enjoys the dispensations from the general law in the country where he actually stays, even though there are no such dispensations granted to the diocese or country where he ordinarily resides.
  • Those who have neither a domicile nor a quasi-domicile in any place are called vagi. They
    are bound to observe both the general and the particular laws that are in force in the place where they actually stay. (Canon 14.)
  • All laws, even those that invalidate an action or inhabilitate a person to act, do not oblige in doubt of law (dubium juris); in a doubt of fact (dubium facti) the Ordinary may dispense, provided there is question of laws from which the Roman Pontiff usually dispenses. (Canon 15.)
  • 16. No ignorance of invalidating or inhabilitating laws excuses unless the law explicitly admits ignorance as an excuse. Likewise ignorance or error is not presumed when it concerns the law or its penalty, or one’s own action, or the notorious action of another; concerning the non-notorious action of another, ignorance is presumed until the contrary is proved. This rule applies mostly to cases where the delinquent is brought to court for the transgression of a law. How far ignorance of the censure attached to the violation of
    a law excuses is specified in Canon 2229. (Canon 16.)
  • Laws are authoritatively interpreted by the lawgiver and by those to whom the power of interpreting has been committed. Authoritative interpretation of a law given in the form of law has the same force as the law itself. If such authoritative interpretation merely declares the meaning of the words of law that are certain, the interpretation does not need a new promulgation and reacts on past actions; if the interpretation restricts, or extends, the law or explains a doubtful point of the law, it does not react on past actions and is regarded
    like a new law, so that it must be promulgated in order to have binding force. An interpretation of the law given by way of a judicial sentence, or by a rescript in some special case, has not the force of law and binds only the persons and affects only those matters for which it was issued. (Canon 17.)
  • Ecclesiastical laws must be interpreted according to the proper meaning of the terms of the law considered in their context. If that meaning remains obscure, one must have recourse to parallel citations of the Code if there are any, or to the purpose and circumstances and the intention of the law-maker. (Canon 18.)
  • Laws that establish a penalty or restrict the free exercise of one’s rights, or establish an exception from the law must be interpreted in a strict sense. It has always been an axiom of interpretation of Canon Law that odious laws are to be explained in such a sense as not to unduly extend them to cases not strictly covered by the words of the law, while in favorable laws a more benign interpretation is allowed. (Canon 19.)
  • If there is no definite rule of law, neither in the general nor in the particular law, concerning some affair, a norm of action may be taken from laws given in similar cases, from the general principles of law applied with the mildness proper to Canon Law, from the manner and custom of handling similar cases in the Roman Curia, and from the common and accepted teaching of doctors. In the application of penalties, however, this liberal interpretation must not be adopted. (Canon 20.)
  • Laws made in order to safeguard the faithful against what is commonly dangerous, oblige even though in a particular case there is no danger. An example of this kind is the law of the Church forbidding bad books of various kinds. Though there may positively be no danger for some particular individual to read such a book, he is not thereby entitled to read it unless he has obtained a dispensation from the law. (Canon 21.)
  • A more recent law given by the competent authority abolishes a former law when it explicitly makes a statement to that effect, or when it is directly contrary to the former law, or, finally, when it takes up and readjusts the entire subject matter of the law. A general law, however, does not abolish laws for particular places or the statutes of inferior legislators, e. g., of bishops, unless the general law is either directly opposed to the special law, or the general law explicitly revokes the particular law.
  • The Code, therefore, does not abolish the decrees of National and Provincial Councils, nor diocesan statutes, rules and constitutions of Orders, except in as far as they may in some points be against the Canons, or in points where the Code explicitly states that notwithstanding particular laws the Code is to be followed. (Canon 22.)
  • In a doubt whether the former law has been revoked the repeal of the law is not to be presumed, but the more recent law is to be, as far as possible, conciliated with the former law, so that one may supplement the other. (Canon 23.)
  • Precepts given to individuals bind them wherever they go, but they cannot be urged in a canonical trial, and they expire with the expiration of authority of the one imposing the precept, unless they are given in the form of a legal document, or before two witnesses. (Canon 24.)

See Also

  • Ecclesiastical Courts
  • Ecclesiastical Courts in the Middle Ages
  • Ecclesiastical Courts Origins
  • Ecclesiastical Courts Decline in Power
  • Canon Law
  • Domicile
  • Ecclesiastical Law
  • Concordat

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