Declaration of war Part 1

Declaration of war Part 1

 

1

INDIGENOUS CHILDREN’S RIGHTS – INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELF-DETERMINATION AND INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION IN GUATEMALA
Sarah Sargent
Contemporary Issues in Law
Volume 10, Issue 1, 2008/2009 p.1

LAW JOURNAL / LAW REVIEW

Guatemala has put a moratorium in place on sending children to other states in intercountry adoption. Before this moratorium, the numbers of children sent had increased rapidly following the end of a decades-long civil war. These events are linked as state policies of assimilation, which have a goal of the cultural eradication of the Mayan Peoples of Guatemala. The manner in which intercountry adoption occurred created international controversy. What information is available on the ethnicity of the children adoption indicates that mainly Mayan and mixed Mayan heritage children were sent in intercountry adoption, following a pattern of the sending of Mayan children for adoption under questionable circumstances during the war. The conflict itself has been condemned as an act of genocide against the Mayan Peoples. Thà­s article argues that the intercountry adoption of sending of Indigenous children from Guatemala simply perpetuated state policies of Assimilation. In 2007, the United Nations ratified a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This Declaration includes the right to self-determination of Indigenous Peoples. This is a right that is at odds with state policies of assimilation. This article critically examines the likelihood of intercountry adoption reforms being successfully implemented and sustained against the Guatemalan state policies of assimilation of its Indigenous peoples. The occurrence of intercountry adoption needs be understood against the backdrop of state violence and antipathy towards the Mayans. The article argues that successful intercountry adoption reform is reliant upon the state making a deliberate and committed shift from a partial embrace of Indigenous rights to a fully engaged acceptance, and in so doing, a rejection of the assimilation policies it has pursued in the past.

2

Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declaration of war
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
George Washington Law Review
Volume 77, Number 1, November 2008 p.89

LAW JOURNAL / LAW REVIEW

3

“PREEMPTIVE WAR”: IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL?
John B. Mitchell
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 44, Number 2, 2004 p.497

LAW JOURNAL / LAW REVIEW

When America attacked Iraq in 2002, it was the first preemptive war in the history of our nation. While there is daily debate over the wisdom and consequences of that action, the question whether the federal government even possessed the power under the Constitution to wage preemptive war does not seem to have been raised. Although the legal literature abounds with discussion about whether the President may authorize significant military operations without the explicit authorization of Congress, the author could not find a single work written in legal cases or commentary about preemptive war. This article considers this heretofore unanswered question of whether the federal government possesses the power to engage in preemptory war. Looking at a variety of sources, including America’s use of military force throughout its history, the framer’s view of war, and the political philosophy and religious views of the framers, the author concludes that such power is beyond that given the federal government in the Constitution. Thus, even were both the President and Congress to concur in such a war, with Congress making a formal declaration of war, the action would be unconstitutional. The article also explains why the Political Question Doctrine does not bar judicial review of whether or not a proposed use of military force is preemptive.

4

LEGAL WAR: WHEN DOES IT EXIST, AND WHEN DOES IT END?
John Alan Cohan
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 27, Number 2, Winter 2004 p.221

LAW JOURNAL / LAW REVIEW

The popular conception of war is clearly different from war in the legal sense. It is important to ascertain when war in the formal, legal sense (Legal War) exists because various legal consequences attach. However, when a Legal War exists between belligerent states is far from certain. Few wars are waged pursuant to a formal declaration, and there is substantial disagreement as to when a Legal War has ended. Further complicating the problem, governments have engaged in significant armed conflicts while vigorously denying a state of war has existed between them, notwithstanding the obvious state of belligerency, the engagement of troops, and the loss of lives. In U.S. law, if there is no declaration of war, no authorizing resolution from Congress, and the belligerents deny that a Legal War exists, determining whether and precisely when “war”provisions of military law and life insurance contracts kick in is problematic. Confronted with a limitless variety of armed hostilities, the judiciary has been unable to construct a definition of Legal War applicable in all contexts. Yet it seems capricious, at best, to allow the resolution of substantive legal issues to turn on a verbal formula that appears to shift from case to case.

 

Conclusion

Notes

See Also

References and Further Reading

About the Author/s and Reviewer/s

Author: international

Mentioned in these Entries

1000 Top law pages in Wikipedia in may 2012, 1500 Top law pages in Wikipedia in may 2012, 500 Top law pages in Wikipedia in may 2012, Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald Von, Constitutional Text: Austria 1920, Admended 2004, Constitutional Text: Brazil Constitution of 1988, Constitutional Text: Marocco 1972, Amended 1996, Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Declaration of war Part 2, Declaration of war, International human rights law Part 47, List of international public law topics.


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