Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention

Sixteenth Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2011

United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): The United States participated in the Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC at The Hague from November 28 to December 2, 2011. On November 29, 2011, Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“OPCW”) delivered a statement on behalf of the U.S. In his statement, excerpted below, Ambassador Mikulak reviewed United States efforts to meet the April 2012 deadline for destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. The full text of Ambassador Mikulak's statement is available at (internet link) opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=15248. A fundamental goal of this Organisation that is certainly on everyone's mind this week is the total destruction of chemical weapons. For the United States, the safe and environmentally sound destruction of more than 27,000 metric tons of assorted chemical weapons has been an enormous challenge. The United States has made significant strides towards meeting this challenge, and I am proud to report on these achievements.

Developments

The United States has met the 1%, 20%, and 45% treaty milestones. To date we have destroyed more than 89% of the U.S. Category 1 chemical weapons. The United States has also destroyed all of the U.S. former chemical weapons production facilities.

We are also committed to transparency of the U.S. chemical weapons destruction programme, so that States Parties can evaluate the U.S. efforts for themselves. To that end, we have provided 90-day reports for the past five and one-half years that track the U.S. progress in three-month intervals. We have also made informal destruction presentations at every informal meeting of the Executive Council on chemical weapons destruction to offer frank and honest information on the U.S. programme. We have invited Executive Council representatives to make site visits to the U.S. facilities and meet with senior officials—which allow an opportunity for these representatives to judge for themselves what we are doing, based on their own observations. In fact, the participants in an Executive Council visit to two U.S. facilities in March 2011 stressed that they came away with a better understanding of the local and technical challenges the United States has successfully overcome and the strong U.S. commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Details

This week, the Conference must take a fundamental decision on the way forward for this Organisation regarding the likelihood that the United States and Russia will miss the 29 April 2012 final extended deadline for the complete destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles. We welcome the action taken by the Executive Council last week to forward a recommendation to the Conference. The recommended draft decision garnered overwhelming support in the Executive Council and is the result of two years of negotiation. It has many shortcomings, but it represents a precarious balance of interests and concerns.

Last week, the Executive Council demonstrated the political will to deal seriously and decisively with this important issue. This week it will be incumbent on the Conference to recognise the results of two years of intense negotiations and demonstrate equal political will in adopting the draft resolution recommended by the Executive Council. We hope that it can be approved by consensus, or if consensus is not present, by an overwhelming majority.

One of the most important developments of the last twelve months was the Director-General's initiative to begin a dialogue with States Parties on the future of the OPCW. We welcome this initiative. The report of the advisory group, and the Director-General's comments, provide a broad strategic vision and a number of very useful recommendations. I look forward to continuing discussions on the future of the OPCW with colleagues, a process that began in September with the very useful ambassadorial-level retreat at Noordwijk. This topic will naturally also be a critical element in the U.S. preparations for the Third Review Conference.

There is naturally a tendency to think of the future of the OPCW in terms of the advisory group report. But we also need to be aware that some of the decisions that we are addressing this week also will have a major influence on whether the OPCW continues to be a successful and effective international organisation—an organisation that is a model and an inspiration to others. I have already mentioned the importance of the Conference taking a decision on the 2012 deadline issue.

More about the Issue

On December 1, 2011, the Conference to the CWC, by a vote of 101 to 1, approved a decision reaffirming the April 2012 deadline but allowing that States Parties which had not completed the destruction of their stockpiles, due to reasons unrelated to their commitment to the CWC, should complete the destruction “in the shortest time possible” in accordance with the CWC. Iran was the only party to vote no. The December 1 Conference Decision, excerpted below, is available at (internet link) opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=15220.

Noting the statements by Libya, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America underlining their unequivocal commitment to their Obligations under Articles I and IV of the Convention for the destruction of their remaining chemical weapons in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and taking note that the inability to fully meet the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012 would come about due to reasons that are unrelated to the commitment of these States Parties to the General Obligations for the destruction of chemical weapons established under Article I of the Convention;

Sixteenth Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2011

United States views on international law (based on the document “Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law”): 1. Decides that the Sixty-Eighth Session of the Executive Council shall be held immediately after the expiry of the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012 for the destruction of chemical weapons;

2. Requests the Director-General of the Organisation's Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as the “Director-General”) to report to the Sixty-Eighth Session of the Executive Council whether or not the final extended deadline has been fully met. The report to be submitted is to include information on the quantities of chemical weapons that have been fully destroyed and that remain to be destroyed by each of the possessor States concerned;

3. Decides that, if the Director-General reports that the final extended deadline has not been fully met, the following measures are to be implemented by the Organisation and the possessor States concerned:

(a) The destruction of the remaining chemical weapons in the possessor States concerned shall be completed in the shortest time possible in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and its Verification Annex and under the verification of the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation as prescribed under the Convention and its Verification Annex.

(b) The costs for the continued destruction of the chemical weapons by the possessor States concerned and the verification of their destruction shall continue to be met in accordance with Paragraph 16 of Article IV of the Convention;

(c) Each possessor State concerned is to submit a detailed plan for the destruction of its remaining chemical weapons, which are to be destroyed in the shortest time possible, to the Sixty-Eighth Session of the Executive Council. The plan submitted by each possessor State, which is to also be considered and noted by the Council at its Sixty-Eighth Session, is to specify the planned completion date by which the destruction of its remaining chemical weapons is to be completed (hereinafter referred to as the “planned completion date”). The possessor States concerned are to take appropriate measures to meet the planned completion date. The detailed plan is to inter alia specify:

(i) A schedule for destruction, giving types and approximate quantities of chemical weapons planned to be destroyed in each annual destruction period until completion for each existing destruction facility and, if possible, for each planned destruction facility.

(ii) The number of destruction facilities existing or planned to be operated over the destruction period until completion.

(iii) For each existing and planned chemical weapons destruction facility:

a. Name and location;

b. The types and approximate quantities of chemical weapons, and the type (for example, nerve agent or blister agent) and approximate quantity of chemical fill, to be destroyed.

The submission of this detailed plan for destruction does not alter, modify or cancel any other requirements contained in the Convention and its Verification Annex for the submission of other destruction plans.

More about Sixteenth Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention

(d) Each possessor State concerned is to report, and provide a briefing in a closed meeting, at each regular session of the Executive Council on the progress achieved towards the complete destruction of remaining stockpiles, including information on measures to accelerate such progress, and identifying progress made since the last briefing in order to meet the planned completion date. These reports and briefings are to also include reporting on any specific measures undertaken to overcome problems in the destruction programme.

(e) The Director-General is to provide a written report at each regular session of the Executive Council on the overall destruction progress by the possessor States concerned that is based on the independent information that is received by the Technical Secretariat from the Organisation's inspectors undertaking verification in accordance with Part IV (A) D of the Verification Annex and that is to include information on:

(i) The progress achieved to meet the planned completion date(s).

(ii) The effectiveness of any specific measures that have been undertaken to overcome problems in the destruction programmes.

(f) The Conference of the States Parties is to undertake an annual review of the implementation of this decision at a specially designated meeting(s) of the Conference. At the annual Conference of the States Parties in 2017 an extra day is to be added for a specially designated meeting(s) for this purpose, unless otherwise decided at the Conference of the States Parties in 2016. Each possessor State concerned is to provide an annual report to the Conference of the States Parties, and provide an annual briefing at a closed meeting of the Conference of the States Parties, on the progress in the destruction of its remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons and identifying progress made since the last briefing in order to meet planned completion date. These reports, and briefings, are to also include:

(i) Reporting on any specific measures undertaken to overcome problems in the destruction programmes.

(ii) Information on the projected schedule for destruction activities to meet the planned completion date.

Developments

(g) The Director-General is to provide an annual written report to the Conference of the States Parties on the overall destruction progress by the possessor States concerned that is based on the independent information that is received by the Technical Secretariat from the Organisation's inspectors undertaking verification in accordance with Part IV (A) D of the Verification Annex and that is to include information on:

(i) The progress achieved to meet the planned completion date(s).

(ii) The effectiveness of any specific measures that have been undertaken to overcome problems in the destruction programmes.

(h) The Review Conference is to conduct a comprehensive review on the implementation of this decision at a specially designated meeting(s) of the Conference. This review is to be based on:

(i) Reports by the possessor States concerned on the progress achieved to meet the planned completion date. These reports are to also include:

a. Reporting on any specific measures undertaken to overcome problems in the destruction programmes.

b. Information on the projected schedule for destruction activities to meet the planned destruction date.

(ii) A written report by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat that is based on the independent information that is received by the Technical Secretariat from the Organisation's inspectors undertaking verification in accordance with Part IV (A) D of the Verification Annex and that is to include information on:

a. The progress achieved to meet the planned completion date(s).

b. The effectiveness of any specific measures that have been undertaken to overcome problems in the destruction programmes.

(i) The submission of the reports under operative paragraphs 3 (d), (f) and (h)i of this decision do not alter, modify or cancel any other requirements contained in the Convention and its Verification Annex for the submission of other reports.

(j) The possessor States concerned are to invite the Chairperson of the Executive Council, the Director-General and a delegation representing the Executive Council to undertake visits to obtain an overview of the destruction programmes being undertaken. These visits are to inter alia include visits to destruction facilities as well as meetings with parliamentarians, if possible, and government officials in capitals as a formal part of the visits. Invitations are to also be extended to observers to participate in the Executive Council delegation. The visits are to take place annually on the basis of biennial visits to the major possessor States concerned consecutively. Visits would also take place to Libya on a biennial basis.

Details

The United States also submitted a statement to the OPCW on December 19, 2011. Excerpts of the U.S. statement, replying to Iran regarding the recovery and destruction of pre-1991 Chemical Weapons in Iraq, appear below. The statement is available at www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/179692.htm.

The United States would like to exercise its right of reply in writing to the Iranian national paper (C-16/NAT 20, 2 December 2011) in which Iran has alleged once again that the United States was not in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention in the manner in which it recovered and destroyed pre-1991 chemical weapons in Iraq. As we have informed Iran twice previously in writing (in September 2010 and February 2011), and as we have stated at the OPCW on earlier occasions, the United States rejects as unfounded any allegation that the United States violated its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. United States forces secured and destroyed the referenced chemical weapons in Iraq under exceptional circumstances that were not encompassed by the procedural provisions of the Convention's Verification Annex. These actions were dictated by the imperative to ensure that the recovered chemical weapons could not be used to threaten the Iraqi people, neighboring states, Coalition forces, and the environment, and they were fully consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. During the chemical weapons recovery and destruction operations carried out by United States forces, verification of destruction activities in Iraq by the OPCW Technical Secretariat was not feasible. Moreover, reporting these activities contemporaneously would have posed a threat to the safety and security of the personnel conducting the activity, the local population and the environment. However, the United States ensured that officials of the Technical Secretariat were made aware of U.S. activities and, when the security situation in Iraq permitted, made appropriate notification to the OPCW and the Executive Council of the actions taken. Records related to these activities were made available to the Technical Secretariat in the interests of transparency and the spirit of the Convention. The United States has participated constructively and in good faith in discussions to develop guidelines for future instances of destruction of chemical weapons in circumstances not foreseen by the Convention.

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See Also

• Use Of Force
• Arms Control
• Disarmament
• Nonproliferation
• Chemical Weapons
• Biological Weapons
• Chemical Weapons