LAWIN

Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism

Human Rights and Counterterrorism in 2011

United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): On March 7, 2011, the United States Delegation to the 16th Session of the Human Rights Council delivered a statement in the interactive dialogue with the special rapporteur for torture and the special rapporteur for the protection of human rights while countering terrorism. The excerpts below from the U.S. statement, which is available in full at (internet link) geneva.usmission.gov/2011/03/07/interactive-dialogue-on-torture-and-protection-of-human-rights-while-countering-terrorism/, address the “Best Practices” recommended by the special rapporteur for the protection of human rights while countering terrorism.

Developments

We would also like to thank Special Rapporteur Scheinin for his most recent and final report on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. We thank him for his tireless work to promote and protect human rights, not only in his tenure as the first Special Rapporteur to hold this post, but throughout his career as well.

As the Special Rapporteur’s work illustrates, countering terrorism is a global challenge, which calls for states to be vigilant and creative, receptive to new ideas, and diligent in ensuring that measures taken to prevent and combat terrorism comply with their obligations under applicable international law.

Details

The Special Rapporteur’s report suggests ten areas of best practice. As the Special Rapporteur notes, recommendations for best practices are not legal obligations and thus may go beyond what is required by international law or practiced by most states. Furthermore, in this most challenging of areas, no one approach or singular set of practices will necessarily apply in all situations. We agree with the Special Rapporteur’s assessment that Member States must consider best practices in a manner that is consonant with the fundamental principles of their various legal systems. As such, the practices suggested by the Special Rapporteur should not be considered as the sole means by which states can effectively counter terrorism while respecting human rights. We thank the Special Rapporteur for his devotion to upholding the human rights of all people, including victims of terrorism, and extend to him the U.S. best wishes as his particular mandate comes to a close.

Counterterrorism

In relation to the international law practice and counterterrorism in this world legal Encyclopedia, please see the following section:

Use of Force

About this subject:

Use of Force Issues Related to Counterterrorism Efforts

Note: there is detailed information and resources under these topics during the year 2013, covered by this entry on counterterrorism in this law Encyclopedia.

Global Counterterrorism Forum

In relation to the international law practice and Global Counterterrorism Forum in this world legal Encyclopedia, please see the following section:

International Criminal Law

About this subject:

International Crimes

Under this topic, in the Encyclopedia, find out information on Terrorism. Note: there is detailed information and resources, in relation with these topics during the year 2011, covered by the entry, in this law Encyclopedia, about Global Counterterrorism Forum

Human Rights and Counterterrorism

In relation to the international law practice and Human Rights and Counterterrorism in this world legal Encyclopedia, please see the following section:

International Human Rights

Resources

See Also

  • International Human Rights
  • Counterterrorism

Further Reading

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