United Nations System

United Nations System

Diplomatic Roles of the U.N

(London, 1994)

Since the late 1980’s the United Nations (UN) has been gaining an increasing prominence on the international stage. Its interventions have been widely reported by the press, its prestige has increased considerably, and yet its failures are a subject of scepticism and concern. Thinking about the UN’s primary purpose, to maintain international peace and security, I cannot but recollect the first pages of Don Quixote where Cervantes narrates how Don Quixote came up with the strangest of ideas, in that he thought it convenient and necessary to become a knight and to go around the world with his weapons and horse seeking adventures, solving all manner of conflicts, and at times positioning himself in situations of danger.

In this essay I shall attempt an examination of the diplomatic roles that the UN plays in pursuit of its primary objective, and in so doing I shall analyse the functions it carries out in this respect, the “weapons” or means at its disposal, and the part it plays as a forum for multilateral diplomacy.

For ease of reference, I shall first concentrate mainly on the period up to the end of the cold-war, and then examine the changes in the world order that have taken place since then, and how these have affected the workings of the Organisation.

The first point to consider is that very soon after its creation, the UN appeared destined to failure. It was created on the assumption that the alliance of the victors of WWII would continue after the war with the object of creating a system of “collective security”. The explosion of the first nuclear bomb by the USA in Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, barely one month after the signing of the Charter in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 -an event not foreseen on 1 January 1945 at the signing of the Declaration by United Nations-, the onset of the Cold War and the arms race dispelled any immediate hope that the new organisation would be able to discharge the functions for which it was set up. The Security Council, charged under Article 24 with the “primary responsibility” for the maintenance of international peace and security, was soon to become the scene of an ideological confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union or between West and East; the requirement of “Great Power unanimity” when voting on substantial matters also ensured that any one of the five Permanent Members could veto any resolution against themselves or their interests -under a framework of collective security and the original assumption of the co-operation of the great powers in the policing of the post-war world this formula might have been viable, in the climate of the Cold War it was a recipe for disaster, the first victim of which was the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47.

The General Assembly, which during the first years of its existence was to be a reflection of the Western majority in the Security Council, changed its composition during the 1950’s and 1960’s with the influx of new states created as a result of the de-colonisation process, and soon became another stage for confrontation, this time between the developed North and the underdeveloped South, and its Resolutions are not binding on member-states. In contrast the Resolutions of the Security Council are binding, but the lack of consensus on substantial matters between the Permanent Members and the use of the veto up until the end of the Cold War, meant that before the UN enforcement action as a result of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, there had only been one other occasion in which this kind of operation had been undertaken, during the Korean War (1950-3), and this was only possible because the Soviet Union was not occupying its seat in the Security Council in protest at the occupancy of China’s seat by the exiled nationalist government of Taiwan.

As Urquhart has pointed out: “The clouds were gathering fast. Two days after the Security Council’s first meeting (17 January 1946), the presence of Soviet troops in Iran was brought before the Council, quickly followed by a Soviet countermove complaining of British troops in Greece and Indonesia…The pattern of the future was already in place” (1). Even with such unpropitious beginnings the UN has played, and continues to play, a major role in some of the most threatening crises and conflicts that have taken place in the last 48 years. How has this been done and what have been the roles of the Secretary-General, the International Secretariat, and the General Assembly?. But before we consider these specific points, it is important that we analyse the status of the UN vis-à-vis its Member States. The UN is not a supranational organisation; Article 2(1)specifically refers to the “sovereign equality of all its Members” and Article 2(7) prevents the UN from intervening “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”.

The Charter emphasizes the peaceful settlement of disputes and directs the parties to any such dispute to “seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice” (Art.33.1), but nevertheless, the UN could always use the threat of enforcement measures under Chapter VII that deals with actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Faced with the unquestioned sovereignty of states, a lack of consensus in the Security Council, no standing army of its own (not that it would had made any difference without a consensus in the Security Council), and the non-binding resolutions of the General Assembly, the UN, in cases of armed conflict, could only operate on the basis of third-party diplomacy and reliance on mediation and conciliation.

The UN took a pragmatic view of its predicament and attempted to overcome these obstacles and look for ways to stop hostilities and contain conflicts. The result was the establishment of operations that were to become known as peace-keeping operations and which were not specifically provided for in the Charter. They can be categorized as observer missions, generally composed of unarmed personnel and peace-keeping forces with lightly armed infantry units, although this division has not always held and each operation is organized on the basis of the specific requirements of the situation to be addressed.

The characteristics of peace-keeping operations are that: (i) they are set up only with the consent of the parties to the conflict; (ii) the parties to the conflict are consulted as to what countries are to contribute troops to the operation; and (iii) the operation does not interfere in the internal affairs of the host country. An important aspect of the operations is that its military personnel is only sanctioned to use firearms in self-defence. Since these operations have to be established by the Security Council, or on occasion the General Assembly, it requires the consensus of the former and thus constituted a convenient half-way solution to the impasse created by the confrontation between the Permanent Members. It is a “holding” solution for situations where the interests of the Permanent Members does not allow the implementation of the measures outlined in the Charter. In many cases it has not solved the underlying dispute between the parties, but has at least managed to contain conflict without any of the parties “loosing face” and has contributed to the legitimisation of the role of the UN. The first of such operations was an observer mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was established in 1948 during the Arab-Israeli war, to supervise the truce called by the Security Council.

In the same year a similar operation, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established to supervise the cease-fire between India and Pakistan after their confrontation over Kashmir. The Korean War of 1950-3 brought about a further development for the UN, this time related to the question of which organ had primary and exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As has been mentioned above, the Korean War, provided the first instance for UN armed intervention, although strictly speaking it was not a UN action, since it was initiated unilaterally by the USA (the aggression by North Korea on 25 June 1950 was met by a response from the USA on 26 June).

Nevertheless, a Security Council meeting on 27 June from which the Soviet Union was absent, legitimized the action by the USA and called on members to assist South Korea. The return of the Soviet Union to the Council in August and its use of the veto prevented the adoption of a Resolution tabled by the USA to authorize UN forces to cross the 38th parallel and reunify Korea. In order to circumvent the deadlock in the Security Council, the USA tabled a Resolution in the General Assembly, the Uniting for Peace Resolution. This Resolution that was adopted by an Assembly which at the time had a Western majority, allowed the same to, as it were, take over the role of the Security Council whenever a veto prevented the latter from acting. It required the usual two-thirds majority to label a member as an aggressor and to recommend coercive action. This procedure was used for the first time on 1 February 1951 when the Assembly labelled China as an aggressor after its intervention in the Korean War. The Suez crisis of 1956, besides once again catapulting the Assembly into the fore under the United for Peace Resolution, also provided the stage for the deployment of the first peace-keeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).

The conflict stemmed, amongst other reasons, from the nationalisation by Egypt of the Suez Canal following the withdrawal of Western financing for the Aswan Dam. Israel invaded Egypt in October 1956 with the prior acquiescence of both Britain and France, who gave an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to withdraw ten miles from the Canal, followed by an attack on Egypt when it refused to accept same. Since the Security Council had been deadlocked by the vetoes of Britain and France, the matter was taken to the General Assembly and on 4 November it authorized the then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to negotiate a cease-fire, to secure the withdrawal of all forces to the Armistice Demarcation Lines already in place, and at the same time requested he investigate the viability of setting-up a United Nations Force. By 6 November, Hammarskjold, who had been discussing the formation of such a force with the Canadian Lester Pearson before the request from the Assembly, had finalised his report, which in the words of Urquhart (2) “was a conceptual masterpiece in a completely new field, the blueprint for a non-violent, international military operation.”

It was then that the distinctive “Blue Helmets” of the UN forces were introduced. The first UNEF contingents landed in Egypt on 15 November, and were made-up of troops from ten countries that by the end of 1957 numbered 6000. There were no troops from the Permanent Members of the Security Council as agreed in the Force Agreement concluded with Egypt. Although the underlying conflict in the Middle-East has not yet been resolved, through UNEF, under the authority of the General Assembly and the direction and supervision of the Secretary-General, the UN was successful in unblocking the inactivity of the Security Council, negotiating a cease-fire, pre-empting a possible intervention of the superpowers, providing a face-saving exit for Britain and France, and with its neutral presence provide a buffer zone and a cooling-off period for the parties to the conflict. Since the UN’s inception there have been a total of 26 peacekeeping operations. UNEF also provided an enhanced role for the office of the Secretary-General that went beyond purely administrative matters, and it is to this that I now turn.

The Charter describes the Secretary-General as “the chief administrative officer of the Organization” (Art.97), but under Article 99 he may “bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. It thus appeared that the Secretary-General had two roles to play, one administrative and another “political”. Without wishing to enter into a Weberian discussion of bureaucracies, there appeared two important consequences deriving from this duality, especially in the context of the Cold War. Firstly, there would be a conflict of interests between the Secretariat and those of the Member States, especially those of the Permanent Members, since the objective of the former must be the attainment of the goals of the Charter without regard to those interests. And, secondly, as a direct consequence of this conflict of interests, differing demands and expectations on the dual role of the Secretary-General. I turn again to Urquhart (3): “In 1945 it was the general view that the functions of the Secretary-General and his staff would be primarily administrative and that political involvement would be the exception rather than the rule.

The Russians in particular feared an independent or pro-Western Secretary-General who might stack the cards against them and were suspicious of any whiff of supranational authority or erosion of the sovereign rights of states”. This contention was expressed in a recent newspaper interview (4) by the present Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “I am a civil servant, an international civil servant, not a politician on a par with world leaders…If you talk back, you are not playing by the rules”. “I have to be philosophical about the attacks. They can’t criticise a building or an amorphous bureaucracy. I personify the UN and inevitably become the target.” But also, “I have to be pragmatic and consider the UN’s interest at large. I cannot afford a confrontation with so important a member of the United Nations as the United States.” So, how does the Secretary-General reconcile all the demands made of his office? The answer is, with difficulty and preferably with great tact, in order to be able to develop the objectives of the organization whilst not antagonizing the major powers. The first Secretary General, Trygue Lie (1946-1953), was at odds both with the USA and the Soviet Union at various points during his tenure, and Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961), came to be considered as an altogether too independent and powerful Secretary-General. But despite this, there appears to have developed a symbiotic relationship between the major powers and the office of the Secretary-General.

He can be a scapegoat for the inactivity of the Security Council and at the same time and in some instances he can draw on their backing when taking the initiative in the role of mediator between parties to a conflict. It is this function, that of mediator, which is perhaps the most important. Despite all the criticisms that have, over the years, been aired against the UN, the office of the Secretary-General, in my opinion, retains an image of neutrality and the moral authority of being the representative of the World Organization. His “good offices” are called upon to mediate not only in fairly visible situations, but also in those behind-the-scene situations where the conflicting parties cannot be seen to be talking directly to each other for whatever reasons, what Hammarskjöld called “quiet diplomacy”. The role of U Thant (1961-1971) during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, of Hammarskjöld during the Suez crisis of 1956, of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1982-1992) during the war between Iran and Iraq, the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, and the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia in 1990 are cases in point.

Up to now, I have examined the UN as an instrument of diplomatic activity. But, what of its role as a forum for such activity? The importance of the Organization in this context can be discerned simply by pointing to the fact that all Member States have permanent missions at New York Headquarters and that some of them are headed by quite senior diplomats, reflecting the importance that Member States attach to the Organization. There are obviously various reasons for this, as Appathurai points out: “…One is the sheer growth in the number of states on the world scene. The presence of their representatives in one place makes it easier [and less expensive than to maintain embassies in a large number of states] for them to follow developments, trends and opinions at the global level as they are reflected in the Organization…Some governments have desired high visibility for their newly acquired political independence.

On the other hand, some governments have wished to have low visibility for their unilateral actions which they would like to process through, and in the name of, the Organization.” (5). The presence as observers of non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), intergovernmental organisations (IGO’s) and some National Liberation Movements (NLM’s) like the PLO and for a time SWAPO, adds weight to the perceived importance of the Organization. The importance of these missions at the UN, lies in the opportunity they provide for bilateral diplomacy. Berridge (6), for example, has mixed views about the role of permanent missions in bilateral diplomacy, especially as regard to those of the great and middle powers and points that the most important bilateral negotiations do not take place in New York. Nevertheless, he also states that: “If it seems likely that the United Nations is of some value for communication and information-gathering even to the great powers and the middle powers, it is sometimes said to be of special value to the dialogue between such powers when their relations descend into pronounced hostility, and also to be of special value to the diplomacy of small states in all circumstances.” Following from this, he refers to states which are so hostile to each other that they have never established diplomatic relations, or who have severed them, “If the permanent missions of such states at the UN can assist in the establishment of serious diplomatic contact, therefore, they are clearly of considerable importance (7).”

An importance that is reinforced if one considers the contacts between Henry Kissinger and the Chinese mission between 1971 and 1973, and the meeting between Shamir and Gromyko in 1981, the first reported diplomatic contact between Israel and the Soviet Union since 1976. However, the reporting of a “private” meeting between the US Ambassador, Andrew Young, and the Head of the PLO’s Observer mission, led to the resignation of the former. Before ending this section, I should comment on a development that took place in the Security Council in the late 1960’s, and which could be termed as the introduction of “secret multilateral diplomacy”, namely the introduction of informal consultations, in closed sessions, between all the Members of the Council, when dealing with substantive matters relating to international peace and security.

It has been suggested (8) that these meetings, by avoiding the public glare and therefore the opportunity for propaganda posturing, allows the Members of the Council, especially the Permanent Members, to engage in serious consultation, negotiation and compromise, especially on matters of common concern such as the Middle East crisis of 1967, when negotiations of this nature produced the guidelines for a peace settlement. Notwithstanding the above, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in his first annual report in 1982, proposed measures to make the Council more efficient, stressing the need for pre-emptive diplomatic interventions and warning that informal consultations should not be an excuse for inaction.

The appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985, signalled the beginning of the end of the Cold War. A summit meeting in Geneva in November of that year between Reagan and Gorbachev, was followed by one in Reykjavik in October 1986, and another in Washington in December 1987, where a treaty was signed banning all intermediate range nuclear missiles worldwide.

In February 1988, the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan and in November of that year the Angolan-Namibian Peace Accords were signed under the auspices of the US and the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s new political thinking, expressed by “glasnot” and “perestroika”, paved the way for momentous changes not only in the Soviet Union, but throughout Eastern Europe during 1989-1990 with the electoral victory of an anti-communist government in Poland in August 1989, the demolition of the Berlin Wall four months later, and the virtual disintegration of the Communist block in the East.

But how did all this affect the United Nations? Encouraging signs for a revival of the UN appeared with the publication of an article by Gorbachev in the Soviet press on 17 September 1985, calling for a central role of the UN in a “comprehensive system of international security.” The first test for this “central role” presented itself on 2 August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and in the event was not as much a “central role” but rather a legitimizing one for the unilateral action of the US, similar to its role during the Korean War forty years before. The Security Council reacted rapidly to Iraq’s invasion, determined that there had been a breach of the peace under Article 39. and demanded an immediate withdrawal. All the Members, except Yemen that did not participate in the meeting, voted in favour of the Resolution.

The Council, further, called upon the parties to resume negotiations in respect of the apparent reason for the start of the conflict, namely, an earlier border settlement which had left certain oil resources within the borders of Kuwait. When Iraq disregarded the Resolution, the Council imposed sanctions under Chapter VII, which were strengthened by further Resolutions over the following months. In the meantime, the US had convinced Saudi Arabia to allow the stationing of troops in its soil in order to safeguard it from a potential Iraqi attack. All efforts, including a visit to Iraq by the Secretary-General failed to secure the formers withdrawal and on 29 November 1990, the Security Council set a deadline of 15 January 1991. If Iraq did not withdraw by then, the UN would take enforcement action under Article 43. On this Resolution (No.678) China abstained and Yemen and Cuba voted against. On 17 January, the US contingent in Saudi Arabia, joined by forces from another 33 states, began their military offensive against Iraq, that ended on 6 April, when the latter accepted a cease-fire.

Although the concerted action over Kuwait endorsed the view of a “new world order”, evidenced by the co-operation between the US and the Soviet Union, it just appeared to confirm the predominant position of the US as the only state capable of policing the world, instead of providing the opportunity for the UN to play a central role in the “comprehensive system of international security”. The role of the UN in the former Yugoslavia, in Somalia and in Haiti, adds weight to this argument, and also brings to light “new” issues of international security. On 1 July 1992, the present Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, circulated a report to all Member-states, An Agenda for Peace, where he writes: “So at this moment of renewed opportunity, the efforts of the Organization to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterized the past [9].” He further emphasizes the use of diplomacy, namely, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building, and “in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression…(10).”

In the above examination of the diplomatic roles of the United Nations, I have tried to concentrate on how these operate as regards to the primary objective of the Organization, the maintenance of international peace and security. I realise that not all UN interventions have been illustrated, and that I have not commented on the question of disarmament -basically because most agreements have been reached outside of the UN, nor on the role of the International Court of Justice, since a proper examination of this body would be better undertaken in a different paper. In conclusion, I suggest that, during the period of the Cold War, the UN, faced with the constraints that have been mentioned above, and armed only with moral authority and an organisational sense of purpose, was restricted to the use of the diplomatic tools of mediation and conciliation, that found a visible expression in the institutionalisation of peace-keeping operations.

The Organization has also been instrumental in legitimising diplomacy and has provided a convenient forum for the conduct of diplomacy, either multilateral or bilateral, at its New York Headquarters. In the post Cold War period, the Organization appears disorientated. Despite calls for a revival of the UN, this has not yet happened. But, I would argue that this is as a result of the uncertainty of the present political climate. The end of the Cold War and the end of the bipolar model for the conduct of international relations, has given way to a process of emancipation of secondary state actors and the proliferation, not only of regional conflicts, but of local conflicts fuelled by nationalisms and their own particular “logic”. It is a situation where traditional diplomacy does not appear to work. The indecision of the US, and the failure of the European Union to achieve a common foreign policy and to position itself as a commanding force in the new geopolitical map, whilst at the same time sidelining the potential of the UN, have contributed to the present situation. Nevertheless, the calls for a review of the composition of the Security Council, and the creation of a UN force, indicate that there is, at least, a recognition of the role the Organization can play in future new security arrangements.

The United Nations is not, nor has it been, a perfect organization. It has had some successes, but has also had its failings, and has been absent from some of the major conflicts (Vietnam, Cambodia after the North Vietnamese invasion, etc.), but, what kind of world would we live in today had it not been there?.”

Coordination in the United Nations System

Resources

Notes

[1]Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, p.99, (London, 1987).

[2]Ibid., p.133.

[3]Ibid., p.96.

[4]The Guardian 16.10.93

[5]E.R.Appathurai, “Permanent Missions in New York”, in Diplomacy at the U.N, G.R.Berridge and A.Jennings, eds, (London, 1985).

[6]G.R.Berridge, op.cit, pp.176-177.

[7]Ibid., p.181.

[8]G.R.Berridge, Return to the U.N., (London, 1991).

[9]Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p.7, (United Nations, 1992).

[10]Ibid., p.8.

Further Reading

  • A concise encyclopedia of the United Nations (including United Nations System , H Volger, KA Annan -2010)
  • The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (TG Weiss – 2007)
  • International Law: A Dictionary (including United Nations System , Boczek, Boleslaw Adam -2005)
  • Baehr, P.R and Gordenker, L. The United Nations in the 1990s, (Macmillan, 1992).
  • Berridge, G.R. and Jennings, A. eds, Diplomacy at the U.N, (London, 1985).
  • Berridge, G.R. Return to the U.N, (London, 1991).
  • Berridge, G.R. International Politics. States, Power and Conflict since 1945, 2nd edn. (Harvester Weatsheaf, 1992).
  • Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace, (United Nations, 1992).
  • Calvocoressi, P. World Politics since 1945, 6th edn. (Longman, 1991).
  • Olson, W.C and Lee, J.R. eds, Theory and Practice of International Relations, 9th edn, (Prentice-Hall, 1994).
  • Taylor, P. and Groom, A.J.R. eds, International Institutions at Work, (London, 1988).

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