A Selection of Legal Maxims

A Selection of Legal Maxims

“A Selection of Legal Maxims, Classtfieli and Illustrated”is a legal treatise. By Herbert Broom, Barrister at Law, and, in the 6th Edition (1884), also by CHARLES CAGNEY and HERBERT F. MANISTY. LONDON: W. MAXWELL & SON, 8, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR.

PREFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION.

The reader will find the Maxims, except in one instance,
arranged in the same order as heretofore, and the system
adopted by the late Dr. Broom in the preparation of the
earlier editions of the Work has been followed. The
Index alone has been re-arranged ; each principal Maxim
is inserted in the Index (as well as in the “List of
Maxims “at the beginning of the Book), with references
to the various heads of Law treated under it.

A large number of the earlier decisions collected by
the late Dr. Broom have been retained in the notes. It
may be thought that a considerable portion of these
decisions might have been expunged as being obsolete.
The reason for their retention is a twofold one; first,
many of the old cases are elaborate treatises on the law
they deal with, and are worthy of careful perusal by
the student; secondly, they were collected, not from
digests, but, after a laborious search, from the Reports
themselves. To strike them out would compel a
reference to the earlier editions, in which alone many of
them are to be found, and to which, in process of time,
access would necessarily become difficult.

The present Editors desire to express their respectful
thanks to the Lord Justice Lindley for the loan of his
copy of a former Edition, noted up by himself with
recent decisions bearing upon many of the Maxims discussed in the text; most of these cases are inserted in
the notes to this Edition. The Editors were further aided
by several valuable suggestions of Mr. S. P. Micholls, of
3, King’s Bench Walk, Temple, who assisted them in the
correction of the proofs ; also by certain manuscript notes
of the Author, prepared with a view to a fresh edition
of the Book.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

In the Legal Science, perhaps more frequently than
in any other, reference must be made to first principles.
Indeed, a very limited acquaintance with the earlier
Reports will show the importance which was attached to
the acknowledged Maxims of the Law, in periods when
civilization and refinement had made comparatively little
progress. In the ruder ages, without doubt, the great
majority of questions respecting the rights, remedies,
and liabilities of private individuals, were determined by
an immediate reference t& such Maxims, many of which
obtained in the Roman Law, and are so manifestly
founded in reason, public convenience, and necessity, as
to find a place in the code of every civilized nation. In
more modern times, the increase of commerce, and of
national and social intercourse, has occasioned a corresponding increase in the sources of litigation, and has
introduced many subtleties and nice distinctions, both
in legal reasoning and in the application of legal principles, which were formerly unknown. This change,
however, so far from diminishing the value of simple
fundamental rules, has rendered an accurate acquaintance
with them the more necessary, in order that they may be
either directly applied, or qualified, or limited, according
to the exigencies of the particular case, and the novelty of
the circumstances which present themselves. If, then, it
be true, that a knowledge of first principles is at least as
essential in Law as in other sciences, certainly in none
is a knowledge of those principles, unaccompanied by a
sufficient investigation of their bearing and practical
application, more likely to lead into grievous error.

In the present Work I have endeavored, not only to
point out the most important Legal Maxims, but also to
explain and illustrate their meaning ; to show the various
exceptions to the rules which they enunciate, and the
qualifications which must be borne in mind when they
are applied. I have devoted considerable time, and much
labour, to consulting the Reports, both ancient and
modern, as also the standard Treatises on leading
branches of the Law, in order to ascertain what Maxims
are of most practical importance, and most frequently
cited, commented on, and applied. I have likewise
repeatedly referred to the various Collections of Maxims
which have heretofore been published, and have freely
availed myself of such portions of them as seemed to
possess any value or interest at the present day. I
venture, therefore, to hope, that very few Maxims have
been omitted which ought to have found place in a work
like that now submitted to the Profession. In illus-
trating each Rule, those Cases have in general been
preferred as examples in which the particular Maxim has
either been cited, or directly stated to apply. It has,
however, been necessary to refer to many other instances
in which no such specific reference has been made, but
which seem clearly to fall within the principle of the
Rule ; and whenever this has been done, sufficient authorities have, it is hoped, been appended, to enable the
reader, without very laborious research, to decide for
himself whether the application suggested has been correctly made, or not.

In arranging the Maxims which have been selected as
above mentioned, the system of Classification has, after
due reflection, been adopted : first, because this arrangement appeared better calculated to render the Work, to
some extent, interesting as a treatise, exhibiting briefly
the most important Rules of Law, and not merely useful
as a book of casual reference ; and, secondly, because by
this method alone can the intimate connection which
exists between Maxims appertaining to the same class be
directly brought under notice and appreciated. It was
thought better, therefore, to incur the risk of occasional
false or defective classification, than to pursue the easier
course of alphabetical arrangement. An Alphabetical
List has, however, been appended, so that immediate
reference may be made to any required Maxim. The
plan actually adopted may be thus stated: – I have, in
the first Two Chapters, very briefly treated of Maxims
which relate to Constitutional Principles, and the mode
in which the Laws are administered. These, on account
of their comprehensive character, have been placed first
in order, and have been briefly considered, because they
are so very generally known, and so easily comprehended. After these are placed certain Maxims which
are rather deductions of reason than Rules of Law, and
consequently admit of illustration only. Chapter IV.
comprises a few principles which may be considered as
fundamental, and not referable exclusively to any of the
subjects subsequently noticed, and which follow thus :
Maxims relating to Property, Marriage, and Descent;
the Interpretation of Written Instruments in general;
Contracts ; and Evidence. Of these latter subjects, the
Construction of Written Instruments, and the admissibility of evidence to explain them, as also those Maxims
which embody the Law of Contracts, have been thought
the most practically important, and have therefore been
noticed at the greatest length. The vast extent of these
subjects has undoubtedly rendered the work of selection
and compression one of considerable labour; and it is
feared that many useful applications of the Maxims
selected have been omitted, and that some errors have
escaped detection. It must be remarked, however, that,
oven had the bulk of this Volume been materially in-
creased, many important branches of Law to which the
Maxims apply must necessarily have been dismissed with
very alight notice ; and it is believed that the reader will
not expect to find, in a Work on Legal Maxim3, subjects
considered in detail, of which each presents sufficient
materials for a separate Treatise.

One question which may naturally suggest itself
remains to be answered : For what class of readers is a
Work like the present intended? I would reply, that it
is intended not only for the use of students purposing to
practise at the bar, or as attorneys, but also for the
occasional reference of the practicing barrister, who may
be desirous of applying a Legal Maxim to the case before
him, and who will therefore search for similar, or, at all
events, analogous cases, in which the same principle has
been held applicable and decisive. The frequency with
which Maxims are not only referred to by the Bench, but
cited and relied upon by Counsel in their arguments ; the
importance which has, in many decided cases, been
attached to them ; the caution which is always exercised
in applying, and the subtlety and ingenuity which have
been displayed in distinguishing between them, seem to
afford reasonable grounds for hoping, that the mere
Selectron of Maxims here given may prove useful to the
Profession, and that the examples adduced, and the
authorities referred to by way of illustration, qualification,
or exception, may, in some limited degree, add to their
utility.

January 301A, 1845.

See Also

Historical Definitions in the Encyclopedia of Law.
Maxims of Law
Maxims of Law from Bouvier’s Dictionary of Law
Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary
List of Legal Dictionaries
Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia
Legal Structure as Public Capital
Mozley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary

Conclusion

Notes

References and Further Reading

About the Author/s and Reviewer/s

Author: international

Mentioned in these Entries

Legal Structure as Public Capital, List of Legal Dictionaries, Maxims of Law, Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia, Mozley and Whiteley’s Law Dictionary, Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary.


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