Decision-Making Processes

Literature Review on (Management) Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) and Critical Path Method (CPM)

In the Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, [1] Bradley J. Best and Jeremy R.T. Lewis provide the following summary about the topic of (Management) Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) and Critical Path Method (CPM): Originating in the late 1950s, Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) and Critical Path Method (CPM) are two of the most important techniques for rationalizing decision-making processes in the public and private sectors. Instruction in each method is a standard feature of courses in project management. PERT and CPM are little addressed in current scholarship; both techniques are part of the conventional stock of knowledge in management science.

Court Decision Making Process

The U.S. Supreme Court´s Justice Willis Van Devanter appeared before the House Judiciary Committee during its hearings on the Judges’ Bill. He sais that his purpose was to “assure Congress that increased control over its [the Court’s] own docket would not lead to arbitrary dismissal of cases”.

Van Devanter also add:

“We always grant petitions when as many as four think that it should be granted and sometimes when as many as three think that way. We proceed upon the theory that, if that number out of nine are impressed with the thought that the case is one that ought to be heard and decided by us, the petition should be granted.”

Resources

Notes and References

1. Entry about (Management) Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) and Critical Path Method (CPM) in the Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy (2015, Routledge, Oxford, United Kingdom)

See Also

Further Reading

• Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance (2018, Springer International Publishing, Germany)

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