Compliance

Compliance with Law

The half century since the end of the Second World War has witnessed the proliferation of international norms, not only in traditional areas of international regulation, but in new fields once thought within the exclusive domes
tic jurisdiction of states. As the systematization and codification of norms becomes relatively complete in some subject areas, it is natural that attention then turns to the implementation and effectiveness of the norms adopted. Compliance with international law is thus a subject of increasing interest, enhanced as concern with the rule of law emerges from within states to become an inter-state issue.

The rule of law requires compliance in order for law to be effective and makes compliance a matter of general international concern. Although any given state may be unaffected by non-compliance with a particular norm, all states are concerned to uphold the rule of law to ensure they are not affected by non-compliance in the future. It may not be necessary for all those subject to the law to comply all of the time, but upholding the rule of law as a general principle requires that measures be taken to encourage compliance, deter non-compliance, and remedy injury caused by violations of legal norms. Consistent non-compliance with a law not only impugns the particular norm, but undermines the rule of law generally. Understanding the factors that compel and condition compliance is thus important to international lawyers and motivates this study, which generally seeks to determine whether states comply with soft law and, if so, why.

States enter into a variety of international commitments, some of which they have chosen to label law. States negotiated the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to govern the most formal of these undertakings. The variety of international commitments, together with concern for compliance, generally raises the question whether the form of a normative instrument, or the formality with which it is approved, as opposed to its language and its content, is crucial to securing compliance. Does formalism, or adoption of a norm according to approved ‘law-making’ methods, make a difference in compliance with the norm being asserted, with state decisions to comply or not comply? Does it matter to non-state actors, who may be more or less willing to pressure states to comply with a given norm?

The question being asked may recall debates in the post-war period over form and function in architecture. Functionalism has inherent limits imposed by the laws of physics and human knowledge, but it has nonetheless had an important impact on the visual landscape, as many architects subordinate form to function. Form in law may also follow function. It is generally assumed that denominating something ‘law’ makes a difference in expectations of compliance and consequences of non-compliance. While some modern critics deny that law is significant to international commitment and the behavior of states, recent activity in the international political arena does not support this conclusion. [1] It was clear at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, for example, that the non-governmental representatives had a strong preference for a binding Earth Charter over the ultimately adopted Rio Declaration, and that states were unwilling to accept a legally binding text because of the consequences flowing from legal obligations. Both groups clearly felt that the form of the commitment made a difference.

While legal obligation brings with it greater expectation of conforming behavior and consequences for non-compliance, states also are demonstrating concern about compliance with other forms of international commitment. The Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Council of Europe, meeting for their first summit conference in Vienna in 1993, reaffirmed that accession to the Council of Europe presupposes compliance with basic principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including freedom of expression and the media, and protection of national minorities. The Summit Statement of October 9, 1992 emphasized: ‘[w]e are resolved to ensure full compliance with the commitments accepted by all member states within the Council of Europe’ and referred to three specific instruments, two of which are legally non-binding. [2]

Author: Dinah Shelton

Compliance Systems

In the United States

For information about Compliance systems in the context of international trade, click here

Compliance Systems and the Laws of International Trade

Export compliance programs: Compliance systems

Export Control in Merger and Acquisitions

Compliance and Europe

There is an entry on compliance in the European legal encyclopedia.

Resources

See Also

• Disability Insurance
• Social Security Administration
• Social Security Statement
• Social Security Benefits

Resources

See Also

Further Reading

• Entry “Compliance” in the work “A Concise Encyclopedia of the European Union from Aachen to Zollverein”, by Rodney Leach (Profile Books; London)

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Notes

1. See Johnston, D.M., Consent and Commitment in the World Community (1997).
2. See Council of Europe, Monitoring of Compliance with Commitments Entered Into by Council of Europe Member States: An Overview, 27 March 1997, Monitor/Inf (97) 1 at 9.

See also

• Export Licenses
• Export Clearance
• Antitrust Compliance
• Export Compliance Programs
• Corporate Compliance
• Compliance Publications
• Export Control Compliance
• Export Compliance
• Boycott Compliance
• Customs Compliance
• E-commerce Compliance
• Commerce Sanctions

Further Reading

• Information about Compliance Systems in the Encyclopedia of World Trade: from Ancient Times to the Present (Cynthia Clark Northrup)