“Lex iniusta non est lex”? Do seriously unjust laws bind? Legally?

Main source: Finnis, John, “Natural Law Theories”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

“Lex iniusta non est lex” ? Do seriously unjust laws bind? Legally?

In such a case, does the law as settled by social-fact sources, in losing its directiveness for judges and citizens, lose also its legal validity? The answer depends upon the discursive context in which the question arises. If a course of reflection or discourse makes it appropriate to acknowledge the rule’s “settled” or “posited” character as cognizable by reference to social-fact sources, one can say that it is legally valid though too unjust to be obeyed or applied. Or if the discursive context makes it appropriate instead to point up its lack of directiveness for judges and subjects alike, one can say that the rule, despite its links to social-fact sources, is not only not morally directive but is also legally invalid. Each way of speaking tells an important part of the truth, or rather, tells the truth with an emphasis which differs from the other’s.

The meaning of “an unjust law is not a law” is essentially identical to Hart’s “This is law but too iniquitous to be applied or obeyed” (or availed of as a defense). The excitement and hostility aroused amongst modern legal theorists (notably Hart) by the former way of speaking is unwarranted. No one has difficulty in understanding locutions such as “an invalid argument is no argument,” “a disloyal friend is not a friend,” “a quack medicine is not medicine,” and so forth. “Lex iniusta non est lex” has the same logic; it acknowledges, in its opening words, that what is in question is in certain important respects-perhaps normally and presumptively decisive respects-a law, but then in its withdrawal or denial of that predicate it affirms that, since justice is the very point of having and respecting law at all, this particular law’s deficiency in justice deprives it of the decisive significance which all law purports to have. It is thus law only in a sense that should be judged-especially when law is regarded, as by Hart himself, as a kind of reason or purported reason for action-to be a distorted and secondary, non-central sense.

Note: Classical political theory, as expounded by Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, makes regular use of this distinction between central and perverted or otherwise marginal instances of an analogical concept or term, and so Aquinas never says simply “unjust law is not law” but rather “unjust law is not straightforwardly or unqualifiedly [simpliciter] law” or “is a perversion of law” , and similar statements. Still, he does elsewhere say that “an unjust judgment [of a court] is not a judgment” and it seems clear that he might similarly have used the simplified or slogan-form locution, about law, as short-hand.

All this seems to have been overlooked by Hart in his polemic (Hart 1961, 204-7; 1994, 208-12) against “lex iniusta non est lex.” Hart’s argument that use of the slogan must tend to discourage or confuse the moral critique of law seems historically and logically indefensible. The slogan is unintelligible save as an expression of and incitement to engaging in such critiques; it can scarcely be rejected without first misquoting it, as Hart and those who employ his argument almost invariably do, averting their gaze from the slogan’s first predicate and implied assertion: that the unjust rule in question is a rule of law.

Some theories have adopted certain main tenets of natural law theory, and professed to be natural law theories, but have asserted that even the most unjust laws create an obligation to obey which is both legal and moral. Kant’s (see Alexy 2002, 117-121) is such a theory: a legal system can consist entirely of positive law but must be “preceded by a natural law that establishe[s] the legislator’s authority…to bind others simply by his arbitrary action.” But this purported natural-law basic norm looks not to the justice of the content of the posited legal rules, but exclusively to the need for legal certainty and civic peace, which Kant takes to exclude any right to resist unjust laws and any denial that they are fully legal. Alexy has pointed out the confusions and inconsistencies in Kant’s attempts to evade the classic position that laws whose injustice is sufficiently grave can and should be denied to have the legal character predicable of laws that citizens and courts, precisely as courts, are morally and juridically entitled to treat as-or as if they are-not law. In this as in many other respects, seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophical developments (like their twentieth and twenty-first century counterparts) were not so much progress as regress.
5. Can general theories of law be value-free? moral-value-free?

Descriptions of the valuations made by particular persons or societies can of course be value-free. Doubtless the historian, detective or other observer thinks there is some value in making the investigation and resultant description, but that valuation in no way need enter into the description. Still less need the description either approve or disapprove of the valuations which it reports. But the situation is different if one’s aspiration is to offer a general account of human practices or institutions, such as law, friendship, constitutions, and so forth. Here one confronts the necessity of selecting and prioritizing not merely the investigation itself but rather some one set of concepts (and corresponding terms) from among (or over and above) the range of terms and concepts already employed in the self-understanding of the individuals and groups under (or available for) study.

Where the subject-matter of the projected descriptive general account is some practice or institution devised by (more or less adequate exercises of) reason, and addressed to the rational deliberations of individuals and groups, there will normally be no good reason not to prioritise those forms of the practice or institution which are more rational, more reasonable, more responsive to reasons, than other forms of the “same” or analogous practices and institutions. The standard for assessing reasonableness for this theoretical purpose is, in the last analysis, the set of criteria of reasonableness that the descriptive theorist would use in dealing with similar practical issues in his or her own life.

This necessity of value-laden selection of concepts and terms for use in a general theory of social realities such as law is evidenced in the work of Max Weber, prophet of “value-free” social science. His account, for example, of forms of domination (Herrlichkeit) identifies three pure, central, characteristic types (ideal Typen): charismatic, traditional, and rational (bureaucratic, legal). But the accounts of the first two types are almost entirely in terms of how they differ from the rational type, whose rationality is self-evident to Weber and his readers on the basis of their own knowledge of human goods (basic aspects of human wellbeing) and related practical truths. See Finnis 1985, 170-72. Natural law theory, as one sees it practiced already in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics, makes these valuations by the theorist overt and explicit (not hidden and embarrassed), and subjects them to rational scrutiny and debate.

Raz, Dickson, and others accept that some such valuation is necessary, but deny that it is moral: Dickson 2001. But once one begins to deal in reasons, can anything other than good reasons count? If moral reason is nothing more than practical reason at full stretch, fully critical and adequate as reason, moral reasons will have a decisive place in concept-formation in social science including descriptive general theory of law. And this will not have the effect feared by Hart, viz. of leaving the study of wicked laws or institutions to some other discipline: Hart 1961, 205; 1994, 209. On the contrary, they are a subject of lively attention in such a theory, precisely because of their opposition to legal systems of a (substantively and procedurally) morally good kind. Aristotle’s Politics, though not methodologically flawless overall, is a primary witness to this sort of clear-eyed acknowledgment and depiction of unreasonable social forms, practices and institutions within a descriptive theory oriented by the moral judgments of the theorist.

Still, descriptive social theory is only a subordinate aspect of natural law theories of law. Their primary focus is typically on identifying the conditions under which law is justified, both in the sense in which law can and should be preferable to anarchy or tyranny or even benevolent “rule of men,” and in the sense in which this or that legal principle, institution or rule can be judged to be preferable to alternative reasons or purported reasons for action. As Green 2003 says:

Evaluative argument is, of course, central to the philosophy of law more generally. No legal philosopher can be only a legal positivist. A complete theory of law requires also an account of what kinds of things could possibly count as merits of law (must law be efficient or elegant as well as just?); of what role law should play in adjudication (should valid law always be applied?); of what claim law has on our obedience (is there a duty to obey?); and also of the pivotal questions of what laws we should have and whether we should have law at all. Legal positivism does not aspire to answer these questions, though its claim that the existence and content of law depends only on social facts does give them shape.

Might it not be better to say: no legal philosopher need, or should, be a legal positivist? For law’s dependence upon social facts is fully acknowledged, and also accounted for, in natural law theories of law. And this is not a “concession” by natural law theorists, for their main positions were clearly articulated by Aquinas, many centuries before legal positivism emerged with its challenge to (what it took to be) natural law theory. Positivist critiques of natural law theory, when they do not rest upon scepticism about the possibility of moral judgment, a scepticism implicitly disavowed in the above passage, rest on misunderstanding of passages from the works of natural law theorists. On such misunderstandings, see Finnis 1980, 23-55; Soper 1992.

Again: How could such fundamental questions as “Should we have law at all?” be “given shape” by the positivist thesis that law’s existence and content depends only on social facts? Does not Green’s claim invert the reasonable order of inquiry and reflection? Basic human needs and circumstances powerfully suggest to people in virtually all times and places that they should make and uphold some norms of the kind we call law, norms which will depend directly and for the most part on social facts such as custom, authoritative rule-making, and adjudication. Legal philosophy retraces and clarifies, critically, that elemental practical reasoning, somewhat as Hart did in Hart 1961, where he constructs a descriptive-explanatory account of law (i.e., refines his and our concept or understanding of law) by explaining how rules differ from habits, how powers have different functions and social value from obligations and so are not aptly reducible to obligations, and how “primary” rules for outlawing gross violence, theft and fraud need, by reason of their lack of certainty in content and application and their immobility, to be supplemented by “secondary” rules of recognition, adjudication and change, the remedial supplementation that shifts a society into the domain and rule of law and legal system. May not those elements in Hart’s book be taken as an instance of natural law legal theory done in a primarily descriptive (rather than primarily justificatory) mode, and with incomplete scrutiny of the resources of practical reason, resources being drawn upon by the whole explanatory general description of law? Does not Hart’s description, despite its incompleteness, work as well as it does precisely because it disinters some elementary justifications conceived and put to use by the people whose activities provide the material for the descriptions? Does he not share the deep methodology of Aristotle and the natural law tradition (Finnis 2003b) in making his identification of what law is (of “the concept of law” ) depend upon his account of why law is a reasonable response to common human needs?

None of this is to say that a sound legal theory of the kind explained in this entry need be called “natural law theory.” Like all philosophy, it should be done by considering propositions, not labels.
6. Other elements of natural law theory

Intended to be part of a comprehensive theory of practical reasons that are fit to direct us to the common good of each of our communities and its members, any natural law theory of law brings to bear on law all the theses proposed and defended in natural law theory’s moral and political parts and in a sound understanding of the human makeup and of the lasting characteristics of our circumstances. So, besides the questions listed by Green as quoted in section 5 above, issues such as the following three (see others in Finnis 2002) are treated by natural law theory as integral to legal science, theory or philosophy.
6.1 Intention in action and utterance

Rules of law are propositions of practical reason, apt for being taken as directive in the deliberations of law’s individual subjects towards judgment, choice (decision), and action (including chosen forbearance). So a sound theory of law will have an integrated and critical understanding of the structure of chosen action, particularly of the relationships between the intending of ends, the adoption of means, the dual character of almost all ends as also means, and of almost all means as also ends, and the necessity and normal possibility of freely choosing between options which embody or promise benefits and disadvantages incommensurable (incompletely commensurable) (Finnis 1997) with the benefits and disadvantages of the alternative options. Such an understanding will clarify the often somewhat crude accounts given in criminal law dogmatics (case law and textbooks) of actus reus andmens rea, accounts which often fail to distinguish been action as a physically or conventionally demarcated chunk of behavior and action as the carrying out of the choice of an option, that is of a proposal shaped and thus given a privileged description in the deliberations of the acting subject. The difference between intended or chosen means (or ends) and foreseeable or even fully foreseen effects (“side-effects” ), like the consequent difference between the moral and, presumptively, legal standards applicable respectively to intended and not-intended effects, is psychologically and morally real. But it is often distorted by a simplistic legal dogmatics too averse to the (very real) risk that defendants will prevaricate about what they had in mind. What counts, and can often be inferred despite prevarication, is the act-description under which the behavior chosen was attractive to the defendant in his or her actual deliberations (as distinct from rationalizing act-descriptions adopted to present that motivation in a better light).

The reality of intention in the distinct but related field of communication of meaning will also be explored and defended by a natural law theory of law. This does not involve an unqualified and simple originalism in constitutional interpretation, or a simple denial of the characteristic insistence of legal dogmatics that the intention of the parties to agreements or declarations is to be ascertained “objectively (not subjectively),” that is, by reference to what a reasonable observer would have taken the statement in issue to mean. For: such an observer (and thus the “objective” viewpoint) will presumptively have given primacy in this interpretation to what (as far as the observer can discern in the circumstances of the statement’s making [= utterance]) the statement’s author actually (“subjectively” ) meant (= intended to express/state).
6.2 Responsibility and punishment

Criminal responsibility (guilt) is primarily for acts and consequences intended by the offender. Liability for negligence is relatively exceptional in modern criminal law, though the predominant form of liability in modern law of compensation (“civil law” ). (The duties and standards of care used to attribute tortious/delictual/civil liability are in part straightforwardly moral and in part conventional-in neither part are they securely source-based in the sense of sources given unconditional primacy in legal positivism.)

The legal enunciation of rules of criminal law (mostly “prohibitions” ) has as its primary goal the elimination or at least discouraging of the specified kinds of action (or omission). In this phase of the legal institution of criminal law and punishment, the goal can be called deterrence. The fact that this goal works partly by enforcement and application of the threatened sanction in the event of violation and conviction does not, however, entail that deterrence is the formative or even the primary end of punishment. Indeed, the institution of punishment has its primary sense and justification, not in deterrence, but in the restoration of that presumptively fair balance of burdens and advantages which offenders upset, precisely in choosing to prefer their own purposes and advantage to restraining their action so as to avoid violating the law. In preferring that self-preferential option, offenders help themselves to an advantage over all who do restrain themselves so as to respect the law. The offenders thereby upset the presumptively fair balance of advantages and burdens between themselves and the law-abiding. The primary purpose of punishment thus can reasonably be to restore that disturbed balance by depriving convicted offenders of their unfairly gained advantage-excess freedom of action-by imposing upon them measures, punishments, whose precise purpose is to restrict their freedom of action, whether by fines or imprisonment, proportionately to the degree to which they indulged their self-preference. Punishment in that way seeks to ensure that, over the span of time running from before the offence to the undergoing of the penalty, no one gains an advantage over fellow citizens by offending.

Thus, while compensation in civil law (tort, delict, etc.) rectifies the disturbed balance of advantages and burdens as between tortfeasors and their victims, punishment in criminal (penal) law rectifies the relationship between offenders and all the law-abiding members of the community. This retributive justification (general justifying aim) of punishment explains why mental competence and mens rea are standard legal pre-conditions of criminal guilt and liability to punishment. It is compatible with concurrent goals of deterrence, protection and reform, as bonus side-effects of the retributive sentence, and as organizing aims of specific measures and features e.g., of a prison regimen. It both presupposes and reinforces the reality that the political community in question stands to offenders and law-abiding alike as our community.
6.3 Each legal system is of and for a particular political community

Examination of (I) how one legal system becomes independent of another by lawful processes and (II) how parts of a legal system (e.g., its constitution, or its rules for identifying office-holders) are replaced by the unlawful processes of coup d’état or revolution demonstrates (see Raz 1979, 100-109) that the identity of a subsisting legal system as one and the same system of legal norms cannot be explained (or even coherently described) by an account which refers only to the norms and their inter-relationships as validating norms and validated norms. The non-momentary identity of a legal system is a function of the subsisting identity of the community whose legal system it is. Legal theory is sub-alternated to the historical understanding (including self-understanding) of a community and its members as being this community-paradigmatically, this nation-state-rather than some accidental sequence or agglomeration of persons and events, and this understanding must be in some substantial measure non-dependent upon the legal norms that the community may succeed in constituting for itself and its members. Doubtless the shared purpose of living together under a rule of law, and the shared memory of a shared acknowledgment or recognition of such laws as our laws, are normally important components of such a shared understanding of political-communal and legal identity. But other shared purposes, memories and dispositions to act must be also be substantially present, if the phenomena of lawful independence and revolutionary constitutional change are to be as they are.

The not uncritical realism of natural law theory, evidenced in its approach to the realities of intention as distinct from foresight and inattention, and of self-preferential choice and the differing relationships between (I) offender and law-abiding and (II) tortfeasor and victim, similarly enables it to undertake a critical reflection, within legal theory broadly understood, on the kinds of community capable of sustaining and being ordered in part by a legal system.
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